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  This Article critiques the practice of limiting federal agency 
authority in the name of federalism. Existing limits presently bind 
agencies even more tightly than Congress. For instance, although 
Congress can regulate to the limits of its commerce power with a 
sufficiently clear statement of its intent to do so, absent clear 
congressional authorization an agency cannot, no matter how clear 
the language of the agency’s regulation. Similarly, although Congress 
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can preempt state law, albeit only when its intent to do so is clear, 
some commentators have read a line of Supreme Court decisions to 
hold that agencies cannot, except upon Congress’s clear 
authorization. 
  A number of leading commentators have hailed this combination 
of rules on the ground that congressional control over questions of 
federalism should be preferred to agency decisionmaking. Congress, 
they claim, is more deliberative, more transparent to the public, and 
more accountable than the executive. Additionally, given the relative 
ease of enacting regulations rather than statutes, those who favor 
Congress fear that lower barriers to federal expansion in the executive 
would lead to runaway federal power. 
  We argue that both these sets of claims are, at best, only 
occasionally accurate. In many instances agencies are—or with wise 
doctrines of judicial review can be made to be—more democratic and 
deliberative than Congress. Although regulating almost always is 
easier than legislating, in many instances the need for additional speed 
bumps under the wheels of the executive is negligible or downright 
counterproductive. Thus, we argue for a more nuanced set of rules 
that would permit agencies in many instances to preempt or regulate 
without the need for express congressional approval. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There are few policy areas in the United States in which 
decisions are made wholly either at the federal or state and local 
level. States have taken up issues such as immigration reform and the 
global climate once thought to be exclusively in the realm of the 
federal government.1 Similarly, federal regulators have aired views, 
sometimes said to be authoritative, on subjects once traditionally in 
the realm of states, such as tort liability for defective products.2 Thus, 
 
 1. See, e.g., Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration 
Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 567 (2007) (revealing how the “federal-state-local dynamic 
operates as an integrated system to manage contemporary immigration”); Editorial, The 
Immigration Wilderness, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2007, at A36; Raymond Hernandez, Republicans 
in Congress Propose Bills on Licenses, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2007, at B5; Andrew C. Revkin & 
Jennifer S. Lee, White House Attacked for Letting States Lead on Climate, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 
2003, at A32. 
 2. See, e.g., Michael S. Greve & Jonathan Klick, Preemption in the Rehnquist Court: A 
Preliminary Empirical Assessment, 14 SUPREME CT. ECON. REV. 43, 49–58 (2006) (surveying 
the landscape of the Rehnquist Court’s preemption decisions); David A. Kessler & David C. 
Vladeck, A Critical Examination of the FDA’s Efforts to Preempt Failure-to-Warn Claims, 96 
GEO. L.J. 461, 462–67, 473–74 (2007) (discussing significant shift in FDA policy to preemption 
of state law failure-to-warn claims); Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal 
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the regulatory enterprise confronts the constant question of how best 
to divide up authority among different levels of government. 
That problem, of course, raises a question of its own: who best to 
decide how best to divide? With some modest exceptions, most courts 
and commentators have looked to Congress.3 Federal courts have 
done little to limit federal power directly. Instead, they have insisted 
on rules that give primacy to Congress, but also impose some burden 
on Congress to make good decisions. We argue in this Article that 
this allocation is a mistake, and that instead federal agencies should 
often be the preferred institutions in which to vest the authority to 
allocate power between states and the federal government. 
To be more precise, we take issue with the important claim, 
advanced by Professors Thomas Merrill, Cass Sunstein, and others, 
that agency power to displace state lawmaking should be more 
limited than Congress’s power to do so.4 Merrill and Sunstein both 
assert that these additional limits are necessary for two basic reasons. 
First, they aver that the work of agencies is less deliberative, 
democratic, and transparent than legislation.5 Second, because agency 
rulemaking is easier than legislating, executive action, absent judicial 
oversight, would upset the balance of federalism.6 
 
Agencies and the Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 227, 227–41 (2007) 
(highlighting the trend of deferring to agency preemption determinations). 
 3. See infra text accompanying notes 32–64. 
 4. See, e.g., Nina A. Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency Preemption, 102 NW. U. 
L. REV. 695, 699 (2008) (supporting a presumption against agency preemption and arguing that 
it seems unlikely that Congress intended such preemption); Thomas W. Merrill, Rescuing 
Federalism After Raich: The Case for Clear Statement Rules, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 823, 826, 
833–34 (2005) [hereinafter Merrill, Rescuing Federalism After Raich] (arguing that “[i]n order to 
rescue federalism after Raich, the Court should return to the clear statement strategy for 
determining the scope of congressional power,” which protects federalism values and separation 
of powers values); Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to 
Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2141–51, 2170 (2004) (arguing that only 
Congress can exercise “legislative” power); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After 
Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2110, 2120 (1990) [hereinafter Sunstein, Law and 
Administration After Chevron] (arguing that substantive norms against constitutionally doubtful 
legislation should trump ordinary deference to agencies); Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation 
Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 317–18 (2000) [hereinafter Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons] 
(arguing that Congress should make highly sensitive decisions); Ernest A. Young, Executive 
Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 869, 871 (2008) (“[W]e may wish to restrict the agencies’ role in 
preemption to interpreting what Congress has done.”). 
 5. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, supra note 4, at 2111–15. 
 6. Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW. U. L. REV 727, 755–
56, 759 (2008); Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, supra note 4, at 2111–13; 
Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, supra note 4, at 320–21. 
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These concerns arise in two significant controversies in 
administrative law. The first is preemption. Congress can preempt 
state law by statute so long as the statute is within the bounds of 
Congress’s powers under the Constitution and Congress clearly 
indicates that the statute has preemptive effect.7 According to 
Professor Merrill, however, agency regulations cannot preempt state 
law, no matter how clearly the regulation is written, because any 
interference with state law should require action by Congress itself. 
Merrill has gone so far as to argue in an amicus brief to the Supreme 
Court that courts should not grant deference8 to any agency 
interpretation of a statute that potentially could result in the 
preemption of state law, including any law a state may decide to 
adopt in the future.9 
The second controversy in modern administrative law addressed 
by Professors Merrill and Sunstein is nondelegation.10 For example, in 
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army 
Corps of Engineers (SWANCC),11 the Court struck down 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations applying the 
Clean Water Act to intrastate bodies of water hydrologically 
connected to navigable waters.12 Because the Court found that 
Congress had not clearly authorized the EPA to exercise jurisdiction 
so broadly, and because regulating waters that are remote from 
(although hydrologically connected to) navigable waters arguably 
expanded federal power at the expense of the states, the Court struck 
down the EPA regulation as beyond its delegated statutory 
authority.13 Merrill and Sunstein applaud this approach, apparently on 
 
 7. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 484 (1996); La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 
U.S. 355, 368 (1986). 
 8. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 9. Brief for the Center for State Enforcement of Antitrust and Consumer Protection 
Laws, Inc. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 6–8, 16–19, Watters v. Wachovia Bank, 
N.A. 127 S. Ct. 1559 (2006) (No. 05-1342), 2006 WL 2570991. 
 10. The nondelegation doctrine is a set of rules of administrative law limiting the scope of 
decisionmaking authority that Congress can validly grant to an agency. For a thorough 
background in the theory and practice of nondelegation, see generally Lisa Schultz Bressman, 
Schechter Poultry at the Millennium: A Delegation Doctrine for the Administrative State, 109 
YALE L.J. 1399 (2000); Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, supra note 4. 
 11. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County (SWANCC) v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 
U.S. 159 (2001). 
 12. Id. at 173–74. 
 13. Id. We note, though, that there are alternative readings of SWANCC under which the 
nondelegation rationale would be only an alternative holding. 
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the ground that it requires any federal action implicating federalism 
concerns to come directly from Congress.14 
We argue that these claims at best sit uneasily with the realist 
approach to administrative law. Notably, Chevron recognized 
statutory interpretation as a political act that might be performed as 
well, if not better, by agencies than by courts.15 Motor Vehicle 
Manufacturers Association, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Co.16 justified that assumption by giving the judiciary the 
power to closely inspect the openness and deliberativeness of 
rulemaking—a critical shift from the easily met 1946 standard.17 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) v. Schor18 also 
blurred the roles of courts and agencies by limiting the earlier 
formalistic decision in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. 
Marathon Pipe Line Co.19 that had suggested that agencies could not 
adjudicate common law causes of action because they were not 
Article III courts.20 
This move to realism is significant because the claims of 
congressional primacy can be defended, we argue, only on formalist 
grounds. For example, we show that, in the wake of State Farm and in 
light of the realities we sketch below, the claim that agencies are not 
sufficiently transparent or deliberative is often mistaken. Further, we 
argue that concerns about the relative ease of rulemaking compared 
to legislation cannot justify an absolute rule against agency 
expansions of federal power, as in SWANCC (although we 
acknowledge that they might justify lesser or occasional restraints). 
Rather, the basis for such a rule would have to lie in some sort of 
claim about exclusive judicial or congressional power to decide the 
 
 14. See Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, supra note 4, at 317–18 (“[H]ighly sensitive 
decisions should be made by Congress, and not by the executive pursuant to open-ended 
legislative instructions.”). 
 15. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984) 
(“When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly conceptualized, 
really centers on the wisdom of the agency’s policy . . . the challenge must fail.”). 
 16. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
 17. Compare id. at 30–31 (requiring courts to ensure that the agency considered relevant 
factors), with Pac. States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 185 (1935) (holding that 
courts presume the existence of facts justifying a particular regulation that is within the scope of 
the agency’s delegated authority). 
 18. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n (CFTC) v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986). 
 19. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982). 
 20. CFTC, 478 U.S. at 854, 862–63 (1986); N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 80, 84–87 
(1982). 
01__GALLE_SEIDENFELD.DOC 7/31/2008  9:55:16 AM 
2008] ADMINISTRATIVE LAW’S FEDERALISM 1939 
appropriate scope of national authority, an exclusivity we believe 
cannot be squared with the basic rationales of federalism. 
In short, the best approach to these questions turns on a 
functional analysis of which branch is most likely to best perform the 
task of allocating policymaking power.21 We readily admit that if it 
proves true that agencies do not perform as well as Congress or courts 
at allocating authority—if they are not as transparent, deliberative, or 
accountable—they deserve closer scrutiny. Accordingly, much of our 
project here is devoted to comparing the relative institutional 
competence of the three branches. We find that, for the most part, 
agencies outperform the others. 
For example, there are strong indications that agency actions, 
especially notice-and-comment rulemaking, are more transparent 
than congressional actions. Agencies are required to publish notices 
of their proposed actions and to allow interested persons to 
participate in rulemaking proceedings. Hence, interest groups 
concerned about regulatory issues will know of any prospective 
agency action before it happens, and interest group entrepreneurs can 
inform their public constituencies of the proposed action. By contrast, 
Congress has the ability to hide actions in unrelated legislation, and if 
a bill is complex enough even the members of Congress may be 
unaware of what provisions have been inserted.22 
In addition, there are even stronger arguments that agencies act 
more deliberatively than Congress.23 Unlike Congress, an agency must 
at least provide a meaningful justification for an action, explain why 
suggested alternative actions are less desirable in terms of the 
agency’s statutory mandate, and respond to criticisms of its action by 
those who disagree with it.24 Moreover, in light of the uncertainty 
agencies face about the individual judge who may review any agency 
action, agencies are also forced to consider different ideological and 
social perspectives and to respond to how those with differing 
 
 21. We are hardly the first to argue for a functional approach to these questions. For 
examples of scholars that seem to rely on a functional approach, see infra note 55. Professor 
Catherine Sharkey advocates an approach that considers the “institutional dimension” in 
preemption decisions. Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional 
Approach, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449, 452 (2008). 
 22. See Neal Devins, Congress, the FCC, and the Search for the Public Trustee, 56 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 145, 167 (Autumn 1993) (noting that members of Congress are not always 
aware of what is in the bills on which they vote). 
 23. See infra text accompanying notes 118–145. 
 24. See infra text accompanying notes 118–145 
01__GALLE_SEIDENFELD.DOC 7/31/2008  9:55:16 AM 
1940 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 57:1933 
viewpoints may react to their action.25 The best argument that 
Congress should control in questions of federalism is that members of 
Congress, unlike agency personnel, are directly elected. This 
argument is ultimately unpersuasive, however, because political 
oversight creates strong incentives for agencies to avoid actions that 
are odds with popular sentiment. Moreover, Congress has its own 
weaknesses, such as a propensity to enact legislation that benefits one 
region at the expense of many others. 
Turning to the claim that agencies can enact rules too easily, we 
argue not that all agency rulemaking is difficult, but rather that the 
degree of difficulty that courts should demand can vary. Courts justify 
frustrating congressional efforts to enact legislation or to delegate 
authority to agencies as necessary to protect underlying constitutional 
values that the enactment or delegation might infringe. But the need 
to defend a value depends on the force of the constitutional concern, 
the extent to which a particular piece of legislation threatens a 
constitutional value, and the degree to which other rules already 
protect that value. Such protection could take the form of either 
direct judicial constitutional enforcement or the increased 
transparency and deliberation that we argue comes from agency 
consideration of the constitutional value. Many of these 
considerations depend on the kind of policy judgments at which 
agencies are most skilled. A uniform rule prohibiting all but very 
clearly authorized agency actions does not accurately reflect the 
complexity of these underlying tradeoffs. Our more nuanced 
balancing test, although perhaps more complex, is also much truer to 
the spirit both of the Constitution and the realist core of 
administrative law. 
Thus, we conclude that any doctrinal trend toward requiring in 
all cases clear congressional authorization for preemption or other 
expansions of federal power is mistaken. The underlying justifications 
for these clear statement rules would at best be relevant in only a 
small fraction of all agency decisions to preempt or regulate at the 
outer limits of federal authority—although, as we concede, they 
 
 25. See Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of 
Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 517 (2002) (stating that uncertainty about 
reviewing judges is a necessary antidote to agencies tailoring their decisions to a particular 
ideology). 
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would justify rejecting certain controversial agency preemption 
claims.26 
Part I of this Article explains federalism and the realist balancing 
that underlies its modern judicial enforcement. We conclude that 
more demanding rules for agency expansions of federal power are 
sensible only to the extent that agencies are less capable than other 
branches of reaching the best balancing of federalism interests. 
Accordingly, Part II compares the performance of the different 
branches on several important metrics—transparency, 
deliberativeness, and accountability. In Part III we set out our 
argument that although agency rulemaking may be easier than 
legislation, ease alone does not justify greater resistance to 
rulemaking to resolve federalism issues, especially in those cases in 
which federal intervention is consistent with federalism values. Part 
IV applies the lessons of our earlier analysis to preemption and 
nondelegation and to the specific examples of federal preemption of 
local chemical plant safety laws and federal regulation of local 
wetlands. 
I.  FEDERALISM AND RESISTANCE NORMS 
Although the foundational statute of the administrative state, the 
Administrative Procedure Act,27 offers little direct guidance about 
federal-state relations, federal agencies are hemmed in on all sides by 
federalism. The Constitution’s text and structure embody a respect 
for state autonomy, or at least a respect for the benefits presumably 
derived from having politically independent states.28 
In this respect there is really not one federalism but two. One 
form, which some commentators have termed “abstract federalism,” 
can be thought of as political or rights oriented.29 In this conception, 
 
 26. As our emphasis on the agency’s choice to preempt suggests, we take no position here 
on preemption in situations in which an agency has not evinced some intent to preempt. 
 27. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 
U.S.C.). 
 28. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the 
National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 5 (2007) (noting that the two main arguments 
against preemption are the importance of federalism in the “American constitutional scheme” 
and in nationwide efficiency). 
 29. See Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737, 741 (2004) 
(“[F]ederalism values, such as ensuring core state regulatory authority and autonomy, are 
important and can be protected through political processes.”); A. Dan Tarlock, The Future of 
Environmental “Rule of Law” Litigation and There Is One, 19 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 611, 613 
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federalism preserves the states as a source of power that rivals the 
federal government, so that competition between the two for the 
loyalty of the public constrains any tendency toward tyranny or other 
bad behavior.30 The second, economic conception, values federalism 
because—and only to the extent that—it may tend to increase overall 
national welfare or utility.31 
Under either theory, there are few direct constitutional limits on 
the power of the national government.32 For a variety of familiar 
reasons, federal courts are reluctant directly to invoke the 
Constitution in curtailing the power of their coordinate branches.33 
For example, state autonomy is not always an unmitigated good, and 
courts may not be particularly well suited for answering the question 
of how best to balance competing interests, many of which may shift 
over time.34 
The courts have supplemented outright constitutional 
invalidation with a sort of second-best set of constitutional 
 
(2002) (criticizing abstract federalism as “divorced from how power is actually exercised, shared 
and constrained”). 
 30. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458–59 (1991); Erwin Chemerinsky, The 
Assumptions of Federalism, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1763, 1768 (2006); Hills, supra note 28, at 4, 25; 
Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L REV. 1, 63 (2004). 
 31. Wallace E. Oates, An Essay on Fiscal Federalism, 37 J. ECON. LIT. 1120, 1121–23 
(1999); Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, The Economics of Federalism 3 (U. Ill. Law & 
Econ. Research Paper No. LE 06-001, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
abstract=875626; see also Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458 (“This federalist structure of joint sovereigns 
preserves to the people numerous advantages.”). For the classic critique of this argument in 
favor of federalism, see Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a 
National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903 (1994). 
 32. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism 
Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 451–61, 474–85, 490–91 (2002) (outlining an evolution of 
doctrine in which, other than protections against federally created claims for money damages, 
constitutional doctrine per se does little to restrict federal power, but noting that 
subconstitutional federalism-promoting doctrines are more extensive); see also Vicki C. 
Jackson, Narratives of Federalism: Of Continuities and Comparative Constitutional Experience, 
51 DUKE L.J. 223, 280 (2001) (“[T]he Court’s record of activism on behalf of the states as 
against national power is neither impressive nor durable.”); Mark Tushnet, Judicial 
Enforcement of Federalist-Based Constitutional Limitations: Some Skeptical Comparative 
Observations, 57 EMORY L.J. 135, 143 n.28 (2008) (“The so-called ‘federalism revolution’ of the 
1990s was on its own terms quite modest, and even that revolution appears to have been 
limited . . . .”). 
 33. E.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550–52 (1985). Garcia 
famously rejected an earlier and more aggressive approach to judicial enforcement of federalism 
norms on the grounds that there are other avenues for defending those norms, that judges are 
poorly equipped to reach correct decisions, and that courts only have a remote connection to 
popular preferences for a given outcome. Id. 
 34. See id. 
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limitations—what Professor Ernest Young has termed “resistance 
norms.”35 What the courts do, in effect, is to make it more difficult for 
other actors to achieve ends the courts think infringe on 
constitutional values. Because resistance norms take the form of 
statutory interpretation, they can be overridden, albeit at some cost, 
within the ordinary political process.36 The fact that these resistance 
decisions are subject to political revision has several benefits: it 
lowers the danger of highly countermajoritarian holdings, it increases 
the ease with which courts may foster deliberation and invite political 
actors into their own decisional processes, and it perhaps expands 
courts’ institutional capacity to do other work.37 
Thus, it is unsurprising that the Supreme Court has done much of 
its work in protecting the values of federalism not through outright 
invalidation but rather through a variety of statutory presumptions 
against federal power.38 Congress cannot diminish the core of state 
power,39 approach the constitutional boundaries of its authority,40 or 
subject states to any kind of private liability41 unless it does so through 
extraordinarily clear language. Courts must read conditions attached 
to federal grants to states strictly against the federal government.42 
And, when federal and state law conflict, courts must begin with the 
presumption that the federal legislation does not preempt state law.43 
 
 35. Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of 
Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1585 (2000) (defining “resistance norms” as 
“constitutional rules that raise obstacles to particular governmental actions without barring 
those actions entirely”). 
 36. Id. at 1552 (noting that resistance norms “may . . . [yield] to governmental action, 
depending on the strength of the government’s interest, the degree of institutional support for 
the challenged action, or the clarity of purpose that the legislature has expressed”). 
 37. John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 SUP. CT. 
REV. 223, 242–43, 252–53; Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. 
L. REV. 4, 88 (1996); Young, supra note 35, at 1606–08. That is, if cooperative decisions lower 
popular resistance to the Court as a whole, they may allow the Court to be more effective even 
when it acts alone. 
 38. Sharkey, supra note 2, at 252 n.126. 
 39. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460–61 (1991). 
 40. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 380–82 (2005). 
 41. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000). 
 42. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Murphy 126 S. Ct. 2455, 2459 (2006); Pennhurst State Sch. 
& Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981). 
 43. For careful examinations of the evolution of the presumption, see Professor Mary 
Davis’s discussion of preemption in the context of food and drug regulation, Mary J. Davis, The 
Battle Over Implied Preemption: Products Liability and the FDA, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1089, 1111–32 
(2007), and Professor Allison Eid’s description of the Court’s “[p]resumption against 
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All of these rules have a resistance norm effect—although they do not 
outright prohibit federal expansions, they make it more difficult for 
the federal government to displace state power. 
These presumptions are especially potent as against federal 
agencies. Although Congress can, with sufficiently clear language, 
press up against the outer bounds of its authority to displace the 
states, the executive branch cannot do so on its own. Any regulation 
that raises constitutional doubts is invalid unless Congress clearly 
authorized that result.44 We term that view the SWANCC rule, after 
the prominent decision applying it.45 Similarly, much as federal 
statutes are presumed not to preempt state law absent clear language 
to the contrary, Justice Stevens has argued, albeit thus far in dissent, 
for a prohibition on any preemption by an agency unless expressly 
authorized by Congress.46 And there is considerable doubt whether 
other federalism-inspired clear statement rules, such as the rules 
against private challenges to state action47 and the expansive reading 
of conditional grants,48 can be satisfied by clear language supplied by 
agencies. 
 
[p]reemption” and commentators’ discussion of it, Allison H. Eid, Preemption and the 
Federalism Five, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 32–37 (2005). 
For an argument that the presumption against preemption should not be lumped together 
with other forms of federalism-inspired interpretive principles, see Viet Dinh, Reassessing the 
Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085, 2092–97 (2000). 
 44. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County (SWANCC) v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 
U.S. 159, 172 (2001); see also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 191 (1991) (applying the rule that 
agency regulations raising “grave and doubtful constitutional questions” are invalid but finding 
no violation in the case). 
 45. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172–74. 
 46. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A. 127 S. Ct. 1559, 1579, 1585–86 (2007) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting); see also Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 452 (2005) (holding, in a 
majority opinion written by Justice Stevens, that a federal pesticide regulation scheme did not 
preempt state common law damages claims that were “fully consistent with federal 
requirements”). On some readings, there is even stronger authority for that rule. See, e.g., 
Merrill, supra note 6, at 769 (arguing that in Gonzales, “[t]he Court observed . . . a delegation of 
authority to an agency to promulgate standards for regulated entities does not entail ‘the 
authority to decide the pre-emptive scope of the federal statute’ unless a separate delegation of 
such authority is evident in the statute” (quoting Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 919 
(2006)). 
 47. E.g., Brian D. Galle, Can Federal Agencies Authorize Private Suits Under Section 1983? 
A Theoretical Approach, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 163, 172 (2003) (summarizing doctrinal 
uncertainty). 
 48. E.g., Peter J. Smith, Pennhurst, Chevron, and the Spending Power, 110 YALE L.J. 1187, 
1188–90 (2001) (noting that it is unclear whether clear agency regulations satisfy Pennhurst clear 
statement rule). 
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Commentators often overlook the extent to which these 
resistance norms, like other forms of constitutional adjudication, are 
matters of degree. As Professor Lawrence Sager explains, ordinary 
constitutional decisions have evolved to comprise at least two 
separate logical steps.49 First, the court must determine the content of 
a constitutional norm; then it must determine to what extent that 
norm will be enforced.50 By varying its levels of scrutiny, or, in the 
model of Professor James Thayer and his twenty-first-century 
followers,51 its degree of deference to others, a court can increase the 
amount of political activity it will permit even if some of that activity 
contravenes an idealized version of the constitutional norm.52 Indirect 
constitutional reasoning of the kind we have just described is simply 
an extension of this sliding scale. Thus, resistance norms, like all 
constitutional judgments, call for the court to decide the importance 
of the underlying norm, whom to protect it against, and how best that 
protection can be achieved to the desired level. To make this last 
judgment, courts must undertake a careful evaluation of the 
incentives and behavior of the actors they wish to influence.53 
 
 49. Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional 
Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1221–26 (1978). 
 50. Id. 
 51. James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional 
Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 144 (1893). A number of latter-day scholars agree to some degree 
with Thayer on this point. E.g., ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: 
RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 290–318 (1994); Steven D. Smith, Moral 
Realism, Pluralistic Community, and the Judicial Imposition of Principle: A Comment on Perry, 
88 NW. U. L. REV. 183, 192 (1993); Mark Tushnet, Policy Distortion and Democratic 
Debilitation: Comparative Illumination of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 94 MICH. L. REV. 
245, 299–301 (1995). 
 52. Sager, supra note 49, at 1221–26; see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable 
Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1274, 1321–31 (2006) (surveying 
different degrees of judicial scrutiny of political actors). Sager’s key example is the scope of 
equal protection rights; as he observes, the Court had acknowledged that truly equal treatment 
might impose one set of demands, but for institutional reasons, the Court opted to enforce 
another, less imposing set instead. Sager, supra note 49, at 1217–18. 
 53. See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 26–29 
(1999) (arguing that empirical questions about the functioning of different branches are critical 
in deciding how to allocate power of constitutional interpretation); Philip P. Frickey & Steven S. 
Smith, Judicial Review, the Congressional Process, and the Federalism Cases: An 
Interdisciplinary Critique, 111 YALE L.J. 1707, 1716 (2002) (“[S]ome legislative judgments on 
fundamental values may be more trustworthy than others, and courts might be able to assist 
Congress in this process.”); Mendelson, supra note 29, at 750–52 (“Nor does it fully resolve 
normative difficulties to argue . . . that Congress, rather than the judiciary, will be the sole 
decisionmaker on the value-laden question.”). 
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Perhaps, then, the incremental protections that federalism 
doctrine affords against agency action could be defended based on a 
comparative analysis of institutions.54 If the executive branch is a 
greater threat to state power, or otherwise is unable to fully cooperate 
with courts, it ought to face greater resistance before it can act. We 
are unaware of any comprehensive effort to make that case, and 
indeed one of our aims for this project is to show that it is 
unpersuasive. 
Recently, though, several commentators have offered thoughtful 
defenses of both the presumption against preemptive regulation and 
the SWANCC rule. These defenses have been based on claims 
regarding institutional behavior that in effect rely on the kind of 
resistance analysis we have just set out.55 For example, Professor 
Thomas Merrill argues that “Congress must expressly delegate 
[preemption] authority [to the agency] in the language of the statute 
itself.”56 Because agencies can reach decisions more readily than 
Congress, he claims, allowing agencies to supply clarity demanded by 
the presumption against preemption would “open the door to 
creating a role for agencies in preemption controversies that exceeds 
what is proper,” thereby greatly shifting power away from the states.57 
He also notes that requiring clear congressional authorization will 
result in greater deliberation before reducing state authority. This 
would be the case, he writes, because there would then be two bodies, 
rather than one, that would have to consider whether to preempt.58 
Similarly, Merrill elsewhere defends SWANCC, again claiming that 
agencies expand federal authority too readily and with too little 
consideration of the value of state autonomy.59 
 
 54. When we do not expressly distinguish between them, our references to “federalism” in 
this Article refer both to abstract and economic versions of federalism. 
 55. Bernard Bell, Interpreting and Enacting Statutes in the Constitution’s Shadows: An 
Introduction, 32 U. DAYTON L. REV. 307, 310–11 (2007); John O. McGinnis, Presidential Review 
as Constitutional Restoration, 51 DUKE L.J. 901, 946–47 (2001); Mendelson, supra note 29, at 
742–43; Merrill, supra note 6, at 729–30; Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, supra note 4, at 317; 
Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism Doctrine: Fidelity, Institutional Competence, and 
Compensating Adjustments, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1733, 1848–50 (2005). 
 56. Merrill, supra note 6, at 767. 
 57. Id.; see also id. at 772–73 (offering the same considerations as factors to be weighed in 
considering the degree of deference to grant to agency’s preemption decisions). 
 58. See id. at 772–73. 
 59. See Merrill, Rescuing Federalism After Raich, supra note 4, at 848–49 (arguing that 
“[t]he Court was . . . correct to invalidate” the statute at issue in SWANCC because “Congress 
never articulated an intention to permit regulation on that theory”). 
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Professor Merrill’s comments are typical of the bulk of the 
commentary in the field. Several other leading commentators have 
argued, like Merrill, that demanding a clear statement from Congress 
is desirable because Congress’ deliberations about federalism will 
likely be superior to those of an agency.60 For instance, Professor 
Sunstein describes the SWANCC rule as a form of “democracy-
forcing minimalism, designed to ensure that judgments are made by 
the democratically preferable institution.”61 Others assert that, 
because agencies can reach decisions without the series of veto gates 
that slow Congress—majority votes, filibusters, bicameralism, and 
presentment—it is appropriate for courts to limit agencies to that 
power granted them expressly by Congress.62 
Finally, some authors have suggested a more formalist approach. 
Professor Merrill notes, without developing an elaborate argument, 
that in his view the text of Article I limits agency power to displace 
state authority absent clear congressional authorization.63 Professor 
Sunstein similarly does not defend formalism as such, but notes that 
the formalist view of legislative power, under which Congress cannot 
delegate its lawmaking authority to the executive, is most attractive in 
those instances in which the executive approaches the limits of 
Congress’s own power.64 
It is useful to emphasize the distinction between the questions we 
address in this Article, which go to the authority of an agency to even 
reach a decision, and the similar debate over the degree of deference 
courts owe to such decisions. Many of the commentators we have 
mentioned have addressed both questions, typically in very similar 
 
 60. Jonathan H. Adler, The Ducks Stop Here? The Environmental Challenge to Federalism, 
9 SUPREME CT. ECON. REV. 205, 221 (2001); Bell, supra note 55, at 310–11; Mendelson, supra 
note 4, at 710–11, 718; Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, supra note 4, at 2112–
13. But cf. William K. Kelley, Avoiding Constitutional Questions as a Three-Branch Problem, 86 
CORNELL L. REV. 831, 891–92 (2001) (arguing that avoidance does not enhance democracy 
because it replaces the legislature’s views with the court’s). 
 61. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, supra note 4, at 335. 
 62. Mendelson, supra note 4, at 723–24; Merrill, supra note 6, at 750, 753–57; Sunstein, Law 
and Administration After Chevron, supra note 4, at 2112; Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, supra 
note 4, at 320. 
 63. Merrill, supra note 6, at 761–63. For a critique of Professor Merrill’s formalist 
argument, see Gillian Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J. 2025, 
2063–67 (2008). 
 64. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, supra note 4, at 319. Professor Young has also argued 
that courts should defend federalism out of fidelity to the Constitution, even if there is no strong 
instrumentalist case in federalism’s favor. Young, supra note 55, at 1764–75. 
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terms.65 That is understandable; the modern notion of judicial 
deference to executive decisions is grounded explicitly on 
comparisons of institutional competence.66 But the fact that these 
commentators have seen the two questions in essentially identical 
terms suggests to us that something is missing. Institutional behavior 
does not exist in a vacuum. Agencies, for instance, behave differently 
depending on the rules courts set for review of agency 
determinations.67 Thus, the relationship between deference and 
institutional competence to handle federalism concerns is a dynamic 
one; a change in deference rules may change how one ought to view 
the prior question of bare agency authority. 
Accordingly, our goal in the ensuing Parts is to evaluate the 
relative competence of the three branches to best resolve federalism 
questions and to do so apart from, but mindful of, the correlative 
rules for judicial review of the decisions of other branches. If it is true 
that agency decisions should face higher resistance than those of 
Congress, then we should be more sympathetic to rules that tend to 
reduce agencies’ ability to expand federal power. We think, however, 
that there is a more persuasive case in the opposite direction. 
II.  COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY TO CONSIDER 
FEDERALISM CONCERNS IN REGULATORY MATTERS 
This Part presents an exercise in comparative institutional 
competence. As we have set out in Part I, other commentators argue 
that the role of agencies in determining the scope of federal power 
should be minimized because of inherent limitations on the 
executive’s capacity to take federalism concerns into account. For 
example, these critics maintain that Congress is more democratic and 
deliberative than are agencies.68 In our view these claims are rather 
oversimplified. For each of the classic elements of representational 
democracy—accountability, transparency, and deliberativeness—
 
 65. E.g., Mendelson, supra note 4, at 698–99. But see Metzger, supra note 63, at 2032. Like 
us, Professor Metzger emphasizes the role of administrative law in the determination of 
federalism questions, id., though her specific approach and conclusions are somewhat different. 
 66. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984); see 
also Julian Ku & John Yoo, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Functional Case for Foreign Affairs 
Deference to the Executive Branch, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 179, 201 (2006) (arguing that the 
central question of which branch should resolve ambiguities in foreign affairs law is the 
comparative competence of courts to the other branches of government). 
 67. See infra text accompanying notes 1971–79. 
 68. E.g., Mendelson, supra note 4, at 716–17. 
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agencies are in many contexts better suited to consider federalism 
concerns than are Congress or the federal judiciary.69 
At the outset, it deserves mention that this Article views the aims 
of federalism, whether in its abstract or economic sense, as improving 
the regulatory process, not the preservation of state regulatory 
prerogatives per se. Hence, the issue is not which institution best 
enables state influence over regulation, but rather which institution 
fosters state influence that will enhance public welfare, and not 
simply state officials’ opportunities for rent seeking.70 This view, 
however, does not universally discount the value of having a 
sovereign independent of the federal government with the power to 
regulate. Rather, it credits the availability of dual sovereignty only as 
a functional matter—that is, only when that availability is related to 
regulatory outcomes and not simply out of some posited formalistic 
preference for protection of dual sovereignty. 
A. Transparency of Legislative, Judicial and Federal Administrative 
Processes 
Transparency refers to the ease with which the public can discern 
both the outcome of legal decisions and the inputs that lead to such 
decisions.71 Outside of a few areas in which government maintains the 
secrecy of its operations, such as national security, the ultimate 
outcome of decisions by all branches of the U.S. government is made 
 
 69. For a description of the relationship between accountability and representative 
democracy, see HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 56 (1967). 
Professor Mark Fenster argues that the work of philosophers Locke, Rousseau, Mill, Bentham, 
Rawls, and Kant, as well as the founders of the United States, all support the contention that 
“open government is an essential element of a functional liberal democracy.” Mark Fenster, The 
Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 895–96 (reporting that the work of philosophers 
Locke, Rousseau, Mill, Bentham, Rawls, and Kant, as well as the founders of the United States, 
all support that “open government is an essential element of a functional liberal democracy”); 
see also Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1559 (1988) 
(noting that the framers of the Constitution embraced the traditional republican belief in 
deliberation). 
 70. For more on the problem of rent seeking by public officials, see infra note 129 and 
accompanying text. 
 71. See ADRIAN VERMEULE, MECHANISMS OF DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 
WRIT SMALL 187 (2007) (labeling inputs and outputs as the two aspects of transparency); 
Fenster, supra note 69, at 888 (defining transparency as “a governing institution’s openness to 
the gaze of [the public]”). 
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public.72 The same is not true, however, about the processes that lead 
to those decisions. Transparency of process depends on the ability of 
the public to know that an issue is being considered, to be involved in 
the decisionmaking process, to know who else is involved and in what 
ways, and to understand how a final decision is reached. 
1. Congressional Transparency.  Commentators often assert 
that Congress is the most transparent branch,73 and there is some 
merit to that intuition. Congress’s actions tend to attract media and 
other public attention because Congress is the sole issuer of binding 
legislative determinations, it acts less frequently than the collective 
federal regulatory apparatus, and its processes are relatively common 
knowledge. Accordingly, members of the public who track Congress 
can learn what Congress is considering, at least once hearings are 
scheduled or a bill is introduced. Moreover, acts of Congress not only 
attract attention but also are accomplished by members meeting and 
voting publicly, which would seem to add to transparency. 
Nonetheless, some traits of the legislative process actually decrease 
congressional transparency. 
Although public awareness of congressional outcomes may be 
high, the public is rather less informed about congressional processes. 
Legislators often trade votes or vote strategically.74 For that reason, a 
member of Congress’s voting record does not necessarily reflect how 
the member stands on an issue. Members of Congress may vote 
contrary to their preferences or those of their constituents on one 
issue to ensure a vote from another legislator on a different and more 
important issue. Similarly, members of Congress may vote on an 
 
 72. See, e.g., Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006) (requiring the executive 
branch to provide information upon request unless the information falls within a particular 
exemption). 
 73. See, e.g., Peter Raven-Hansen, Detaining Combatants by Law or by Order, 64 LA. L. 
REV. 831, 832 n.5 (2004) (opining that Congress does not need procedures like those imposed 
on agencies because Congress’s “process is substantially transparent, it often allows for public 
input, and its law is published”); David A. Wirth, The President, the Environment, and Foreign 
Policy: The Globalization of Environmental Policy, 24 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 393, 
403–04 (2004) (stating that Congress’s “normal law-making processes” are “designed to insure 
the accountability and transparency of the legislative process”); Rebecca E. Zietlow, To Secure 
These Rights: Congress, Courts and the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 945, 953 & 
n.40 (2005) (asserting that Congress’s “constitutional construction deliberations are more 
transparent than those of judges”). 
 74. See Saul Levmore, Voting with Intensity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 111, 143 (2000) (“Legislators 
can normally engage in logrolling, or perhaps rely on repeat play, to control strategic 
behavior.”). 
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amendment to a bill that they do not really support to make the bill 
less attractive to the median voter in Congress and thereby decrease 
the likelihood that the entire bill will pass.75 Legislators may vote and 
make statements meant to convince voters of their position on an 
issue when their position actually may be more nuanced.76 By doing 
so, the legislator may hope to avoid a negative reaction from voters 
while maintaining support from individuals and entities who are large 
campaign donors and who can more accurately assess the actual 
position of the legislator.77 
Additionally, the mechanisms by which Congress reaches 
decisions are relatively obscured from public view. Conference 
committee meetings—perhaps the most crucial of all the steps leading 
to enactment—are not meaningfully open to the public.78 It is true 
that the antecedent hearings, testimony, and debate are publically 
available, even if they are of low salience. But ultimately, individual 
legislators do not need to give an explanation for their votes, leaving 
concerned voters uncertain how or when to hold their representatives 
accountable. 
Thus, although voters may be aware of the general behavior of 
Congress, they may not have sufficient information to monitor the 
behavior of any particular legislator. This point implies that the 
legislative process is conducive to opacity, and it also creates the 
potential for differential transparency because the public and more 
diffuse interest groups are often less able to discern the true 
 
 75. See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. 
L. REV. 873, 905 (1987) (noting that strategic voting can mislead constituents who do not 
recognize that the vote was not sincere). Proponents of Title VII opposed the addition of “sex” 
to Title VII’s provisions, seeing it as a strategic ploy to defeat the entire bill. See, e.g., 110 CONG. 
REC. 2578 (1964) (statement of Rep. Celler); id. at 2581–82 (statement of Rep. Green). This led 
to the anomalous situation that many representatives who voted for Title VII opposed the 
amendment that became part of the statute. Id. 
 76. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 222 (1994); 
Frickey & Smith, supra note 53, at 1744; Harold Hongju Koh, The Fast Track and United States 
Trade Policy, 18 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 143, 166–67 (1992) (noting that ordinary legislative 
processes are not as transparent as some assume because of opportunities for members of 
Congress to engage in obfuscatory tactics). 
 77. See Elizabeth Garrett, Harnessing Politics: The Dynamics of Offset Requirements in the 
Tax Legislative Process, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 546 (1998) (describing how legislatures can 
adopt statutes that satisfy public demand for symbolic action while appeasing special interest 
demand for concrete benefits). 
 78. Frickey & Smith, supra note 53, at 1733. For a discussion of the importance of the 
conference committee and reports, see ROBERT A. KATZMANN, COURTS AND CONGRESS 62–64 
(1997). 
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machinations of legislators’ actions than are focused interest groups.79 
Further, it may be in the interest of members of Congress to 
manipulate this differential opacity, at least for some issues.80 
Consistent with public choice critiques of the government, this 
differential opacity gives focused interest groups greater influence 
than they are entitled to under a theory of representative democracy 
that counts the interests of each citizen equally.81 
States, however, generally are well represented on Capitol Hill, 
and their lobbyists have access to legislators.82 Hence, a possible 
implication of the public choice concern is that the legislature may be 
too protective of state interests vis-à-vis the public interest. To the 
extent that states’ interests in sovereign autonomy compete with the 
interests of other well-organized groups, however, states’ undue 
advantage may be eliminated.83 
In short, congressional transparency is only skin deep. If 
transparency is to have any purpose other than as an end in itself,84 it 
must be a mechanism for voters to gather information necessary to 
 
 79. Sophisticated repeat players who interact directly with members of Congress and their 
staffs are more likely to learn of and understand the motivations behind legislators’ votes than 
are members of the general public. See Randall S. Kroszner & Thomas Stratmann, Corporate 
Campaign Contributions, Repeat Giving, and the Rewards to Legislator Reputation, 48 J.L. & 
ECON. 41, 45 (2005) (concluding that a special interest group is able to develop more accurate 
information about how a legislator will act the longer the legislator serves on a committee 
relevant to the group). 
 80. See Elizabeth Garrett, Term Limitations and the Myth of the Citizen Legislator, 81 
CORNELL L. REV. 623, 686–87 (1996) (describing the economic theory of legislation that would 
predict such manipulation); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation 
Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 227–29 
(1986) (same). The economic theory of legislation views the legislative process as aimed at 
providing rents to special interest groups that then repay legislators with support for their 
reelection. See FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT 
EXTRACTION, AND POLITICAL EXTORTION, at x (1997) (noting that the book “explains how 
political extortion via ‘rent extraction’ figures in politicians’ maximization of their own welfare 
personally, to the detriment of society generally”); Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and 
Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 101, 102 (1987) (noting 
ways that politicians can actively seek rents from private actors). 
 81. See Jonathan R. Macey, Public and Private Ordering and the Production of Legitimate 
and Illegitimate Legal Rules, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1123, 1139 (1997) (describing how 
informational advantages give focused interest groups an advantage over the general public in 
securing favorable legislative outcomes). 
 82. Mendelson, supra note 29, at 762–63. 
 83. Hills, supra note 28, at 5–6. Whether states’ interests are over- or underrepresented in 
terms of accepted theories of democracy is an empirical question. We explore that question in 
more depth in Part II.B. 
 84. Fenster, supra note 69, at 895–902 (detailing the benefits of transparency for democracy 
as well as other instrumental benefits). 
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their own participation in the political process. On that measure, the 
public’s window into Congress looks fairly clouded. 
2. Judicial Transparency.  At the outset, judicial matters may 
attract less attention than legislative matters. The public may not be 
aware that a court is considering a matter that has not already 
attracted public attention prior to judicial consideration. If, however, 
a federal circuit court decides to consider a case en banc, and even 
more so if the Supreme Court decides to consider a case, that case 
will often attract the attention of the media and consequently general 
public. Although Supreme Court cases involving issues of federalism 
are likely well covered by the media,85 similar cases in the lower 
courts may escape media and public attention simply because of the 
large number of potential decisions and their smaller jurisdictional 
reach. Of course, lower court cases that have national significance 
often do attract significant media attention. 
Independent of public awareness of federalism issues decided by 
lower courts, those who are interested can discern how individual 
judges vote on cases because votes are publicly announced. 
Moreover, each judge either writes or signs onto an opinion that at 
least purports to explain the judge’s decision in the case. Hence, 
judicial decisionmaking, like congressional action, seems to be highly 
transparent in that those who wish to influence judicial decisions can 
readily ascertain the grounds on which they must engage the court. 
The actual conferences at which judges vote are not open to the 
public; even if they were, only the judge knows what actually 
motivates that judge to vote one way or another on a particular case. 
Legal academics are fond of accusing judges of being result 
oriented—essentially of caring about which outcome they prefer 
rather than which decision the law requires.86 From this accusation, 
 
 85. Metzger, supra note 63, at 2108–09; see also Sunstein, Law and Administration After 
Chevron, supra note 4, at 2088 (suggesting that “administrators are in a far better position” to 
deal with changing circumstances than courts or the legislature); cf. Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, 
Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 411, 485 (2005) (claiming that empirical 
evidence supports the notion that the notice-and-comment process changes regulatory 
outcomes). 
 86. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross & Stephanie Lindquist, The Scientific Study of Judicial 
Activism, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1752, 1766 (2007) (“There is considerable empirical support for 
claims that the Supreme Court has engaged in result-oriented judging.”); see also Jesse Choper, 
Why the Supreme Court Should Not Have Decided the Presidential Election of 2000, 18 CONST. 
COMMENT. 335, 346 n.44 (2001) (citing numerous legal scholars who accused the Supreme 
Court of being result oriented in deciding Bush v. Gore, 591 U.S. 98 (2000)). 
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one might surmise that one cannot rely on a judge’s opinion to give 
any meaningful insight into that judge’s position on the law. But such 
an inference is unjustifiably pessimistic for at least two reasons. 
First, judges get some satisfaction from engaging in their craft. 
That craft involves discerning the law established prior to any 
particular case and determining how it is best interpreted and applied 
to the particular case. Under prevailing norms, it appears that if 
judges want to be recognized (by others as well as by themselves) as 
skilled legal craftsmen, they must give reasons for outcomes that are 
cogent to both author and audience.87 
Second, even if one were to attribute outcome-preference 
motives to a judge, the opinion the judge writes would still articulate 
legal principles and advance the law in a way the judge prefers. Law is 
built on precedent. Accordingly, a judge who favors a particular 
outcome in a case can make it more likely that judges in future cases 
raising similar issues will decide those cases as the first judge would.88 
Because of these motivations, the judicial process seems to be 
relatively transparent. 
If the ultimate goal of transparency is to assure some sort of 
democratic accountability, transparency might be less meaningful 
because federal judges are appointed and protected by lifetime 
tenure. Judicial transparency, however, is not irrelevant. Even if the 
public’s opinion about the judge’s performance does not influence 
that judge, it influences the judicial system as a whole. On an issue 
like federalism, if resistance norms created by the courts are not too 
great, the legislature can overrule any judicial decision that proves 
sufficiently unpopular. If resistance norms are effective at deterring 
legislation, a deviation of judges’ legal preferences from those of the 
polity could still stimulate the appointment of future judges whose 
 
 87. Craft is related to wanting to succeed in one’s own eyes as well as others’ at the “game” 
of judging. See Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing 
Everybody Else Does), 3 SUPREME CT. ECON. REV. 1, 28–29 (2003) (discussing how, among 
other things, judges value playing the game of judging); see also Brian Galle, The Justice of 
Administration: Judicial Responses to Executive Claims of Independent Authority to Interpret the 
Constitution, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 157, 212–13, 222–23 (2005) (arguing that modern norms of 
judging oblige judges to defend their opinions based on reasoned and internally consistent 
elaborations from existing law); Amnon Reichman, The Dimensions of Law: Judicial Craft, Its 
Public Perceptions, and the Role of Scholars, 95 CAL L. REV. 1619, 1628–29 (2007) (discussing 
the role of judicial craft in helping the courts maintain their perceived legitimacy). 
 88. See Tonja Jacobi & Emerson H. Tiller, Legal Doctrine and Political Control, 23 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 326, 326 (2007) (modeling legal doctrine as a means for higher courts to 
constrain the discretion of lower courts). 
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views accord with those of the polity. Transparency therefore does 
permit the public to better influence the judiciary or to enact 
legislation that constrains the influence of courts. Finally, of course, 
actual litigants can use the information in judicial opinions. 
3. Agency Transparency. Agency proceedings are more 
transparent than intuition might suggest. The public may not be 
aware of every agency proceeding that potentially could affect the 
allocation of sovereign power between states and the federal 
government.89 Agency decisions affecting federalism values, however, 
usually are made as part of legislative rulemaking proceedings. These 
proceedings are more salient than formal adjudications and informal 
agency proceedings and are governed by procedures that facilitate 
public awareness of the matter.90 By Executive Order, the president 
requires every agency to include in the Unified Regulatory Agenda of 
the United States an agency regulatory agenda providing both a brief 
summary and contact information for “all regulations under 
development or review” by that agency.91 The Unified Regulatory 
Agenda also includes every agency’s “Regulatory Plan . . . of the most 
important significant regulatory actions that the agency reasonably 
expects to issue in proposed or final form in that fiscal year or 
thereafter.”92 Once an agency is ready to propose a rule, the 
Administrative Procedure Act as well as other statutes and Executive 
Orders impose numerous procedural constraints on agency 
rulemaking that further increase the visibility of the rulemaking 
process.93 
 
 89. Cary Coglianese & Margaret Howard, Getting the Message Out: Regulatory Policy and 
the Press, 3 HARV. INT’L J. PRESS/POL. 39, 40–41 (1998) (noting how the press tends not to 
cover regulatory politics). 
 90. Agencies potentially could affect federalism values through adjudication and guidance 
documents, see 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b), 554 (2006), although the more limited reach and force of 
such actions compared to legislative rules decreases the prospect of agencies using them to 
affect federalism values. In any case, we suggest that courts should be more hesitant to allow 
agencies to interfere with state regulatory prerogatives through these processes because they are 
less transparent, deliberative, and politically accountable. See infra note 311 and accompanying 
text. 
 91. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 4(b), 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2006). 
 92. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 4(c), 3 C.F.R. at 641 (as amended by Exec. Order 13,422 § 4, 
72 Fed. Reg. 2,763, 2,764 (Jan. 18, 2007)). 
 93. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (providing for notice in the federal register, a public comment period, 
and publication in the federal register of a final rule thirty days prior to its taking effect); Mark 
Seidenfeld, A Table of Requirements for Federal Administrative Rulemaking, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 533, 533–35 (2000). 
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Before adopting a rule, an agency must notice its intent to do so 
in the federal register and identify the subject of the regulation.94 For 
most rules, the agency actually proposes a specific rule as part of its 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR)95 Any interested person can 
then comment on the NOPR.96 In the NOPR, the agency must reveal 
information on which it relied in formulating the proposed rule to 
ensure that the public has a meaningful opportunity to comment on 
the rule.97 Likewise, if a private person provides information to or 
otherwise communicates with an agency about a proposed rule 
outside of the notice-and-comment process, the agency generally 
documents the ex parte contact and makes the information and a 
summary of the communications available as part of the rulemaking 
docket.98 
Public awareness of a rule and the agency process for developing 
it before the rule is formally proposed is a crucial component to 
administrative transparency. By the time an agency issues an NOPR, 
it has already invested much time and effort in developing the 
proposed rule and often does not change it in fundamental ways in 
response to comments.99 Thus, public awareness at the time the 
agency issues the notice of proposed rulemaking may be too late. 
Generally, an agency considering whether to propose a rule appoints 
a team of staff members to formulate the proposed rule.100 Team 
 
 94. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b). 
 95. See Jack Beermann & Gary Lawson, Reprocessing Vermont Yankee, 75 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 856, 892 (2007) (“A typical notice of proposed rulemaking today contains extensive 
background on the agency’s activity prior to issuing the notice, a summary of the evidence in the 
agency’s possession and what it hopes to acquire during the rulemaking, and a proposed rule.”). 
 96. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c). 
 97. Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 20 F.3d 1177, 1181 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that the 
Administrative Procedure Act “requires an agency to make available to the public, in a form 
that allows for meaningful comment, the data the agency used to develop the proposed rule”); 
see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Waiting for Vermont Yankee III, IV, and V: A Response to 
Beermann and Lawson, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 902, 903 (2007). 
 98. Cary Coglianese, Richard Zeckhauser & Edward Parson, Seeking Truth for Power: 
Informational Strategy and Regulatory Policymaking, 89 MINN. L. REV. 277, 323 (2004). 
 99. See Cuéllar, supra note 85, at 424–25 (2005) (discussing agency responses to public 
comments); E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1492–93 (1992) 
(noting that the function of notice-and-comment rulemaking has shifted from providing 
information to the agency to creating a record for judicial review); Stephanie Stern, Cognitive 
Consistency: Theory Maintenance and Administrative Rulemaking, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 589, 621–
23 (2002) (presenting a psychological explanation for agencies “locking in” rules prior to the 
comment period). 
 100. Thomas O. McGarity, The Internal Structure of EPA Rulemaking, 54 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 57, 90–91 (Autumn 1991) (describing the “team model” of rulemaking at the 
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members, each with different professional backgrounds and contacts 
outside the agency, collect and filter information within their ambit of 
expertise. By the time a potential rulemaking proposal reaches an 
agency head, the agency has amassed considerable information, the 
alternative avenues for action have narrowed, and the arguments that 
the agency presents to the agency head regarding the proposal have 
largely been developed. Thus, well before an agency proposes a rule, 
awareness that the agency is developing the rule is a crucial 
component of administrative transparency. 
Even prior to the issuance of the NOPR, however, agency 
processes are relatively transparent. Representatives of interest 
groups, even those with diffuse interests, do have access to the staff 
members in each of the offices represented on a rulemaking team.101 
Each office is likely to have different professional training and norms, 
different perspectives, and different constituents outside the agency 
with whom they communicate about what is occurring in the agency. 
Thus, agency economists may communicate with economists outside 
the agency regarding economic issues that a possible rulemaking 
raises; the same is true for engineers, environmentalists, health 
scientists, and virtually every profession from which a member of the 
rulemaking team comes. As with the legislative process, repeat 
players in the policy formulation process who have the ear of agency 
staff generally know what the agency is considering.102 These players 
can provide input into the rulemaking process even at a very early 
stage.103 
Presidents dating back to Reagan have issued executive orders 
that, although intended to increase the president’s power to oversee 
agency policymaking, have also opened the rulemaking process to 
public scrutiny. Thus, in addition to their Regulatory Plan,104 agencies 
 
EPA); Seidenfeld, supra note 25, at 527–28 (calling the team model “[t]he idealized 
embodiment of the [agency] work group”). 
 101. See Mark Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules: Flexible Regulation and Constraints on Agency 
Discretion, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 463 (1999) (noting that awareness of interest group politics 
has facilitated access to agencies by representatives of diffuse interests); Wendy E. Wagner, 
Congress, Science, and Environmental Policy, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 181, 283 n.358 (“Accessing 
members of Congress can be much more difficult than communicating lay concerns to 
bureaucrats.”). 
 102. See Cary Coglianese, Citizen Participation in Rulemaking: Past, Present, and Future, 55 
DUKE L.J. 943, 949–50, 965 (2006). 
 103. Id. 
 104. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. Regulatory plans are incorporated into the 
Unified Regulatory Agenda that the Office of the Federal Register National Archives and 
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must file a host of analyses and reports with the Office of Information 
and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) on such matters as the costs and 
benefits of rules.105 Much of the interaction between the agency and 
OIRA is made public.106 In addition, agencies are subject to Freedom 
of Information Act (FOIA) requests, which require that the agency 
reveal to a requester any information that it maintains in its records 
unless the information comes within one of the limited exceptions 
provided by FOIA.107 Although FOIA does not require an agency to 
reveal its plans and strategy regarding future action, one can often 
glean from information in the agency records just where an agency is 
headed on a particular issue. 
Despite these mechanisms that increase the transparency of 
agency decisionmaking, the rulemaking process does create some 
barriers to transparency. As we have noted, proposed rules are 
formulated early in the process, prior to any statutory requirements 
for public involvement. The formulation of rulemaking is a complex 
process that involves staff members from various agency offices and 
potentially complex interactions with politically appointed agency 
managers.108 Thus, as in the legislative process, the potential for 
confusion and obfuscation by the agency about who is responsible for 
what aspects of an agency rule is significant. Although the rulemaking 
process provides critical early stage access for some constituents, it 
does restrict access for others who are not as well organized and 
connected.109 
Nonetheless, the agency process likely is more transparent than 
the legislative process primarily because the costs of gaining access to 
agency staff members who can explain the agency’s deliberations is 
 
Records Administration publishes biannually. The Unified Regulatory Agendas are available 
online. U.S. Gov’t Printing Office, Unified Agenda: Main Page, http://www.gpoaccess. 
gov/ua/index.html (last visited May 31, 2008). 
 105. The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) is part of the president’s 
Office of Management and Budget and is responsible for monitoring agency compliance with 
requirements imposed under various Executive Orders. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 4(d), 
3 C.F.R. 638, 642 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2006). 
 106. See Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical 
Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821, 828 (2003) (discussing how OIRA is required to publish 
details about all substantial oral communications between OIRA personnel and outside 
parties). 
 107. 5 U.S.C § 552 (2006). 
 108. See Coglianese, supra note 103, at 949–52. 
 109. See Cuéllar, supra note 85, at 414–15 (observing that some scholars have found that the 
notice-and-comment process often fails to include concerns of the “lay public”). 
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lower than the cost to gain access to legislators.110 The obstacles to 
gaining access to members of Congress stem in large part from 
members’ wide portfolio of matters under consideration.111 Members 
of Congress also spend a majority of their time doing constituent 
service and fundraising.112 The implication of these two realities is that 
members of Congress and their personal staff have little time to meet 
with individual members of the public or representatives of diffuse 
interest groups to discuss general substantive policy. 
Congressional committee staff members may be more accessible 
than members or personal staff, but they lack the expertise and 
professional connections of agency staff.113 And although committee 
staff members are technically in the employ of their committee, 
members of Congress generally hire the committee staff, with the 
number of staff positions varying depending on which party is in 
power.114 Committee staff members thus have an incentive structure 
similar to that of legislators, so that they too are focused on reelection 
and party supremacy. If they seek or grant outside access, they do so 
only to the extent that it advances those ends. In contrast, as a career 
 
 110. Peter H. Schuck, Delegation and Democracy: Comments on David Schoenbrod, 20 
CARDOZO L. REV. 775, 781 (1999) (“[T]he costs of participating in the rulemaking and more 
informal agency processes, where many of the most important policy choices are in fact made, 
are likely to be lower than the costs of lobbying or otherwise seeking to influence Congress.”). 
The term “agency deliberations” refers to considerations of the various offices in the 
decisionmaking process rather than the thought processes of the agency head. 
 111. See Cuéllar, supra note 85, at 420 n.31 (“Legislators must vote on foreign policy, 
campaign among their constituencies, evaluate tax law changes, and supervise staff. They cannot 
afford to supervise every regulatory development, so they must develop techniques for 
deploying scarce attention and resources.”). 
 112. See MORRIS P. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON 
ESTABLISHMENT 44–45 (2d ed. 1989) (arguing that Congress delegates to agencies to stimulate 
demand for constituent service); Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 1099, 1135 (2005) (describing how representatives use constituent service to gain political 
support). 
 113. See Kathleen Clark, The Ethics of Representing Elected Representatives, 61 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 31, 35 (Spring 1998) (noting that Senate staff members “tend to have 
responsibility for quite a wide range of issues, and therefore do not usually have the opportunity 
to develop expertise in a particular subject area”). In correspondence, David Vladeck points out 
that congressional staff’s lack of resources might be a basis for greater opportunities for 
outsiders because Congress and its staff may be dependent on outside sources of information. 
As we argue in the main text, though, any such access is likely to be selective and politically 
driven. That suggests that individuals with viewpoints inconsistent with the members’ goals are 
unlikely to obtain access. 
 114. See CHARLES TIEFER, CONGRESSIONAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: A REFERENCE, 
RESEARCH AND LEGISLATIVE GUIDE 87–103 (1989) (reporting that party representation on 
committees in each house is proportional to the percentage of seats the party controls in that 
house of Congress). 
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bureaucrat, an agency staff member on a rulemaking team generally 
focuses on one particular aspect of a rulemaking, has already 
established a network of professional relationships, and does not have 
to spend time protecting a boss who is constantly seeking reelection.115 
Agency staff members also have a greater incentive than their 
legislative counterparts to encourage meaningful rather than merely 
self-serving public access. Because Congress and the staff it directs 
have no clear incentives to consider all relevant facts before acting,116 
any outside support Congress seeks for its conclusions will likely be 
based on the members’ existing objectives instead of a real need for 
information gathering. Often, these existing objectives will discourage 
any access. For instance, as we have noted, members of Congress can 
often use opacity about where they stand on certain issues to placate 
voters while benefiting special interest groups that may make major 
campaign contributions. 
Conversely, agency staff members facing hard look judicial 
review must know all the potential objections to a rule the agency is 
proposing and obtain as much information about those objections as 
possible to facilitate the defense of any rule if it is challenged in 
court.117 For these reasons, access to the early stages of agency 
formulations of rules, although not entirely open, probably is open to 
 
 115. For a description of the career bureaucrat, see JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: 
WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO IT 118–19 (1989). For overviews of 
the professional networks to which career bureaucrats belong, see A. Grant Jordan, Iron 
Triangles, Woolly Corporatism and Elastic Nets: Images of the Policy Process, 1 J. PUB. POL’Y 
95, 99–103 (1981); James A. Thurber, Dynamics of Policy Subsystems in American Politics, in 
INTEREST GROUP POLITICS 319, 323–24 (Allan J. Cigler & Burdett A. Loomis eds., 3d ed. 1991). 
 116. See Galle, supra note 87, at 173–75 (claiming that reasoned deliberation in lawmaking is 
a public good and therefore produces no political rewards for politicians). 
 117. See Mark Seidenfeld, Hard Look Review in a World of Techno-Bureaucratic 
Decisionmaking: A Reply to Professor McGarity, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483, 564–65 (1997) 
[hereinafter Seidenfeld, Hard Look Review]. Hard look review requires that 
agencies offer detailed explanations for their actions. The agency’s explanation must 
address all factors relevant to the agency’s decision. A court may reverse a decision if 
the agency fails to consider plausible alternative measures and explain why it rejected 
these for the regulatory path it chose. If an agency route veers from the road laid 
down by its precedents, it must justify the detour in light of changed external 
circumstances or a changed view of its regulatory role that the agency can support 
under its authorizing statute. The agency must allow broad participation in its 
regulatory process and not disregard the views of any participants. In addition . . . , 
courts have, on occasion, . . . remand[ed] decisions that the judges believed the 
agency failed to justify adequately in light of information in the administrative record. 
Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify Judicial 
Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483, 491–92 (1997) [hereinafter 
Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification] (footnotes omitted). 
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a broader range of interest groups than are the behind the scenes 
aspects of the legislative process. Moreover, because of the 
availability of FOIA discovery, information about early steps in the 
agency rulemaking process is more likely to be reported to the public 
than is information about back room deals in the legislative process. 
On balance, then, when it comes to federalism, agencies are the 
most transparent of the branches. Although the public may be more 
aware of statutes or Supreme Court decisions than of obscure federal 
regulations, true transparency entails not only knowledge of 
outcomes but also knowledge of the rationales on which 
decisionmakers rely and the ability to influence the decisionmaker’s 
deliberations. Here, agencies outperform their rivals, as they offer 
more sources of insight about their decisionmaking as well as 
information about how to influence it. 
B. Deliberation of Congressional, Judicial and Administrative 
Processes 
To be deliberative, the decisionmaking processes of a 
government institution must not simply translate preferences of the 
relevant polity into outcomes as would an economic market. Rather, 
outcomes must allow for self-reflection and changes in individual 
preferences as a result of the decisionmaking process.118 Outcomes 
must therefore reflect consideration of the interests of all affected 
groups and a reasoned justification for why the decisionmaker weighs 
those interests as it does in arriving at a final decision. In considering 
interests, the decisionmaker should be receptive to the concerns of 
various members of the public and should not weight some 
preferences a priori as more deserving or important than others. 
Ultimately, however, when deliberation is complete and the time 
comes for action, the importance of an interest to the decisionmaking 
process should increase with both the importance of the interest to 
those who hold it and the number of individuals sharing the interest.119 
 
 118. See AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 93, 
135 (1996) (stating that the aim of the deliberative process is to “encourage [citizens] to discover 
what aspects of [their first-order moral] beliefs could be accepted as principles and policies by 
other citizens with whom they fundamentally disagree”); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican 
Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1529 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1549 (1988) (“[R]epublicans will attempt to 
design political institutions that promote discussion and debate among the citizenry . . . .”). 
 119. This follows if the ultimate goal of deliberation is the maximization of societal welfare. 
See Daryl J. Levinson, Market Failures and Failures of Markets, 85 VA. L. REV. 1745, 1750 
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1. Congressional Deliberation.  The legislative process generally 
is not as conducive to deliberation as it is to compromise and division 
of spoils. These problems are exacerbated by the incentives at play in 
decisions affecting state interests. And, in the federalism context, at 
least, courts apparently have abandoned as fruitless attempts to force 
legislatures to justify their outcomes in terms of effects on various 
interests of the public.120 
a. Veto Gates, Logrolling, and the Structural Obstacles to 
Deliberation.  On individual issues, because of the multitude of veto 
gates, legislative decisionmaking often results in no action when the 
median voter would prefer some action.121 On other issues, however, 
logrolling and vote trading allow Congress to pass laws that may not 
reflect the preferences of the electorate.122 Both these outcomes are 
inconsistent with deliberation’s aim of reaching results that are best 
for the public. 
Committee chairs and party leaders within each house of 
Congress constitute one set of veto gates that are not necessarily 
 
(1999) (describing a voting system that allows for reflection of preferences in the aggregation of 
votes as desirable in some aspects); Gordon Tullock, Problems of Majority Voting, 67 J. POL. 
ECON. 571, 572 (1959) (“Permitting the citizens who feel very strongly about an issue to 
compensate those whose opinion is only feebly held can result in a great increase of the well-
being of both groups, and prohibiting such transactions is to prohibit a movement toward the 
optimum surface.”). 
 120. See Frickey & Smith, supra note 53, at 1710–11 (concluding that courts cannot 
efficaciously require legislatures to justify their outcomes in a way similar to the justification 
that courts require for administrative agencies); Merrill, Rescuing Federalism After Raich, supra 
note 4, at 836–37 (arguing that Lopez really reflected a rejection of congressional findings as a 
factor in the determination of the statute’s constitutionality); cf. United States v. Morrison, 529 
U.S. 598, 614–15 (2000) (rejecting Congress’s findings of impact on interstate commerce as 
insufficient to sustain the constitutionality of the challenged legislation). Others argue that 
because Congress is entitled to control over its own proceedings, efforts to direct congressional 
deliberation are illegitimate. See, e.g., Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 
MICH. L. REV. 80, 86–87 (2001); Harold J. Krent, Turning Congress into an Agency: The 
Propriety of Requiring Legislative Findings, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 731, 733 (1996) 
(predicting that if the requirement for legislative findings becomes anything more than a 
formality, it will “denigrate” the tripartite system of government). 
 121. See Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in 
Statutory Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593, 605 (1995) (arguing that Congress is apt to 
leave in place court holdings with which most legislators disagree rather than risk the political 
costs and spend the time to reverse them); Mark Seidenfeld, Pyrrhic Political Penalties: Why the 
Public Would Lose Under the “Penalty Default Canon,” 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 724, 733–34 
(2004). 
 122. See Daniel H. Lowenstein, California Initiatives and the Single-Subject Rule, 30 UCLA 
L. REV. 936, 954–55 (1983) (contending that logrolling can “subvert[] the will of the majority” 
(quoting Schmitz v. Younger, 577 P.2d 652, 655–56 (Cal. 1978)). 
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responsive to the preferences of the overall polity. Committee chair 
control over legislative agendas can force a majority of legislators to 
grant statutory favors to a minority of legislators who are well 
situated to block consideration of an issue.123 Party leaders’ ability to 
control the entire body’s agenda, and in the House of Representatives 
to control voting procedures, provides them with similar influence.124 
There is evidence that members of Congress self-select committee 
membership to afford themselves more influence over legislation that 
their constituents and supporters find most important.125 
On the other hand, the fact that leaders and chairs are elected 
and appointed, respectively, imposes limits on the extent to which 
they can deliver such benefits. For instance, the legislative process 
constrains committee chairs from providing the general body with 
inaccurate information on bills because a committee chair who is 
found repeatedly to provide inaccurate or incomplete material 
information in a committee report may be removed. Such constraints 
are themselves limited, however, because the large number of issues 
that Congress faces at any one time makes monitoring of veto gates 
imperfect at best. Further, the system does not seriously question 
committee chairs’ entitlement to stop legislation they oppose.126 In 
short, veto gates may result in too much influence for the interests 
that support committee chairs’ and other legislative leaders’ 
preferences, which imposes costs on the national polity. 
This combination of inertia and vote trading creates an 
environment in which deliberation is scarce. Veto gates and 
bicameralism can create legislative inertia that virtually obliges 
 
 123. See Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Timing Rules and Legal Institutions, 121 HARV. 
L. REV. 543, 568 (2007) (describing one theory proposing that by “delegating power to 
committee chairs, Congress gives them an incentive to invest in expertise, since committee 
members also have greater control of legislative outcomes and thus can obtain extra rents that 
justify the investment”); cf. Elizabeth Garrett, The Purposes of Framework Legislation, 14 J. 
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 717, 759–63 (2005) (describing framework legislation as a means for 
Congress to limit the power of committees with outlier preferences from acting contrary to the 
preferences of the body as a whole). 
 124. See Neal Devins, The Academic Expert Before Congress: Observations and Lessons 
from Bill Van Alstyne’s Testimony, 54 DUKE L.J. 1525, 1537–38 (2005) (describing the trend 
toward greater party control over Congress’s agenda). 
 125. Mark Seidenfeld, The Psychology of Accountability and Political Review of Agency 
Rules, 51 DUKE L.J. 1059, 1076–77 (2001). 
 126. See Garrett, supra note 123, at 759–63 (2005) (describing framework legislation as a 
means for Congress to limit the power of committees with outlier preferences from acting 
contrary to the preferences of the body as a whole but noting the imperfection of these 
limitations). 
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legislators to engage in logrolling and vote trading to pass any 
statutes. There are few obvious incentives for any individual 
lawmaker to supply or demand a reasoned explanation for any given 
outcome.127 As a result, most legislation that Congress passes 
represents a compromise of coalitions rather than a consensus of all 
legislators—a triumph of bargaining over deliberation.128 The opacity 
of the logrolling system, which facilitates rent seeking and conceals 
the absence of considered justifications, may further exacerbate this 
tendency.129 Thus, logrolling often enables legislation that is 
unexplained and does not promote the public interest.130 
b. Legislative Deliberation about States’ Interests.  Having 
discussed the nondeliberative influences of the legislative process, it is 
enlightening to consider how states’ interests are likely to fare in that 
process. Here we disagree somewhat with Professor Mendelson’s 
thorough examination of congressional and executive consideration 
of federalism. Mendelson argues that although both Congress and 
agencies do an adequate job considering federalism interests with 
 
 127. See Galle, supra note 87, at 173–75 (claiming that reasoned deliberation in lawmaking is 
a public good and therefore produces no political rewards for politicians). 
 128. Frickey & Smith, supra note 53, at 1740–45; see also Colker & Brudney, supra note 120, 
at 119 (“There are, in short, political dimensions when members of Congress promote, or 
oppose, a given legislative proposal. The business of trying both to influence and to anticipate 
the public makes for messy and unpredictable legislative history.”). 
 129. Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 
44–45 (1982); William H. Riker & Steven J. Brams, The Paradox of Vote Trading, 67 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 1235, 1240 (1973). But see Michael D. Gilbert, Single Subject Rules and the Legislative 
Process, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 803, 866–67 (2006) (noting that logrolling can decrease 
transparency of legislation but opining that voters get cues from sophisticated political observers 
who will not be confused by these practices). Rent seeking is conduct aimed at the transfer of 
wealth rather than the creation of wealth. STEPHEN J. SPURR, ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF 
LAW 26 (2006). 
 130. From a pluralist perspective, logrolling can be beneficial because it allows legislative 
outcomes to reflect intensities of preferences. Richard L. Hasen, Vote Buying, 88 CAL. L. REV. 
1323, 1343 (2000); Tomas J. Philipson & James M. Snyder, Jr., Equilibrium and Efficiency in an 
Organized Vote Market, 89 PUB. CHOICE 245, 245 (1996). From a public choice perspective, 
however, logrolling facilitates legislative action that is likely to represent a deal about how to 
distribute monopoly rents. See Mark Tushnet, Fear of Voting: Differential Standards of Judicial 
Review of Direct Legislation, 1996 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 373, 383 (“Log-rolling is condemned by 
those who see the legislative process as a forum for rent-seeking by organized interest 
groups . . . .”); see also Edward J. McCaffery & Linda R. Cohen, Shakedown at Gucci Gulch: 
The New Logic of Collection Action, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1159, 1173 (2006) (“Logrolling among 
members of Congress . . . mudd[ies] the trail of rent seeking.”). 
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national benefits, Congress is superior at considering local effects.131 
The structure of Congress, she claims, allows states’ influence to 
protect their own interests.132 
To the contrary, we think that Congress is unlikely to be a 
consistent defender of local interests. Opportunities for rent seeking 
give individual members of Congress incentive to enlarge federal 
power.133 Such rent-extracting legislative activity is limited by the fact 
that once Congress passes legislation, an agency invariably 
implements the legislation, and therefore it is the threat of agency 
action that creates the potential for political contributions. Hence, to 
cash in the long-term rents generated, Congress would have to create 
a regulatory structure in which it retained significant influence over 
agency implementation of matters of importance to political 
contributors.134 But this barrier hardly seems insuperable.135 
Another limitation on the rent-seeking incentive may arise if the 
local interests at issue pertain uniquely to one state or region. State 
lobbying in favor of general state prerogatives typically is weak as a 
result of free-rider effects.136 When the positive externality from 
defending state power is small, however, local interests may offer 
their congressional representatives rents large enough to warrant 
logrolling with others in Congress to defeat federal expansion.137 Note, 
 
 131. Mendelson, supra note 29, at 768; see also Adler, supra note 60, at 221 (making the 
same claim). 
 132. Mendelson, supra note 29, at 768. 
 133. Hills, supra note 28, at 26–27. 
 134. See, e.g., DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS 24–25, 29–
30 (1999); Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative Law, 
2006 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 211; cf. Edward J. McCaffery & Linda R. Cohen, Shakedown at Gucci 
Gulch: The New Logic of Collective Action, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1159, 1179 (2006) (noting that a 
“salient feature” of rent extraction is that Congress will resist resolving the threat that allows it 
to extract contributions). 
 135. See Brian Galle, Designing Interstate Institutions: The Example of the Streamlined Sales 
and Use Tax Agreement (SSUTA), 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1381, 1420–23 (2007) (summarizing 
tools for continuing congressional oversight of its delegates). 
 136. See Mendelson, supra note 29, at 767–68. That is, as in public choice theory generally, 
the fact that lobbying efforts by one state benefits all of them inclines each state to depend on 
the efforts of others rather than expending its own resources. 
 137. Id. at 768. For example, Florida may have a strong enough interest in keeping its 
beaches and waters in the Gulf of Mexico free from oil spills that it has sufficient incentives to 
trade its support for legislation favored by members of congress from other states for their 
promises not to allow the federal government to issue oil leases for this region. More 
generically, if a federal-expanding enactment would give member of congress A rents of ten, but 
impose harms of one hundred on B’s district, B may be willing to offer A votes later that would 
have present discounted value of greater than ten. 
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though, that these local rents would have to be so large as to buy out 
the federalizing rent value of a national majority. We expect such 
dramatic local interests will be relatively rare.138 
To the extent that local interests do triumph, they may do so at 
the cost of the nationwide welfare. Local interests can just as easily 
lobby to create or preserve the opportunity to export costs to their 
neighbors as to defend their own prerogatives.139 This scenario is 
especially plausible if the negative spillovers on other jurisdictions are 
small and diffuse, so that there is little political reward for 
representatives of other states in preventing them.140 
c. Problems with Congress Informing Itself and Acting on 
Accurate Information.  Finally, even if Congress does manage to 
produce deliberative outcomes that reflect state influence, those 
outcomes may quickly become obsolete. The legislative process 
imposes large costs on collecting accurate information. Congress has 
authority over all national matters, which significantly consumes 
members’ time. Neither members nor their staff develop expertise 
about programmatic details, and most generally do not come from 
professions that could help inform them about the options for and the 
 
 138. For instance, in our examples supra note 137, to obtain a majority vote in, say, the 
Senate, B would have to offer total rents of at least 500—fifty times larger than the individual 
gains from empire building. Florida’s members of Congress would have to agree to provide 
rents to favorite entities of legislators from all of the forty-nine other states, which not only 
would cost Florida’s citizens greatly but also could result in its members of Congress being 
identified as regular supporters of pork barrel legislation. 
Congressional incentives for expansion may also be constrained if expansion carries other 
costs for enacting members. For example, in the case of federal-power-expanding conditions 
attached to federal grants, any enhancement of federal power necessarily reduces the funds 
available for a legislator’s other projects. Because the grant recipient has the power to refuse a 
grant and its attendant conditions, thereby driving up the size of the grant, conditional grants 
may on balance be a very poor vehicle for obtaining greater legislative rents. Thus, in the 
limited circumstance in which Congress cannot regulate directly due to constitutional restraints 
and must depend on conditional spending, we would agree with Mendelson that local autonomy 
is relatively safe from congressional expansions. 
 139. See Hills, supra note 28, at 26; McGinnis, supra note 55, at 926–27. 
 140. Professor Jide Nzelibe argues that legislative logrolling enhances national welfare, 
claiming that lobbyists from the negatively affected area block efforts to redistribute from one 
region to another. Jide Nzelibe, The Fable of the Nationalist President and the Parochial 
Congress, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1217, 1244–46 (2006). This analysis overlooks the possibility, as we 
sketch in the text, that burdens may affect more than one region, raising the possibility that all 
of the affected groups will remain passive in an attempt to free ride on one another. Moreover, 
Professor Nzelibe’s claim assumes that the burdened regions are even aware of the burden; 
again, we would expect individuals to free ride on the efforts of others in monitoring Congress 
to ward against redistribution. 
01__GALLE_SEIDENFELD.DOC 7/31/2008  9:55:16 AM 
2008] ADMINISTRATIVE LAW’S FEDERALISM 1967 
implications of regulatory decisions. Congress therefore likely 
depends on outsiders to gather information about the need to update 
a statute.141 But, as we already noted, members of Congress and their 
staffs have little incentive to ensure that the information they receive 
is balanced or entirely accurate.142 Moreover, even outside groups face 
the dilemma of either free riding on the efforts of others or spending 
the costs to hold together an effective coalition.143  
The episodic nature of statutory enactment also impedes the 
process of turning even the most recent information into updated 
legislation. Congress may adopt legislation based on an assessment of 
the impact of regulations that is accurate when it acts, but that 
assessment becomes less accurate as time passes and Congress fails to 
update the statute.144 Congress does have some ability to change the 
interpretation of statutes in a more continuous manner than by 
statutory amendment. It can do so by delegating a matter to an 
agency and then influencing that agency or court by direct oversight 
or through the appropriations process.145 Both of these mechanisms, 
however, operate through an intermediary and hence rely on a fairly 
broad delegation of the matter to the court or agency. In sum, the 
costs of participation in the congressional process and the barriers to 
translating that process into statutory enactments imply that if the 
scope of states’ regulatory authority depends primarily on Congress 
passing statutes, then the extent of that authority often reflects an 
inaccurate or unduly broad assessment of the need for federal 
authority. 
 
 141. Cf. Arthur Lupia & Matthew McCubbins, Learning from Oversight: Fire Alarms and 
Police Patrols Reconstructed, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 96, 97–98, 112 (1994) (describing 
congressional dependence on monitoring by outside groups in order to assure continuing 
effectiveness of statutes). 
 142. See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
 143. Cf. Saul Levmore, Precommitment Politics, 82 VA. L. REV. 567, 571–72, 581 (1996). 
 144. See Glen Staszewski, Avoiding Absurdity, 81 IND. L.J. 1001, 1024 (2006) (observing that 
inaccuracy of legislative classifications is exacerbated as statutes age); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Problems with Rules, 83 CAL L. REV. 953, 993 (1995) (noting that new developments make rules 
anachronistic over time). 
 145. See JOEL D. ABERBACH, KEEPING A WATCHFUL EYE: THE POLITICS OF 
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT 2 (1990); Julian Ku & John Yoo, Beyond Formalism in Foreign 
Affairs: A Functional Approach to the Alien Tort Statute, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 153, 192 (“Holding 
oversight hearings and threatening budget cuts present a far less difficult method to change 
incorrect agency interpretations than does the enactment of specific override legislation.”); 
Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police 
Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 165–67 (1984). 
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2. Judicial Deliberation.  Judicial decisionmaking is the 
quintessential example of a deliberative process. Judges explain their 
decisions in written opinions. Explanations are based on law, which 
includes precedents, binding texts, and reasoning about how those 
sources of law bear on the issue presented to the court. The passions 
that can drive either personal preferences of judges or the immediate 
demands of the polity are not directly relevant to the judicial process. 
As the “least dangerous branch,” the judiciary depends on the 
persuasiveness of its justifications under the law for its legitimacy.146 
Therefore the influence of the branch depends on the deliberative 
nature of judicial decisions. 
In terms of deliberative democracy, however, judicial 
decisionmaking is wanting in several respects. Deliberative 
democracy demands that the decisionmaker translate the values held 
by the polity at some deep level into an outcome that is at least 
acceptable to all (if not preferred by all) in terms of a broadly 
conceived public interest.147 Because individual federal judges are 
insulated from the pressures of politics, courts are well suited to make 
decisions that avoid simply acquiescing to the impassioned demands 
of a current majority. But judges’ political insulation and the reactive 
nature of the judicial process equip courts poorly to ensure that their 
decisions comport with well-established basic values of the public. 
Court decisions can deviate from these basic values for two 
reasons. First, the courts’ viewpoint is limited. A court’s duty is to 
resolve a dispute between the parties, and the parties are unlikely to 
represent all the various backgrounds and perspectives that may be 
relevant to a determination.148 Although federalism cases often 
involve a government litigant, it is unclear that a government attorney 
litigating a particular case has more than a highly attenuated 
connection to the views and interests of the public. Moreover, judges 
tend to approach these issues from a legal perspective, which may 
predispose them to overemphasize structural constitutional concerns 
and to shortchange the pragmatic effects of the lines drawn in any 
 
 146. See Seidenfeld, supra note 118, at 1543 (citing ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST 
DANGEROUS BRANCH 24–27 (1962); HERBERT WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, AND 
FUNDAMENTAL LAW 27–28 (1961)). 
 147. Id. at 1539 (expressing hope that civic republicanism will yield consensus). 
 148. Id. at 1544 (“Parties to litigation ordinarily do not adequately represent many 
potentially affected interest groups.”). 
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particular case. This structural emphasis is especially likely if the 
judge sees making “law” as a unique aspect of the judicial role.149 
To the extent that a federalism issue arises solely out of the 
meaning of a statute or the Constitution, courts frequently get input 
from amicus briefs, which provide an avenue for nonparties with 
differing perspectives to be heard. But even amicus briefs are limited 
by the fact that an entity must first learn of the issue on which it 
wishes to inform the courts of its view, and then must hire a lawyer to 
write a brief on the issue. For matters that are sufficiently important 
that they are heard by the Supreme Court, interested groups might 
have enough interest to incur the costs of filing amicus briefs. In 
lower courts, however, interest groups face both higher costs of 
learning about relevant cases and lesser benefits of prevailing in those 
cases. Therefore, the costs of participation relative to the potential 
payoff from influencing the outcome of the case create a significant 
barrier to participation. 
In addition, the issues related to federalism involve more than 
simply reading texts and legal precedents. Decisions about federalism 
are often a choice of institutions—for example, a choice between 
uniform federal regulation and more diverse but more complex and 
costly state-by-state implementation.150 Choosing the best institution 
to carry out policy or preserve rights is a complex policy judgment. 
That judgment is informed not only by legal analyses but also by 
technical knowledge relating to a regulatory program and political 
knowledge about how various members of society will be affected by 
the ultimate determination of whether and how states can regulate.151 
Further, amici do not participate in creating the record on which the 
court must base its decision;152 therefore, participation as an amicus is 
 
 149. Cf. Elizabeth V. Foote, Statutory Interpretation or Public Administration: How Chevron 
Misconceives the Function of Agencies and Why It Matters, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 673, 691 (2007) 
(“Unlike the judiciary, agencies implement their enabling acts with a combination of expertise, 
practicality, interest-group input, and political will—not with a strictly legal, neutral, judicial-
style methodology that would be principally attentive to the text and structure of the 
[controlling legal document].”). 
 150. See Merrill, supra note 6, at 733 (illustrating a similar choice of institution in another 
federalism context). 
 151. See Hills, supra note 28, at 6; McGinnis, supra note 55, at 949. 
 152. See Barbara M. Yarnold, Do Courts Respond to the Political Clout of Groups or to 
Their Superior Litigation Resources/”Repeat Player” Status?, 18 JUST. SYS. J. 29, 31–32 (1995) 
(reporting that interest groups prefer to bring cases rather than file amicus briefs because that 
allows them to choose test cases and create the record for appeal). 
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insufficient to provide the courts with all the relevant information 
that various interest groups have to offer. 
Second, courts are reactive, which can lead them to shortchange 
the programmatic considerations related to federalism.153 To illustrate, 
consider a situation in which it is unclear whether a statute authorizes 
an agency to displace state law that would affect the agency’s 
program. Suppose in addition that the courts had adopted the 
position, suggested by some commentators,154 that an agency may not 
displace state law unless the statute authorizing such action clearly 
indicates that the agency has the authority to preempt. In such a 
situation, the agency could not assert its authority to displace state 
law because the statute is not sufficiently clear on the question until 
the courts resolve its meaning. Therefore, the issue of whether 
regulations under the statute displace state law would arise, if at all, 
only through a case in which an entity adversely affected by state law 
argues that the law is preempted by federal regulation. 
Professor Merrill suggests that this is the preferred mechanism 
for raising a regulatory preemption case because such cases usually 
arise in state court. This avenue for raising the preemption issue 
therefore allows state courts to clarify the bounds of state law, 
allowing the Supreme Court to assess better whether preemption is 
warranted.155 
By the time a case is brought in state court, however, the 
federalism decision will come too late for most entities. From a 
federal agency’s perspective, the ideal shape of federal regulation 
may depend on related state laws. For example, an agency that deems 
uniformity of paramount importance—and would therefore prefer to 
displace state law—would adopt different regulations if it could not 
provide for such displacement than if it could be certain of 
preemption. Similarly, deferring resolution of the preemption 
decision to a court challenge may come too late for many regulated 
entities; out of the fear of penalty under state law, these entities will 
comply with that law even if they have a good faith belief that state 
 
 153. See Neal Devins & Alan Meese, Judicial Review and Nongeneralizable Cases, 32 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 323, 328 (2005) (“[B]ecause courts almost always play a reactive role, they lack 
meaningful control of either the facts or legal issues before them.”). 
 154. E.g., Mendelson, supra note 4, at 707; Merrill, supra note 6, at 767. 
 155. Merrill, supra note 6, at 767. 
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law has been preempted. If every entity subject to regulation 
acquiesces, the federalism issue may never get to court at all.156 
3. Agency Deliberation.  Agencies have the potential to be both 
deliberative and responsive to political preferences, both because of 
their relationship to the courts and the political branches and because 
of their composition and the motivation of their staff members. 
a. Strengths and Limitations on Agencies’ Abilities to Address 
Constitutional Matters.  Agencies have not to date explicitly focused 
on federalism issues in most rulemakings.157 But under hard look 
review, courts could demand that agencies include such analyses or 
face reversal of a policy or rule.158 It is possible, as Professor 
Mendelson suggests, that having agencies consider federalism values 
would move decisions away from the best accommodation of state 
and federal interests.159 We agree with Mendelson’s account with 
respect to those aspects of federalism that accrue from the mere 
availability of an alternative independent sovereign but that are 
unrelated to the program that the agency regulates—what we term 
“abstract federalism.”160 We think, however, that agencies are better 
suited to consider all other aspects of federalism, and in our view 
those other aspects are considerably more important. 
Abstract federalism involves issues of general constitutional 
structure, such as the desirability of maintaining a robust state 
regulatory apparatus to counter potential power grabs by the federal 
government that could threaten individual liberties. Such issues 
 
 156. Cf. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 503–04 (1985) (explaining that the 
Court sometimes permits individuals “whose own speech or expressive conduct may be validly 
prohibited or sanctioned” to facially challenge statutes that impose overbroad restraints on free 
speech because “those who desire to engage in legally protected expression but who may refrain 
from doing so rather than risk prosecution”); Mark Seidenfeld, Playing Games with the Timing 
of Judicial Review: An Evaluation of Proposals to Restrict Pre-Enforcement Review of Agency 
Rules, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 85, 126–27 (1997) (arguing that if the penalty is sufficiently great, all 
entities will comply with the rule even if its validity is suspect). 
 157. See Mendelson, supra note 29, at 782–83 (noting that agencies have not prepared 
federalism impact analyses of rules as required by Executive Order). 
 158. See Metzger, supra note 63, at 2079–80 (suggesting that arbitrary and capricious review 
be used to compel agencies to consider impacts of proposed regulation on states). 
 159. Mendelson, supra note 29, at 779. 
 160. Id. at 779–80; Mendelson, supra note 4, at 724–25; cf. Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, 
Practices, and the Paradox of Deference: A Preliminary Inquiry into Agency Statutory 
Interpretation, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 501, 510 (2005) (doubting that agencies would be expert in 
interpreting background constitutional norms). 
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involve an appreciation not only for the structure of the constitution 
regarding state-federal relations, but also an appreciation of other 
structural constraints on the federal government that the Constitution 
mandates. Again, we concede that agencies are not experts in 
factoring into their decisions the potential benefits of abstract 
federalism—protection against tyranny by either sovereign—that are 
unrelated to agencies’ programmatic mandates. The fear is that 
agencies would simply get the evaluation of benefits wrong, or, worse, 
would abuse consideration of abstract federalism by trotting it out to 
justify decisions made on nonlegitimate grounds such as partisan 
politics.161 In essence, the impacts from the consideration of abstract 
federalism are external to the agency program. Given that the agency 
would not bear most of any costs it creates if it gets such 
considerations wrong, the agency would have little motivation, absent 
any incentives supplied by judicial doctrine, to ensure that it gets 
these considerations right.162 By not considering such benefits, 
agencies would undervalue the instrumental benefits of abstract 
federalism (especially compared to courts and the legislature). We 
note, however, that there is a silver lining to this critique of the 
limitations of agency considerations of abstract federalism: for the 
same reason agencies would undervalue abstract federalism, they also 
would be less likely than their legislative or judicial counterparts to 
attribute some inherent, noninstrumental value to state autonomy 
that might inflate the importance of federalism beyond what the 
public interest justifies. 
Simultaneously, however, courts are inferior to agencies in 
factoring into their decisions the day-to-day impacts that autonomous 
state regulators would have on a federal program.163 The agency is the 
one familiar with the programmatic details and real-world 
consequences of allowing competing sources of law on a regulatory 
issue. Here, the abilities and motivations of the courts and the agency 
are exactly reversed. Because courts are not well grounded in the 
technical details of agency regulatory programs, they may fail to 
comprehend the significance of state and local authority on the 
effective implementation of an agency program. Moreover, although 
 
 161. Mendelson, supra note 29, at 781; Merrill, supra note 6, at 755–56. 
 162. Mendelson, supra note 29, at 781, 786; see also Hills, supra note 28, at 15 (doubting that 
agencies give weight to abstract federalism values); Merrill, supra note 6, at 756 (same); 
Metzger, supra note 63, at 2065–67 (noting arguments on both sides of the question). 
 163. Metzger, supra note 63 at 2064–65; Sharkey, supra note 21, 485–90. 
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courts are free to consider such impacts, it is the agency and not the 
courts that would have to live with the day-to-day fallout from any 
arrangement that incorporates local and state governmental 
influences on a particular regulatory scheme.164 Accordingly, we do 
not trust courts to take into account these considerations to the extent 
warranted by the public interest.165 
Additionally, given that states retain viable regulatory capacity 
over virtually all areas in which they have a legitimate interest, the 
concerns that are the focus of abstract federalism are more remote 
than programmatic federalism concerns.166 It seems a bit far-fetched to 
think that states will not be sufficiently influential generally to 
exercise their police powers. The states have proven to be effective at 
influencing agencies to preserve their state prerogatives.167 More 
specifically, “the expansion of federal power into areas that were 
previously the exclusive province of the states has generally involved 
the sharing of power between federal and state officials.”168 For 
example, the Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries 
Service has authority essentially to engage in land use regulation 
when approving “habitat conservation plans.”169 This authority has 
resulted in “something akin to a collaborative local/federal land use 
planning process” rather than simply replacing local land use 
regulation.170 
 
 164. David R. Woodward & Ronald M. Levin, In Defense of Deference: Judicial Review of 
Agency Action, 31 ADMIN. L. REV. 329, 332 (1979) (observing that an agency’s immersion in 
day-to-day administrative operations exposes to it the practical consequences of statutory 
interpretation). 
 165. One of us has observed that 
[we] conceive the public interest as deriving from the fulfillment of the preferences of 
a fully informed polity in a context that encourages consideration of the experiences 
and interests of others. Although that fuzzy definition provides no operational 
measure by which to determine which of several outcomes better serves the public 
interest . . . [we] believe one can argue that certain outcomes clearly fall far outside 
the public interest even without providing a precise operational measure. 
Seidenfeld, supra note 121, at 727 (footnote omitted). 
 166. See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 31, at 930 (“The political power of the states, whether 
cultural or constitutional in origin, is not under attack.”). 
 167. See Mendelson, supra note 29, at 774–75. 
 168. Rubin & Feeley, supra note 31, at 934. 
 169. Holly Doremus, Biodiversity and the Challenge of Saving the Ordinary, 38 IDAHO L. 
REV. 325, 350 (2002). But cf. Robert L. Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and Natural 
Resources Law, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 179, 195 (2005) (noting that habitat conservation plans 
need not involve state or local government in what is essentially a bargain between the federal 
government and private entities). 
 170. Doremos, supra note 169, at 350. 
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On balance, then, the costs of shortchanging abstract federalism 
in most cases will be small compared to the effect of federalism on 
programmatic effectiveness. Hence, in most cases, we suspect that 
agencies’ abilities to assess programmatic federalism values more 
accurately than courts or Congress will outweigh any bias in their 
federalism considerations, even if we assume that Congress is 
unbiased.171 In essence, the other branches’ relative disadvantage in 
deliberation means that their protections of federalism in any given 
situation will vary greatly around voters’ preferred level of protection. 
The assumption that Congress and courts are not biased only means 
that such variations average to the preferred level of protection, but 
the deviation for individual cases is likely to be large. In individual 
cases, agencies frequently underprotect federalism values by a little, 
whereas Congress either over- or underprotects them greatly.172 
Moreover, even if we are wrong in our conclusion that abstract 
federalism is likely less important to the electorate than 
programmatic federalism, it may still be the case that voters will 
prefer some agency involvement in the selection of the level of 
protection for federalism.173 
b. The Potential for Judicial and Political Oversight to Enhance 
Deliberation about Federalism.  Perhaps the most significant influence 
on agency deliberation has been the prospect of judicial review and 
increased political oversight of agency policymaking processes. 
Courts demand that an agency give reasons for its decisions, forcing 
 
 171. Based on our public choice critique applied to federalism issues, see supra notes 133–40 
and accompanying text, we think that Congress is more likely biased in favor of well-organized 
interest groups than are agencies. Because states are a well-organized interest group—one that 
is even given a special preferential status as comprised of sovereign entities—there is a strong 
likelihood that Congress is biased in favor of state interests, at least vis-à-vis more diffuse 
interests. This adds to our preference for agency resolution of federalism issues. 
 172. See Matthew C. Stephenson, Optimal Political Control of the Bureaucracy 22 (Harvard 
Law Sch. Faculty Scholarship Series, Paper No. 5, 2007), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/ 
viewcontent.cgi?article=1007&context=harvard/faculty (illustrating how slightly biased 
outcomes are preferable to greatly variable but unbiased outcomes when the concern is the 
average of each outcome’s distance from the ideal outcome). This point illustrates the 
potentially misleading notions of information that averages supply. More accessible illustrations 
include that when Bill Gates frequents a bar, the average wealth of patrons in the bar is 
extremely high, but this says nothing about the wealth of the individuals in the bar. 
 173. See id. at 33 (proposing a model of federal regulatory decisionmaking in which 
“majoritarian interests are often best served not by maximizing the influence of an electorally 
accountable politician, but rather by ensuring a degree of bureaucratic insulation that makes 
political control of agencies costly but not impossible”). 
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the agency to explain its decisions in terms that do not simply reduce 
to ideological or political preferences but rather can be connected to 
legislatively specified criteria or broadly accepted public values.174 
This demand, along with demands from the political branches for 
various types of regulatory analyses, has forced agencies to change 
their structure.175 Most agencies are not populated by staff members 
from one industry or profession that dominates the agency 
decisionmaking process. Rather, to satisfy judicial review, agencies 
need staff members from a multitude of professions who can 
understand the views of all greatly affected interest groups. 
Just as judicial review has prompted agencies to consider a 
myriad of other concerns, courts can force agencies at least to 
consider issues of federalism as part of judicial review for reasoned 
decisionmaking.176 For example, contrary to some commentators’ 
views, courts do have ready standards on which to gauge agency 
decisions, so that review is not simply a naked assertion of judicial 
preferences.177 Recall that clear statement rules are meant to enforce 
the Constitution.178 Thus, the yardstick for measuring agency 
deliberation on federalism values is the extent to which those 
deliberations give proper regard to those substantive constitutional 
norms the courts would choose if they were to enforce federalism 
directly. 
State courts may also influence administrative outcomes. For 
many federalism issues, once an agency has decided the extent to 
assert federal authority or to displace state authority, the reach of that 
decision will arise through an action in state court. This allows the 
 
 174. Richard J. Pierce, How Agencies Should Give Meaning to the Statutes They Administer: 
A Response to Mashaw and Strauss, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 197, 203–04 (2007); see also Metzger, 
supra note 63, at 2038–40 (making this point about agency consideration of federalism). 
 175. See generally Philippe Aghion & Jean Tirole, Formal and Real Authority in 
Organizations, 105 J. POL. ECON. 1 (1997) (setting out the relationship between outside 
influences, including judicial review, and internal agency decisions); Mathew D. McCubbins et 
al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 243 
(1987) (same). 
 176. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43–44 
(1983) (holding that an agency rule could only be upheld if the court concluded that it was the 
product of reasoned decisionmaking); cf. Gersen, supra note 134, at 233 (noting that agencies 
can develop expertise in preemption questions); Sharkey, supra note 2, at 256–58 (noting that 
courts might condition deference to preemption decisions on compliance with measures aimed 
at increasing state influence in the agency’s decisionmaking process). 
 177. For the contrary views, see Mendelson, supra note 29, at 794. For a detailed example of 
this point in the discussion of preemption, see infra Part IV. 
 178. See supra text accompanying notes 32–43. 
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states to have input in determining the precise bounds of the agency 
determination. For example, an entity asserting that federal 
regulation has displaced state law could raise that assertion as a 
defense to enforcement of state law in a state administrative or 
judicial proceeding. This allows states an opportunity to clarify both 
how their laws operate and to communicate their regulatory interests 
in the context of a particular concrete controversy. Ultimately, state 
courts can, and do, resist broad assertions of preemption by a federal 
agency, forcing the agency to clarify the issue by subsequent action 
(for example, a rule amendment or interpretive rule).179 In short, the 
relationship between the agency and the federal system would 
constrain the agency from dictating its view to states without any state 
involvement and would facilitate a dialogue about the precise extent 
of the need for state regulatory authority. 
Judicial review also changes agency deliberation by changing the 
makeup of agency personnel. Because the agency must demonstrate 
its reasoned consideration of relevant issues, its staff includes a 
professionally diverse corps of experts who generally share a norm of 
nonpartisanship.180 That is not to say that agency decisions do not 
reflect politics. But the politics reflected in an agency’s decisions 
generally is dictated by the agency’s political overseers—Congress 
and the president—either directly or through the political appointees 
that head the agency.181 Professional agency staff members tend to see 
their role as implementing programs consistently with the political 
values of agency heads.182 
These factors support our view that, contrary to Professor 
Mendelson’s suggestion, agencies ought to serve as the primary 
institution for considering programmatic federalism values. Whatever 
 
 179. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism in Action: FDA Regulatory Preemption in 
Pharmaceutical Cases in State Versus Federal Courts, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 1013, 1035–36 (2007) 
(detailing one state court’s total lack of respect for an FDA preemption policy and explaining 
why state courts are apt to be less deferential to federal agencies than federal courts). 
 180. See JOHN BREHM & SCOTT GATES, WORKING, SHIRKING, AND SABOTAGE: 
BUREAUCRATIC RESPONSE TO A DEMOCRATIC PUBLIC 196–99 (1999); MARISSA MARTINO 
GOLDEN, WHAT MOTIVATES BUREAUCRATS? POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION DURING THE 
REAGAN YEARS 155–56 (2000). 
 181. See GOLDEN, supra note 180, at 31–32 (describing how the Reagan “administrative 
presidency” constrained bureaucrats to cooperate with the political agenda of agency heads). 
 182. See Mark Seidenfeld, Why Agencies Act: A Reassessment of the Ossification Critique of 
Judicial Review, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 22 & n.79, on file with 
authors) (“[S]taff members in most agencies will act to support the policies of their politically 
appointed overseers, whether or not the members agree with these policies.”). 
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their skill at interpreting abstract federalism, agencies are well suited 
for evaluating the benefits of both localism and the need for 
experimenting within the programs they regulate.183 Agencies are 
informed of the extent to which geographic variations warrant 
different regulatory approaches, as well as the extent of problems 
with all existing regulatory paradigms that might warrant using states 
as laboratories to develop new approaches. In addition, the agency is 
keenly aware of the potential for state regulation to interfere with its 
federal regulatory program. Courts, Congress, and the president do 
not have a sufficiently intricate understanding of federal regulatory 
programs to fully appreciate the potential costs of lack of uniformity 
or of local resistance to federal regulatory policy. 
Nor do states often strike the right federalism balance. States 
tend to want to expand their own power and autonomy even when 
uniformity or less spillover would be theoretically preferable.184 
Allowing agencies to evaluate federalism issues, coupled with a 
demand by courts that agencies deliberate and explicitly give reasons 
for any federalism decisions they make, thus promises to factor 
programmatic federalism values more accurately into regulatory 
decisions than would reliance on the legislature and courts to make 
such decisions. 
One might reason that courts can factor agency input about 
programmatic federalism values into their decisions and therefore 
that courts should be the institution ultimately responsible for 
deciding how to accommodate states’ interests in federal regulatory 
programs. But the relationship between courts and agencies is not 
symmetrical. Unlike agencies, courts not only have limited knowledge 
of pragmatic day-to-day concerns about federal regulatory programs, 
 
 183. See McGinnis, supra note 55, at 920, 926 (arguing that the president is more likely than 
Congress to maximize national welfare); Mendelson, supra note 29, at 788 (acknowledging 
superior agency capabilities on this front); Metzger, supra note 63, at 2043 (noting avenues for 
state influence on agencies). 
 184. Cf. Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. 
L. REV. 23, 98–99 (1994) (arguing that local jurisdictions will self-interestedly draw resources 
from national commons, whereas executives, with a national constituency, will not). 
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but they also have little incentive to pay sufficient heed to such 
concerns.185 
Administrative deliberation is also enhanced by the various types 
of analyses that the president and Congress require agencies to 
perform. Executive orders require agencies to consider a variety of 
impacts—the most noted of which mandates cost-benefit analyses for 
major rules.186 But other less well-known mandates in executive 
orders include the requirement that agencies evaluate the impact of 
their regulations on state, local, and tribal government.187 In fact, 
Executive Order 12,866 explicitly invokes involvement of the public, 
and State, Local, and Tribal officials in regulatory planning as one 
purpose of its mandated Planning Mechanism.188 
Professor Mendelson asserts that agencies generally ignore the 
mandate to consider impacts on state and local government, noting 
that few agency analyses include federalism impact assessments.189 
This, however, is not surprising. The mandate is internal to the 
executive branch, and presidents are unlikely to hold agencies to 
comply with it when they are the force pushing for federal usurpation 
of state and local government functions. In essence, Executive Orders 
offer at most rather low-powered incentives for agency staff.190 
Courts, however, can create rather higher-powered incentives for 
agency deliberation. For instance, under State Farm and other rules of 
hard look review, a court can reject an agency decision outright, or 
reciprocally (by relaxing the stringency of review) greatly lower the 
effort an agency must invest in any given decision.191 Thus, to the 
 
 185. For federal judges, who enjoy life tenure, politics is irrelevant to their pecuniary 
interests, and the success of agency programs is relevant to the nonpecuniary rewards, such as 
recognition for their craft, that motivate most judges’ decisions. For a discussion of judicial 
motivations, see supra text accompanying notes 86–87. 
Courts, however, can force themselves to take agency views into account by creating rules 
of deference to agency views. See infra Part III.C., which takes up the question of the 
appropriate rule of deference further. 
 186. See McGinnis, supra note 55, at 923–26. 
 187. See id. at 923–24. 
 188. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 1(b)(9), 3 C.F.R. 638, 638 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 
(2006). 
 189. Mendelson, supra note 29, at 783–86; Mendelson, supra note 4, at 718–19. 
 190. For a discussion of the president’s tools for agency oversight, see supra Part II.C.2 
 191. See Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 
DUKE L.J. 1385, 1411 (1992); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 
47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 67–68 (1995); Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Ossification, supra note 
117, at 514. On the rewards side, see Gersen, supra note 134, at 215; Metzger, supra note 63, at 
2056–58. 
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extent that agency deliberation about federalism may appear at first 
to lag, courts can adjust doctrine to spur it. 
Because agencies and courts each have their strengths when 
considering federalism, the best institution for allocating power 
between the federal government and the states depends on the 
precise circumstances of the regulatory matter. If issues of abstract 
federalism seem paramount, courts are the superior forum; if the 
programmatic federalism issues predominate, agencies are the 
preferable forum. We suspect that for most issues, agencies are the 
better forum. Abstract federalism concerns are relatively insignificant 
in the modern era, and courts can strengthen agency deliberation 
through doctrines of review. 
C. Political Accountability of Legislative, Judicial and Agency 
Processes 
Finally, opponents of agency control of federalism 
determinations have sometimes maintained that Congress is more 
accountable than agencies.192 Administrative law scholars are likely 
already familiar with the various reasons to doubt this claim, but we 
review the reasons herein, and apply them to this discussion. 
In comparing accountability of the three institutions of 
government, at first blush it appears that Congress enjoys a distinct 
advantage because its members are directly elected, while agency and 
judicial decisionmakers are not. But elections are fraught with 
imperfections that potentially interfere even with basic accountability; 
simultaneously, there are extrapolitical mechanisms that keep 
administrative and even judicial decisionmaking from straying too far 
from public sentiments. These complications demand careful analysis 
of the relative accountability of Congress and agencies.193 
1. Legislative Accountability.  Legislators are directly elected. If 
they stray too far from the preferences of their constituents and 
supporters, they will not likely be reelected.194 Because voters must 
 
 192. Jack W. Campbell IV, Regulatory Preemption in the Garcia/Chevron Era, 59 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 805, 832 (1998); Merrill, supra note 6, at 757; Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, supra note 
4, at 331. But see Mendelson, supra note 29, at 741–42. 
 193. We think the debate about judicial accountability is familiar enough, and, in light of 
Chevron’s acceptance of the superior accountability of agencies, settled enough, that we omit 
further discussion of it. 
 194. See David W. Brady et al., Differences in Legislative Voting Behavior Between Winning 
and Losing House Incumbents, in CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN HOUSE ELECTIONS 178, 181–
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incur costs to discern the true position of candidates on policy issues, 
however, the correlation between the positions of members of 
Congress and their constituents is attenuated.195 Moreover, accepted 
wisdom holds that incumbents in Congress enjoy a huge advantage 
over challengers.196 The relative safety that incumbents seeking 
reelection enjoy, all else being equal, illustrates the extent to which 
assessments of the merits of the candidates’ positions on issues do not 
drive many congressional elections. 
Congressional inertia in adopting legislation also can drive a 
wedge between current constituent preferences and legislative 
outcomes. Even if the political market worked perfectly in all respects 
except inertia, one could conclude only that statutes reflect public 
preferences at the time they are passed.197 Circumstances change, 
 
89 (David W. Brady et al. eds., 2000) (contending that representatives who take extreme 
positions relative to their district’s preferences increase their probability of electoral defeat); 
Robert S. Erkson & Gerald C. Wright, Representation of Constituency Ideology in Congress, in 
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN HOUSE ELECTIONS, supra, at 149, 177 (asserting that members of 
Congress “lose votes—and sometimes elections—if they stray too far ideologically [from their 
constituents]”). 
 195. See Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial 
Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 102 n.270 (1991) (explaining that voters are likely to engage in 
probabilistic voting—sometimes voting for alternatives contrary to their personal preferences—
when information costs discourage voters from being fully informed about the alternatives). 
Political parties and support of special interest groups provide information about candidates 
that help voters reduce information costs, but do not provide a perfect proxy for knowledge of 
candidates’ true position on policy issues. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive 
Psychology and Optimal Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 565 (2002) (discussing 
interest group influence); Ernest A. Young, Protecting Member State Autonomy in the European 
Union: Some Cautionary Tales from American Federalism, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1612, 1700–01 
(2002) (explaining that voters use parties as proxies for information on issues). 
 196. Incumbents have several advantages in overcoming voter information costs. They have 
greater name recognition; garner more press coverage; and enjoy a monopoly in delivering rents 
to interest groups, which yields contributions that fund communication with voters. See Ronald 
A. Cass, Money, Power, and Politics: Governance Models and Campaign Finance Regulation, 6 
SUPREME CT. ECON. REV. 1, 46–47 (1998) (discussing the “incumbency advantage”); Linda 
Cohen & Matthew Spitzer, Term Limits, 80 GEO. L.J. 477, 479–80 (1992) (listing some of the 
“tremendous advantages [that] incumbents enjoy over challengers”); Einer Elhauge, Are Term 
Limits Undemocratic?, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 83, 154–55 (1997) (discussing the advantages that 
incumbents have over their challengers in contested elections). Especially for representatives 
and less so for senators, the ability to garner votes by constituent service provides another 
advantage to incumbents. See Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 61, 139 (2006) (describing how casework for constituents gives incumbents an electoral 
advantage). 
 197. See Martin H. Redish & Theodore T. Chung, Democratic Theory and the Legislative 
Process: Mourning the Death of Originalism in Statutory Interpretation, 68 TUL. L. REV. 803, 836 
(1994) (commenting that legislative inertia is inherent in the political process and “severely 
limits Congress’s ability to bring outdated statutes in line with the times”). 
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however, and with them the propriety of a particular regulatory 
structure changes as well. 
Congress has ways other than legislating to influence the power 
of the federal government relative to the states—for example by 
threatening to limit agency appropriations,198 which must be passed 
every year for programs other than entitlement programs, or by 
hauling an agency head into hearings.199 Because these mechanisms do 
not exhibit the same inertia as the substantive legislative process, one 
might think that they provide alternatives by which Congress can 
exert its will on federalism issues without having to authorize agencies 
to address these issues. But except for appropriation riders, which 
have the potential to cause members of Congress to incur political 
costs,200 spending provisions and hearings do not limit or authorize 
state regulatory authority or otherwise affect the reach of state law. 
Rather, spending provisions work as carrots and sticks for agencies to 
translate congressional will into regulatory reality. In other words, for 
Congress pragmatically to maintain its influence over federalism, it 
must grant agencies discretion over the reach of state regulatory 
matters on programs that they administer.201 
2. Administrative Accountability.  Although agencies are not 
elected, they are subject to congressional and presidential oversight. 
Some scholars contend that Congress can largely dictate important 
 
 198. See LOUIS FISHER, THE POLITICS OF SHARED POWER: CONGRESS AND THE 
EXECUTIVE 100 (4th ed. 1998). 
 199. See Beermann, supra note 196, at 71–143 (surveying techniques, including committee 
hearings, for congressional control over executive). 
 200. Often appropriation riders “fly below the political radar,” and legislators may not even 
be aware of riders in bills on which they vote. Beermann, supra note 196, at 88–89. 
Commentators generally criticize riders for circumventing legislative accountability. See, e.g., id. 
at 88 (summarizing why appropriation riders are problematic from the standpoint of the 
legislative process); Thomas O. McGarity & Sidney A. Shapiro, OSHA’s Critics and Regulatory 
Reform, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 587, 643–44 (1996) (same). But their introduction can 
usually be traced back to particular legislators who then can take heat for attempting to force 
their colleagues to approve provisions that the entire body would not approve. See Carl Tobias, 
Natural Resources and the White Commission Report, 79 OR. L. REV. 619, 629–30 (2000) 
(reporting criticism by House leaders of an appropriation rider added by West Coast senators 
that would have bifurcated the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals). 
 201. The extent to which Congress is willing to delegate depends on relative costs to its 
members of creating policy themselves versus the agency cost that results from delegation. See 
EPSTEIN & O’HALLORAN, supra note 134, at 49 (describing the cost-benefit analysis involved in 
Congress’s decisionmaking process regarding the delegation of authority to agencies). 
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agency decisions,202 whereas other scholars assert that the president 
dictates the policies that agencies pursue and the regulations that they 
adopt.203 We do not believe that either congressional or presidential 
influence on agencies is such that agencies have no significant 
discretion even with respect to fundamental policy issues such as the 
relationship between federal and state authority over regulatory 
matters. We do, however, believe that both political branches of 
government sufficiently constrain agencies that their decisions 
generally do not deviate greatly from the postdeliberation 
preferences of the polity.204 In contrast to courts or Congress, agency 
decisions comport more closely with popular values because the 
political branches can flexibly influence agency action and agencies 
then can respond quickly to those influences.205 
As we have noted, Congress oversees agencies using a variety of 
mechanisms from formal passage of substantive legislation to 
informal threats of distracting and potentially embarrassing 
committee hearings.206 The need for Congress to rely on “fire alarms” 
to monitor agencies’ agendas provides a substantial advantage to 
focused interest groups in the oversight process.207 Nonetheless, the 
influence of interest groups on Congress does not fully translate into 
equal influence on agencies because congressional influence favoring 
interest groups is attenuated by Congress’s imperfect control over 
 
 202. See, e.g., McCubbins et al., supra note 175, at 257 (“Administrative procedures, 
however, can be used to guide agencies to make decisions that are broadly consistent with the 
policy preferences of political principals.”); see also Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & 
Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and 
the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 440–44 (1989) (describing mechanisms that 
limit agencies’ ability to pursue policies different than those supported by politicians); Charles 
Tiefer, Congressional Oversight of the Clinton Administration and Congressional Procedure, 50 
ADMIN. L. REV. 199, 200 (1998) (suggesting that congressional oversight of agencies helps to 
ensure that agencies’ actions are aligned with the wishes of congressional committees); Barry R. 
Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory 
Policymaking By the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765, 777–78 (1983) 
(describing the congressional influence on Federal Trade Commission policy implementation). 
 203. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2281 
(2001) (asserting that during the Clinton years “presidential control of administration . . . 
[moved] to the center of the regulatory landscape”). 
 204. Seidenfeld, supra note 118, at 1554. 
 205. Mashaw, supra note 160, at 512–13. 
 206. See supra notes 198–99 and accompanying text. 
 207. See McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 145, at 172 (noting that fire-alarm oversight 
“arguably emphasizes the interests of individuals and interest groups more than those of the 
public at large”). 
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agencies.208 In other words, slack in congressional control of agencies 
reduces the impact of the kinds of antideliberative biases that would 
affect congressional determinations of federalism issues. 
Like Congress, the president also has an array of formal and 
informal mechanisms for influencing agencies. Formally, the 
president, with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoints and 
often can fire an agency head unilaterally.209 The president can greatly 
influence the budget of agencies through the appropriations process 
and can employ the power of the bully pulpit and the press to focus 
on an agency and the popular support for agency programs.210 The 
president thus can influence particular agency decisions and perhaps 
even to dictate outcomes for salient regulatory issues. 
Although the precise effect of the president’s influence on an 
agency decision depends on the preferences of the president 
regarding that decision, the president is accountable to the electorate 
in every state. In addition, a president up for reelection has to receive 
votes from the electoral college, and state legislators are influential in 
what is essentially a state-by-state presidential election as well as in 
how the electoral votes for the state are allocated. Therefore, overall 
one should expect that presidential influence would make agencies 
more receptive to state concerns about their power over regulatory 
matters.211 
 
 208. Because legislative control over agencies is probably greater when one party controls 
both the White House and Congress, Neal Devins, Signing Statements and Divided Government, 
16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 63, 71–73 (2007), one-party rule increases the likelihood that 
interest group influence over Congress will spill over to agencies. 
 209. This power is not unlimited. See McGinnis, supra note 55, at 918 (“[F]iring an agency 
head is politically costly to the president.”). 
 210. See Thomas H. Hammond & Jack H. Knott, Who Controls the Bureaucracy?: 
Presidential Power, Congressional Dominance, Legal Constraints, and Bureaucratic Autonomy 
in a Model of Multi-Institutional Policy-Making, 12 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 119, 124 (1996) 
(reporting that many studies support the theory that the president plays “an agenda-setting role 
for congressional deliberations on agency appropriations”); Terry M. Moe, Control and 
Feedback in Economic Regulation: The Case of the NLRB, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1094, 1101 
(1985) (discussing the president’s influence over agencies, through the use of such mechanisms 
as the appointment process and the agency budget). 
 211. It is not surprising that every president since Ronald Reagan has issued or at least 
maintained an executive order requiring agencies specifically to consider state and local 
government concerns when regulating. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,132, 3 C.F.R. 206 (2000), 
reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2006) (requiring that federal agencies avoid conflict with state laws 
and keep preemption of state law to the “minimum level necessary”); Exec. Order No. 12,372, 
47 Fed. Reg. 30,959 (July 14, 1982) (requiring that federal agencies consult with local and state 
officials before proposing to limit state regulatory authority). 
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3. Comparative Responsiveness to Contemporaneous Values of 
the Polity.  One distinct advantage of agencies over courts and 
legislatures is that agencies are more responsive than either to current 
political preferences. Because of legislative inertia, Congress passes 
statutes infrequently. A court remaining true to the intent of the 
adopting Congress may be implementing old public preferences if the 
statute has not been revamped in years. Agencies, through both 
congressional and presidential influences, are more apt to be 
influenced by current political pressures because political influences 
on agencies are ongoing and flexible.212 
Whereas private litigants can be expected to keep courts aware 
of live controversies, litigants by themselves can do little to update 
the court about the preferences of the current polity. Over a long 
enough period of time, the political nature of the judicial 
appointment process ensures that the courts are not woefully out of 
touch with popular sentiments.213 But because judicial appointments 
happen infrequently and many judges sit for decades, one would 
expect that judicial outcomes would sometimes lag the preferences of 
the polity.214 
As with deliberativeness, courts have doctrinal options for 
overcoming their own shortcomings. Most significantly, a court can 
deal with change by incorporating into its own processes the dynamic 
judgment of agencies.215 But this partnership can only arise if judicial 
 
 212. Metzger, supra note 63, at 2042–43; see also Sunstein, Law and Administration After 
Chevron, supra note 4, at 2088 (suggesting that “administrators are in a far better position” to 
deal with changing circumstances than courts or the legislature); cf. Cuéllar, supra note 85, at 
485 (claiming that empirical evidence supports the notion that the notice-and-comment process 
changes regulatory outcomes). 
 213. See David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the Origins of 
Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1, 51 (2003) (opining that lack of public 
support doomed the Lochner era jurisprudence but its demise still required a change in the 
Justices on the Supreme Court); Neal Devins, How Constitutional Law Casebooks Perpetuate 
the Myth of Judicial Supremacy, 3 GREEN BAG 259 (2000) (stating that “populist resistance to 
Court decisionmaking often prompts the Court to recalibrate its position”). 
 214. The Lochner era is probably the most notorious example of judicial policy falling 
behind popular preferences. See Paul Finkelman, Civil Rights in Historical Context: In Defense 
of Brown, 118 HARV. L. REV. 973, 990 (2005) (reviewing MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM 
CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 
(2004)) (stating that during the Lochner era, the Court “was notorious for thumbing its nose at 
the will of the people”). 
 215. See, e.g., Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688, 
2700 (2005) (allowing an agency to overrule a lower federal court’s interpretation of a statute in 
certain circumstances to allow courts to consider the agency position on that interpretation); 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984) (creating 
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doctrine is open to agency consideration of the shifting field of 
federalism. 
III.  FEDERALISM 
In addition to the claim that Congress is institutionally superior 
to agencies, the second major rationale underlying the preference for 
congressional action is, as we have said, the claim that it represents a 
sort of second-best enforcement mechanism for constitutional values 
the Supreme Court is reluctant to defend directly. By demanding a 
clear statement from both houses of Congress together with the 
consent of the president (or a supermajoritarian agreement of the two 
houses alone) before federal power can displace state power, the 
Court increases the systemic resistance to expanded federal 
influence.216 
As a descriptive matter, this account seems hard to dispute. We 
could not seriously contend that it is more difficult to enact 
regulations than to enact clear legislation. 
Our method in this Part accordingly is a bit different from our 
approach in the last. Although we accept the factual premise behind 
the preference for Congress, we question its uniform application. 
Why should all expansions of federal power be equally difficult to 
implement? In some cases, we argue, federal agency action is 
consistent with, rather than at odds with, federalism values—for 
example, the agency is a better arena for state influence than 
Congress alone. Moreover, the normative justification behind 
sheltering the states may be stronger or weaker in varying 
circumstances. A realist view of federalism should account for these 
differences, rather than imposing a single, blanket presumption. 
A. The Case for Nuanced Evaluation of Federalism Effects 
Federalism is not a constitutional monolith, but instead a 
composite of somewhat related values, some of which at times rest 
uneasily together. In preserving local autonomy against a single, 
national rule, federalism offers citizens with differing preferences the 
 
doctrine under which courts are to defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous 
statutes). 
 216. See Mendelson, supra note 4, at 709–11 (discussing “justifications for the presumption 
against preemption of state law”); Mendelson, supra note 29, at 753 (“[C]ourts effectively make 
congressional deliberation a prerequisite to preemption.”); see also McGinnis, supra note 55, at 
902–03 (describing the relative ease of administrative enactments). 
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opportunity to craft a local rule that most nearly accords with their 
values.217 Local choices may prove impossible or counterproductive, 
however, when the results of a decision in one jurisdiction spill over 
to affect others.218 Similarly, although decentralization permits 
efficiency-enhancing competition, it may also result in higher political 
rents and compliance and lobbying costs, as well as a sacrifice of some 
potential economies of scale.219 Variety permits experimentation, but 
when new ideas result in positive externalities to other jurisdictions, 
innovation is likely to be produced at a socially suboptimal level.220 
 
 217. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457–58 (1991) (describing federalism and the 
importance of preserving the powers of state governments); Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: 
Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1498–99 (1987) (reviewing RAOUL 
BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS’ DESIGN (1987)) (discussing why local governments 
are more likely to pursue various policies that are popular with the electorate than is the 
national government); Oates, supra note 31, at 1122–23 (proposing that one rationale for a 
decentralized provision of goods and services is that local governments “possess knowledge of 
both local preferences and cost conditions”). Although we accept this efficiency-related value of 
federalism for the sake of argument, we note that one could reach the same goal using a 
centralized system that permitted but guided local experiments. Cf. Rubin & Feeley, supra note 
31, at 919–20 (“If we are truly serious about providing people with the exit option of choice, or 
the voice option of participation, we should provide those options universally, through a 
national, decentralized program.”). 
 218. Oates, supra note 31, at 1121. Additionally, the existence of beneficial spillovers 
suggests that local governments would produce public goods at a level below the social optimum 
because the benefits of the good are not realized by the provider. Id.; see also Tom Stacy & Kim 
Dayton, The Underfederalization of Crime, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 247, 289–90 (1997) 
(noting that states underenforce criminal laws because they fail to consider the benefits such 
enforcement provides to other states). 
 219. Rents, lobbying, and compliance costs can increase simply because, under a federal 
system, regulated entities have to monitor and lobby numerous local governments and comply 
with numerous standards that may be inconsistent with one another. See Jonathan R. Macey, 
Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of Regulation: Toward a 
Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REV. 265, 271–73 (1990) (offering high 
transaction costs as grounds for why interest groups prefer regulation at the national level); 
Daniel Shaviro, An Economic and Political Look at Federalism in Taxation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 
895, 919–21, 925–26 (1992) (describing costs of diversity in local taxing systems). But see Barry 
R. Weingast, The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and 
Economic Development, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 5 (1995) (contending that federalism usually 
induces competition among jurisdictions that might drive down monopoly rents demanded by 
local governments). Weingast’s prediction seems to us difficult to reconcile with the observed 
behavior of multijurisdictional businesses, which appear to prefer uniform rules to multifaceted 
competition. See, e.g., John A. Swain & Walter Hellerstein, The Political Economy of the 
Streamlines Sales and Use Tax Agreement, 58 NAT’L TAX J. 605, 613 (2005) (describing efforts of 
nationwide retailers to force states to harmonize their sales tax regimes). 
 220. For well-articulated statements of the proposition that jurisdictional variety leads to 
fruitful, competitive experimentation, see PAUL E. PETERSON, THE PRICE OF FEDERALISM 18–
19 (1995); William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The New Economics of Jurisdictional 
Competition: Devolutionary Federalism in a Second-Best World, 86 GEO. L.J. 201, 208–09 
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Finally, local governments may be a political counterweight to the 
national government, so that even if they are fruitless on their own 
they nonetheless help to preserve liberty or good government in the 
nation as a whole;221 the existence of multiple layers of government, 
however, may make the whole more opaque, reducing the 
responsiveness of elected officials both locally and nationally.222 
A key implication of these cross-cutting currents is that some 
apparent expansions of national power may actually better protect 
federalism values than the status quo. Spillovers are the readiest 
source of examples.223 Lax regulations in one state—be they on 
handguns, fireworks, or abortions—can make restrictions in nearby 
states largely fruitless.224 Upwind pollution makes East Coast clean-air 
efforts prohibitively expensive,225 for example, and tax havens siphon 
funds away from states with preferences for more government 
 
(1997). A number of critics argue that externalities will result in suboptimal experimentation if 
the government is committed to subnational actors. E.g., David Lazer, Regulatory Capitalism as 
a Networked Order: The International System as an Informational Network, 598 ANNALS AM. 
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 52, 60 (2005); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: 
Does Federalism Promote Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593, 594 (1980); Rubin & Feeley, 
supra note 31, at 925; Koleman Strumpf, Does Government Decentralization Increase Policy 
Innovation?, 4 J. PUB. ECON. THEORY 207, 208 (2002). 
 221. See Randy E. Barnett, The Ninth Amendment: It Means What It Says, 85 TEX. L. REV. 
1, 21 (2006) (“[A] principal end of federalism is the protection of the liberties of the people, 
both personal and political.”). 
 222. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1992); Matthew D. Adler & Seth F. 
Kreimer, The New Etiquette of Federalism: New York, Printz, and Yeskey, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 
71, 110. 
 223. See Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 405–09 (1997) 
(discussing economic rationales for federal control, including addressing externalities); Samuel 
Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1353, 1371–72 
(2006) (explaining that interstate externalities can be solved either by interstate compacts or 
uniform national standards). 
 224. See Daniel Abrams, Ending the Other Arms Race: An Argument for a Ban on Assault 
Weapons, 10 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 488, 516 (1992) (concluding that crimes committed with 
guns bought outside of a local jurisdiction make it difficult to assess the direct impact of local 
gun control laws); Kristin A. Goss, Policy, Politics, and Paradox: The Institutional Origins of the 
Great American Gun War, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 681, 700 (2004) (noting the position of the 
National Council to Control Handguns that local laws are ineffective). 
 225. See Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144 U. 
PA. L. REV. 2341, 2349–54 (1996) (recognizing externalities as a justification for federal 
environmental regulation, but arguing that the federal government has used its authority 
inefficiently); Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating 
State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1215–16 (1977) 
(arguing that negative externalities of pollution justifies federal environmental regulation). 
01__GALLE_SEIDENFELD.DOC 7/31/2008  9:55:16 AM 
1988 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 57:1933 
services.226 Federal regulation can adjust state autonomy to a level at 
which it is more nearly Kantian—that is, more consistent with the 
greatest freedom for all.227 Alternatively, the federal government 
might take the lead in policy setting in an area in which there is a 
need for experiment so that the decisionmakers would internalize the 
nationwide benefits of the information that would result.228 There are 
similar stories we could tell for each of federalism’s many tradeoffs. 
The likelihood that state autonomy sometimes undermines 
federalism in turn suggests that any rule throwing up broad barriers 
around that autonomy is probably ill advised. To be sure, it is possible 
that, notwithstanding the exceptions we identify, a general 
presumption against federal encroachments benefits the nation on 
net. But the overall benefits of the resulting rule could be further 
improved by raising the costs, not of all national regulation, but 
rather of only that federal regulation inconsistent with the best 
interests of the public. The only case in which that might not be true 
would be if the costs of adding nuance to the rule outweigh the 
benefits of greater precision. We return to that question shortly. 
First, though, to make our point as plainly as possible: on the 
assumption that resistance to national norms should be increased only 
when those norms disserve beneficial federalism, a clear statement of 
federal authority from an agency should often be as or more 
authoritative in a court’s eyes as a clear statement from Congress to 
the same effect.229 Although Congress has its strengths, such as its 
 
 226. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the 
Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1586–99 (2000) (describing how tax havens prevent 
other nations from setting optimal tax levels); Robin Boadway et al., The Consequences of 
Overlapping Tax Bases for Redistribution and Public Spending in a Federation, 68 J. PUB. ECON. 
453, 453–54 (1998) (discussing spillover effects resulting from individual states’ tax policies). 
 227. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 35 (John Ladd trans., 
1965) (1797). 
 228. See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic 
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 321–22 (1998) (offering an elaborate set of tools for 
incentivizing information sharing and innovation by local governments); Rose-Ackerman, supra 
note 220, at 615–16 (suggesting that the central government could offer grants or prizes to spur 
localities to innovate, but might be better off just contracting directly with private firms or 
having federal agencies create innovative policy). 
 229. In this respect we agree with Professor Merrill that the extent to which a regulation 
displaces state law might vary depending on the subject of the regulation, although we would 
also consider an array of other factors. Merrill, supra note 6, at 738–44; see also Dinh, supra note 
43, at 2098–99 (arguing that presumption against preemption applies only “where concern for 
state regulation properly plays a role”). But see Hills, supra note 28, at 6–8 (noting that 
Professor Merrill’s approach has some virtues but ultimately rejecting it as too difficult for 
courts to apply). As we explain in the next paragraph of the main text, Professor Hills’s criticism 
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ability to consider more abstract federalism questions, agencies 
frequently are in a better position to assess the programmatic costs 
and benefits of federalism, as we have demonstrated in Part II.C.230 
Their greater accuracy in this assessment in most instances will 
swamp the likely effects of underprotection of abstract federalism 
values. Again, the premise of the preference for congressional action 
is that it serves federalism values by increasing the cost and 
decreasing the volume of rules that reduce state autonomy. It would 
be counterproductive to increase the cost or reduce the volume of 
agency decisions that actually serve the proper goals of federalism. 
It might be argued in response that, taking into account decision 
and error costs, a bright-line rule requiring legislative action is still 
superior to one with exceptions for “good” regulations. For example, 
suppose that courts have limited resources, and that determining 
whether a given regulation is good for federalism values consumes a 
great deal of time and judicial effort.231 Improving the performance of 
the federalism-enhancing rule at the margins might then result in 
fewer resources for other court projects, including efforts to enforce 
federalism more directly. Even if federalism were the only value in 
play, a more nuanced rule might reduce the overall achievement of 
federalism’s ends. Further, a critic might contend that even in the 
event that courts’ resources are not especially limited, the court is 
more likely to sometimes reach the wrong results—allowing the 
federal government to expand too easily—because the nuanced rule 
is more difficult to apply.232 
Although these are empirical questions, one can get some sense 
of the size of the expected costs by considering the likely performance 
of agencies. As we have argued, agencies are highly skilled at most of 
the tasks that comprise a decision about federalism, and they often 
 
of the more nuanced approach is weaker against our version of judicial decisionmaking, because 
in our vision agency participation strengthens judicial capacity to find facts, analyze institutions, 
and adapt as those facts and institutions change. 
 230. See supra text accompanying notes 120–145. 
 231. For a discussion of these forms of judicial calculations in dealing with judicially-
manageable standards, see Fallon, supra note 52, at 1310–13. 
 232. Some have argued against “atom-splitting” analysis of these questions. See, e.g., Hills, 
supra note 28, at 56 (defending the presumption against preemption on the ground that it 
conserves judicial resources); Merrill, supra note 6, at 773–74; Jonathan H. Adler, Reckoning 
with Rapanos: Revisiting “Waters of the United States” and the Limits of Federal Wetland 
Regulation, 14 MO. ENVTL L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 24 (2006) (arguing that an uncertain federalism 
doctrine limits state autonomy). 
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have incentives to exercise those skills on behalf of states.233 To the 
extent that agencies are relatively disinclined to examine closely the 
federalism implications of their decisions, courts can offer them 
additional incentives to do so through rules of review and deference 
that increase or decrease the agency’s cost and reward structure.234 
Granting a higher degree of deference for thoroughly reasoned 
agency-federalism decisions therefore serves two dovetailing ends for 
the court: it reduces the court’s cost of conducting its own 
independent research and analysis while increasing the likelihood that 
the agency decision is right.235 
Moreover, the court’s own performance is likely to be weaker 
without the benefit of agency consideration. From time to time 
Congress will overcome the resistance norm and enact clear 
legislation. On those occasions the courts may have to outright decide 
the question of the appropriate scope of national authority. They will 
be far better positioned to do so if they can draw on the extensive 
analysis and research of an agency that has already considered the 
question, experimented with alternative outcomes, and updated its 
results as the world changes.236 Indeed, the Supreme Court’s 
performance in balancing on its own the competing interests that 
federalism entails have been so uninspiring that both commentators 
and Justices themselves have often called for it to give up the 
project.237 
Although Congress too can deliberate, courts should prefer to 
encounter federalism questions in the context of agency, rather than 
congressional, enactments. As we have argued, there is little 
mechanism in the legislative branch for ongoing reevaluation of a 
policy, and the very high costs of legislative change decrease the 
likelihood that Congress will respond definitively to new events.238 
 
 233. See supra Part II.B.3.a. 
 234. See supra notes 176–82 and accompanying text. 
 235. This is not to say that we endorse Chevron deference to agency federalism decisions. 
Our view is that the most sensible deference approach is a sliding scale. See infra Part III.C. 
 236. JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO 
IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 164–80 (1997); see also Dorf & Sabel, supra note 228, at 363 (stating that 
in a regime led by agency experimentation, “courts [would] decide administrative law cases 
against a detailed backdrop of fact”). 
 237. Hills, supra note 28, at 6. 
 238. We acknowledge that the superior adaptability of agencies depends to some extent on 
the rules for judicial review of agency decisions, some of which have the potential to “ossify” the 
regulatory process. For a discussion of the optimal set of rules of judicial review, see infra Part 
III.C. 
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True deliberation may be rare in an institution that strikes internal 
bargains to overcome its own inertia. And courts would have more 
influence over agency deliberation, helping ensure that agencies took 
great care before displacing state law so that the expected outcome 
would be less likely to displace state law when that would be bad 
policy. 
On the other hand, there may be some policy decisions in which 
Congress, because of its structure, provides unique information for 
the courts to appraise. This is arguably more likely to be the case 
when abstract federalism concerns loom larger than economic ones.239 
Thus, for example, it could make sense for the courts to look for clear 
congressional authorization of agency action before crediting a 
determination of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms on 
states’ rights to regulate guns, notwithstanding the Second 
Amendment.240 In those instances, a congressional clear statement 
rule might be more defensible because without the information 
Congress provides, the court could be unable to determine whether 
the policy serves or disserves abstract federalism values.241 
Congress may also be epistemically superior to agencies when 
there is some question whether a policy is on net nationwide welfare 
enhancing.242 For instance, imagine that widgets can be manufactured 
 
 239. Again, by “abstract” federalism we mean rights-preserving federalism, in which divided 
government reduces the likelihood of tyranny. Professor Galle would like to note here that he 
finds this argument considerably less persuasive than does Seidenfeld. 
 240. That is, because the Second Amendment is sometimes said to be a structural device for 
resisting government encroachments, abstract federalism concerns would likely loom larger in 
that context. 
 241. On the other hand, as we have noted, we think the significance of abstract federalism is 
minimal in the modern world, where there seems no serious danger that the states will disappear 
as rival sources of political authority to the federal government. 
 242. To our mind this is the main significance of the suggestion, which we think implicit in 
Sunstein’s work, that the congressional clear statement rule is appealing because Congress is 
more “democratic” than are agencies. Although Sunstein does not outright assert this argument, 
he notes that the superior democratic pedigree of legislatures is one of the points usually offered 
in favor of nondelegation. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, supra note 4, at 319–20. He then 
suggests that the nondelegation arguments he canvasses are more persuasive in the instance of 
constitutional avoidance. Id. at 321; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s 
Power to Say What the Law Is, 115 YALE L.J. 2580, 2610 (2006) (stating that the avoidance 
canon “grants the executive exactly the degree of discretion that it deserves to possess”). This 
seems a tentative endorsement of the democracy argument. 
As a general proposition, we think the argument for representativeness per se is 
incoherent. We agree with Professor Edward Rubin that there is no persuasive account of 
representation that specifies the proper degree of representativeness of government. See 
Edward L. Rubin, Getting Past Democracy, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 711, 713–15 (2001) (proposing 
that a government should be analyzed in terms of its interactions with its citizens, as opposed to 
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to be either red or green. There are some economies of scale in 
production and distribution if all widgets nationwide are the same 
color, which would generate a modest amount of consumer and 
producer surplus. Federalism—in this case, the instrumental goal of 
federalism to enhance nationwide welfare through diversification of 
local choices—would thus be served by maintaining a local choice of 
widget color if, but only if, welfare losses for those consumers who 
would prefer to purchase widgets in the alternative color would 
exceed the size of this surplus. 
One might argue that Congress is better designed to produce 
information about these kinds of net welfare determinations.243 If 
agency costs are small, majority voting by representatives elected 
regionally, combined with logrolling, should permit those groups 
whose disutility would exceed any national gain from uniformity to 
kill the legislation.244 If the bill passes, therefore, it is relatively easy 
for a court to conclude that it is welfare increasing for the nation as a 
whole. The agency’s decision to regulate does not signal welfare 
maximization as strongly. True, the president heads the executive 
branch and is elected nationally.245 Still, even if agency costs are quite 
low, and the president truly represents every state (rather than, say, 
“swing” states), it remains possible that the president’s position more 
nearly represents the median national voter than the total national 
welfare.246 The executive has no built-in internal logrolling mechanism 
 
generalized notions of democracy). Democracy’s value must lie either in its power to enable 
individual participation in government or in its epistemic qualities—that is, its ability to reach 
better results because of the quality of deliberation it entails. Thus, we take Sunstein’s point to 
be a claim that Congress, because of the way in which it provides for representation, can better 
be relied on to produce welfare-enhancing outcomes. 
 243. See McGinnis, supra note 55, at 942–43 (conceding that because the executive is more 
“centralized,” it may be less skilled at correctly estimating the costs and benefits of regulation). 
 244. In other words, if a bill would cost 25 percent of the nation 100 utils per person but gain 
the other three-quarters 5 utils, the bill will fail because representatives of the disfavored 
quarter will be able to trade their votes on less important matters to defeat the proposed bill. 
 245. Calabresi, supra note 184, at 35 (arguing that a national election of the president 
renders the president more likely to maximize national welfare); Kagan, supra note 203, at 2335 
(same). 
 246. That is, the president might maximize votes rather than derive a policy based on the 
intensity of voter preferences. Thus, it is possible that the president would favor a policy that 
was weakly favorable for 51 percent of the nation and strongly unfavorable to the other 49 
percent. Political science suggests that this outcome is unlikely, but it does so only by relaxing 
the assumption that there are little or no agency costs. E.g., George J. Stigler, The Theory of 
Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 11–12 (1971) (explaining that policy 
outcomes depend on expression of preferences, not simply votes). On the question whether the 
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for trading off stronger for weaker preferences. Thus, the agency 
decision to regulate may or may not increase welfare. An agency 
might have to rely on relatively complex and controversial tools, such 
as contingent valuation surveys, to assure the court that its decision 
was as good as the legislature’s.247 
This argument, however, fails under a straightforward 
application of public choice theory.248 For instance, when there are 
agency costs, the opacity of the logrolling process may facilitate 
welfare-diminishing bargains.249 There is no scholarly consensus 
whether Congress is more or less subject to interest group pressures 
than the Executive; we tend to side with those who say “more,” but 
we recognize that the debate is still open.250 In any event, in order to 
justify a demand for a clear statement from Congress under this 
rationale, one would have to believe that Congress’s failure to act 
sends a meaningful signal about national welfare. Thanks to the high 
costs of any definitive congressional action, though, relying on 
 
president may target swing voters in swing states rather than the welfare of the whole nation, 
see Nzelibe, supra note 140, at 1235–39. 
 247. A fine overview of the challenges of demonstrating that a regulatory policy is optimal 
in some sense, such as overall well being, can be found in Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, 
Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L.J. 165, 172–87, 225–43 (1999). For examples of 
discussion on the use of citizen surveys in making these determinations, see William H. 
Desvousges et al., Measuring Natural Resource Damages with Contingent Valuation: Tests of 
Validity and Reliability, in CONTINGENT VALUATION: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 91, 91–93, 113–
114 (Jerry A. Hausman ed., 1993); Peter A. Diamond & Jerry A. Hausman, Contingent 
Valuation: Is Some Number Better Than No Number?, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 45, 47–48 (1994). 
 248. Cf. Mendelson, supra note 29, at 772 (“[T]he President may be better able than 
Congress to register the full intensity of the public’s preferences.”). 
 249. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
 250. Compare MASHAW, supra note 236, at 152 (“The President has no particular 
constituency to which he or she has special responsibility to deliver benefits. Presidents are 
hardly cut off from pork-barrel politics. Yet issues of national scope and the candidates’ 
positions on those issues are the essence of presidential politics.”), and MANCUR OLSON, THE 
RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC GROWTH, STAGFLATION, AND SOCIAL 
RIGIDITIES 50–52 (1982) (“[I]ndividual members of Congress are overwhelmingly influenced by 
the parochial interests of their particular districts and by special-interest lobbies.”), and Frank 
H. Easterbrook, The State of Madison’s Vision of the State: A Public Choice Perspective, 107 
HARV. L. REV. 1328, 1341 (1994) (“A President may resist claims by factions . . . by adding 
other items to the agenda.”), and Daniel B. Rodriguez, Management, Control, and the Dilemmas 
of Presidential Leadership in the Modern Administrative State, 43 DUKE L.J. 1180, 1193–96 
(1994) (discussing the comparative advantage resulting from the president’s national 
constituency), with Nzelibe, supra note 140, at 1249 (acknowledging “that individual legislators 
may be primarily concerned with their constituents” but concluding that Congress has “a 
comparative advantage over the president in understanding the potential costs and tradeoffs 
involved in any specific legislation”). 
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congressional inaction as a signal of anything meaningful is dubious—
a familiar point to students of the dormant commerce clause.251 
In sum, there is little reason to believe that a bright-line rule 
prohibiting executive expansions of federal power serves beneficial 
federalism better than a more nuanced one. Without agency 
assistance, courts are more likely to draw the borders of state 
autonomy wrongly, and the court can design rules for reviewing 
agency deliberations that both increase accuracy and reduce judicial 
effort. We would add further that even if the considerations were in 
equipoise, false negatives (wrongly rejecting some good policies as 
bad for state autonomy) are just as bad as false positives (wrongly 
permitting some policies that are bad for state autonomy).252 As we 
have shown, many false negatives would themselves undermine 
federalism values. Therefore, even if one wanted to choose the 
position that was most likely to minimize federalism-damaging errors, 
it is quite possible that ours is that position. 
B. Formalism Strikes Back: Must the Judiciary Have Exclusive 
Control Over Deliberations About Federalism? 
The story we have given so far depends on a willingness to 
acknowledge that the legal realism that animates administrative law 
also should inform constitutional doctrine. If constitutional outcomes 
turn on complex questions of fact and political judgment, it is sensible 
that agencies should play at least some role in their resolution. 
Indeed, our argument depends on the stricture that, before agencies 
can approach constitutional boundaries between state and federal 
governments, they must first deliberate about the wisdom of their 
choice to do so. This logic has one significant sticking point. At the 
time of this writing, the Supreme Court seems somewhat hostile to 
constitutional legal realism, and clings instead to a more formalist 
claim that in constitutional matters it must remain solely for the Court 
to say what the law is.253 In this Section we briefly consider whether 
 
 251. Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the 
Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J. 569, 588–90; see also Hills, supra note 28, 
at 12 (describing causes of congressional gridlock). 
 252. For an argument that the presumption is an effort to avoid erroneous preemptions, see 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 
1024–25 (1989). 
 253. United States v. Georgia, 126 S. Ct. 877, 880–82 (2006); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 
U.S. 507, 519–20, 529, 532 (1997) (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 
01__GALLE_SEIDENFELD.DOC 7/31/2008  9:55:16 AM 
2008] ADMINISTRATIVE LAW’S FEDERALISM 1995 
formalism has any appeal. In fact, we concede that it has its place, but 
we argue that the most sensible application of the principles that 
would justify it suggests that formalism should only rarely bar an 
agency from deliberating about and affecting state authority.254 
To begin with the points in favor of limiting agency authority to 
consider the Constitution, claims that constitutional reasoning is 
different from other legal interpretation and that it is uniquely the 
realm of judges may serve to reinforce the uniqueness of the judicial 
role. This in turn offers two somewhat distinct advantages for the 
judiciary. For one, as others have noted, it may be a way of deflecting 
popular discontent over countermajoritarian outcomes.255 If 
constitutional law is “law” whereas all else is simply part of “politics,” 
then judges can assert that their constitutional rulings are not the 
product of their own preferences but instead the result of following 
the law wherever it leads. Reserving this law-giving power to judges 
might signal to the populace that the judiciary is uniquely qualified 
for that role, so that its views are legitimate and ought to be accepted. 
Relatedly, the signal of judicial uniqueness may help to shape the 
internal psychological norms of judging, so that in fact judges do 
behave differently than other political actors.256 
Neither of these points persuades us that agencies should be 
prohibited from or presumed incompetent at reasoning about 
federalism. Exclusivity—barring Congress and agencies from relying 
on their own constitutional reasoning—cannot be an effective means 
of reducing political resistance to the judicial project, because a court 
acting alone is necessarily not minimalist but maximalist.257 Not only 
must it achieve all its goals with no assistance from the political 
branches—and thus with no partner to guide it to better outcomes or 
to share political heat—but it must also act often to defend its 
 
(1803)); see also Galle, supra note 87, at 165 (describing the Court’s claims to exclusive power to 
interpret the Constitution). 
 254. Others have taken a stronger stand in favor of constitutional deliberation in the 
executive branch. E.g., Kelley, supra note 60, at 886–91; Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, 
The Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1269–70 (1996); 
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 
83 GEO. L.J. 217, 264 (1994). 
 255. LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 237 (2004); Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and Political 
Instability, 84 VA. L. REV. 83, 93–94 (1998). 
 256. Galle, supra note 253, at 202–09. 
 257. Keith E. Whittington, Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation: Three Objections and 
Responses, 80 N.C. L. REV. 773, 796 (2002). 
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supposedly unique prerogatives. The claim that there is something 
distinctive about constitutional law is difficult to maintain against the 
fact that many decisions with constitutional overtones, such as the 
rules for access to the courthouse, are often politically crafted.258 
Although the courts could take over all such decisions (including their 
own budgets, presumably), that too is the path of maximalism. 
On the other hand, both aspects of judicial uniqueness can 
arguably be made cogent in limited circumstances. If the key to 
reinforcing the judiciary’s own professional norms is a claim to 
eliteness, judges could achieve that by staking a claim even to a small 
slice of constitutional law, such as particularly fundamental or central 
rules. And when constitutional rights are in conflict, the Supreme 
Court may want to limit competing interpretations that could inspire 
greater political resistance to its resolution (although this would come 
at the cost of losing potential insights about alternative solutions). 
Even if applied selectively, the claim of uniqueness could buttress a 
court that says its balancing on some particularly fundamental issues 
has special moral status.259 
The other potential justification for a formalist approach 
similarly has strong appeal only when applied narrowly. Some 
proponents of the formalist approach have contended that exclusive 
judicial control over the Constitution allows the Court to settle 
controversial social issues.260 That explanation seems strained as to the 
more practical, nuts-and-bolts aspects of constitutional law, or as to 
those, such as federalism, in which the underlying issues are based on 
fluid facts rather than enduring value debates.261 Moreover, given the 
possibility that cooperative interpretation produces better results, 
settlement seems foolish; it encourages courts to lock in inferior 
solutions.262 Still, there might be occasions in which an attractive 
answer seems evident and settlement would indeed be appealing. 
 
 258. See Galle, supra note 253, at 199. 
 259. For more extensive discussion of the tradeoffs inherent in partial claims of judicial 
exclusivity, see Galle, supra note 253, at 209–16. 
 260. Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 
110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1360–62, 1371–81 (1997); see also Merrill, supra note 6, at 757–58 
(arguing that a strong stare decisis rule for preemption would permit private actors to invest 
efficiently). 
 261. See Whittington, supra note 257, at 791 (arguing that exclusivity undermines the 
possibility that doctrine can adapt to change). 
 262. Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination 
Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 467, 514–15 (2000). 
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Therefore, we again see that the strongest arguments against 
agency determinations of federal power have force only occasionally. 
A formalist view of constitutional deliberation cannot explain, for 
example, a blanket presumption against preemption, or an all-
encompassing avoidance doctrine. At most, the formalist could at 
times rule out the sort of agency deliberation we invoke here. In the 
next Section, we sketch when those kinds of formalist complaints, 
combined with other considerations, could most forcefully limit 
agency action. 
C. Deference and Other Details 
Having proposed a more complex balancing test in place of a 
bright-line rule, we should explain how we expect our test to operate. 
We envision the central question as “should this agency action be 
permitted to displace state authority?”263 To our minds, the main 
factors at play should be the strength of the underlying interest in 
state autonomy, the agency’s decision process, the court’s need for 
information from the agency, the evidence of congressional 
authorization, the need for exclusive judicial control over 
fundamental constitutional issues, and the possibility of political 
externalities. 
The most fundamental factor for the court to consider would be 
the degree to which the underlying federalism norm needs shelter. As 
we have explained, not all encroachments on state power contravene 
the interests of federalism. In other situations, an agency decision 
taken in isolation might diminish state prerogatives, but a host of 
other surrounding factors bolster them. For instance, one small, 
detailed change to state tort law, in the context of a tort system that 
states overwhelmingly control, deserves less scrutiny than a 
preemption on the scale of the Employment Retirement Income 
Security Act.264 Alternatively, it may be that a preemption or other 
 
 263. As we have suggested, there are a number of different situations that would present 
this question, including agency interpretation of a statute in a manner that raises an issue about 
Congress’s power to involve the federal government in matters traditionally regulated by states, 
e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2000), as well as agency regulations that 
explicitly displace state regulations through preemption. 
 264. E.g., Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 208–09 (2006) (discussing the 
“expansive” preemptive effect of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act). We note 
that we do not think of a complete prohibition on private tort suits as a “small, detailed” 
change; we have in mind here something like statutes of limitations or rules for the admissibility 
of evidence. 
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state-displacing system provides other channels for state influence, 
such as the State Implementation Plan process common in 
environmental legislation.265 If the court is largely convinced that 
federal authority is consistent with federalism or makes only a small 
dent in it, then the “resistance” the court should provide ought to 
diminish accordingly. 
The process behind the federal decision is nearly as important as 
its substance. A thorough, deliberative decision, in which state and 
private stakeholders have a place at the table and a meaningful voice 
in outcomes, should command substantial respect. Again, we have 
explained why that is so: it both increases the likelihood that the 
outcome is a reasonable balancing and also influences future 
administrative actions further toward that end. 
A troublesome issue on this front is the state of administrative 
law deference doctrine. On the understanding prevailing in some 
influential places, such as the D.C. Circuit, courts and agencies have a 
distasteful set of choices.266 One option is Chevron deference, which is 
typically costlier in procedure for the agency, but which offers the 
agency extensive control over the legal outcome and the opportunity 
to change its finding over time in response to new developments or 
leadership.267 Alternatively, under Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,268 and its 
progeny, the agency can opt for procedurally simpler enactment but 
surrenders interpretive primacy to courts.269 The resulting holding is 
 
 265. See Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 470 (2004) (describing 
the State Implementation Plan process and the state role in it). 
 266. See Jonathan T. Molot, Ambivalence About Formalism, 93 VA. L. REV. 1, 40–42 (2007); 
Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliot, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal 
Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1059 (noting that the D.C. Circuit has affirmed agency 
decisions at a far lower rate than other circuits). 
 267. Kenneth A. Bamberger, Provisional Precedent: Protecting Flexibility in Administrative 
Policymaking, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1272, 1318–20 (2002); Schuck & Elliot, supra note 266, at 1047 
(finding that agencies frequently change their interpretations of statutes that have been 
judicially affirmed under Chevron review). 
 268. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
 269. Chevron and Skidmore deference represent differing methods for coordinating 
statutory meaning between two different interpreters, courts and agencies. Under a regime of 
Chevron deference, a court treats any reasonable agency interpretation of an uncertain 
statutory provision as the correct interpretation. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). In contrast, Skidmore deference is a matter of judicial 
prudence, under which an agency interpretation has at most the “power to persuade, if lacking 
power to control.” Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. Although the Supreme Court has left open some 
question as to when each mode is triggered, in general, agency determinations that issue after 
relatively formal notice-and-comment procedures receive binding, Chevron deference, whereas 
those that are issued informally by low-level agency officials receive only Skidmore regard. For 
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frozen as the definitive meaning of the statute until Congress revisits 
it or the agency expends the effort to enact regulations deserving of 
Chevron deference.270 
We doubt Chevron is flexible enough to capture all the nuances 
of our test.271 Perhaps the balancing we describe here could be 
shoehorned into a kind of Step One question inquiry—does the 
statute, in light of the background norms and other factors we 
describe, clearly prohibit expanded federal authority?272 But because 
an agency cannot alter Step One interpretations, any judicial holding 
that the statute does not grant authority to an agency would, through 
stare decisis,273 lock the court into its position. Yet one of the key 
advantages of involving agencies in the federalism decision is their 
ability to help update the accuracy of a legal decision over time. And 
even a holding that the agency did have authority would leave the 
court unable adequately to ensure agency deliberation about 
federalism concerns. 
Similarly, it is uncertain whether adding a rule that determines 
when the Chevron framework applies to an agency interpretation—
the so-called “Step Zero” question—can be changed absent 
intervening congressional action.274 On our reading of Barnhart v. 
Walton,275 Step Zero holdings could be changed by courts in response 
 
further discussion of all these points, see Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s 
Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 838–63 (2001). 
 270. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2700 
(2005) (holding that an agency can alter lower court interpretations of ambiguous statutes by 
proceeding in a manner that triggers Chevron deference). 
 271. A court’s review of an agency interpretation under Chevron deference comprises two 
steps. First, the court determines whether Congress has clearly indicated its intended outcome. 
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. If so, that outcome prevails, regardless of the agency’s views. Id. If 
Congress has not clearly resolved the issue at hand, however, then at Step Two, the court asks 
whether the agency’s interpretation is reasonable. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 
227 (2001). If so, it is controlling. Id. Agencies can alter their views of what is the most 
reasonable view of an ambiguous statute and still command Chevron deference from courts. 
Brand X, 125 S. Ct. at 2701. A court’s determination of Congress’s intent at Step One, however, 
is a definitive reading of the statute that the agency is not free to alter. Id. 
 272. See Mendelson, supra note 29, at 745–46 (discussing this possibility). 
 273. The Court is reluctant to revisit its own interpretations of statutes. Leegin Creative 
Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2720 (2007) (“[C]oncerns about maintaining 
settled law are strong when the question is one of statutory interpretation.”). 
 274. See Gersen, supra note 134, at 207, 217, 226, 235, 243. For the origin of the term and its 
explication, see Merrill & Hickman, supra note 269, at 912–13; Cass Sunstein, Chevron Step 
Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187 passim (2006). 
 275. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002). 
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to new information alone.276 In our view, that decision makes the 
deference determination turn on what look to be fluctuating factors, 
such as the thoroughness and quality of agency deliberation.277 But 
there are those who disagree with our view on that point.278 
Finally, we think placing our test at Step Two would likely water 
it down hopelessly. Step Two is intended to be highly deferential to 
agencies, and we doubt courts would be willing under that rubric to 
impose fairly rigorous restraints on regulations that seriously distort 
federalism norms.279 
If Chevron is too inflexible, then granting only Skidmore 
deference to agencies’ federalism-tinged decisions would be inflexible 
 
 276. See id. at 222 (holding that the question of whether or not to grant an agency 
interpretation Chevron deference turns on “the interstitial nature of the legal question, the 
related expertise of the Agency, the importance of the question to administration of the statute, 
the complexity of that administration, and the careful consideration the Agency has given the 
question over a long period of time”). 
 277. See Gersen, supra note 134, at 218–19. Others offer this view of Mead as well. E.g., Lisa 
Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 VAND. L. 
REV. 1443, 1457 (2005). 
 278. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001) (tying Chevron deference 
to congressional intent about whether the means an agency chose to make an interpretation has 
the “force of law”); see also Merrill & Hickman, supra note 269, at 882 (advocating a formal 
rather than fact driven test for when agency has power to issue binding regulations). 
 279. See Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-
KENT. L. REV. 1253, 1261 & n.35 (1997) (noting that in the first thirteen years applying 
Chevron, the Supreme Court never struck down an agency interpretation at Step Two, but also 
reporting D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals cases that applied something akin to hard look review 
at Step Two); Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking 
in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83, 96 (1994) (“[O]nce [a court] 
reaches step two, it rarely reverses an agency interpretation as unreasonable.”). By our count, 
which is admittedly not comprehensive, after twenty-four years of living with Chevron, the 
Supreme Court has reversed an agency at Step Two only once, in that case because the agency 
interpretation fell outside the bounds of the ambiguity in the statute. See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa 
Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 388–89 (1999) (holding that the requirements that network elements be 
necessary for them to be subject to open access requirements under the 1996 
Telecommunications Act could not support a rule opening access to all network elements). 
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in spades.280 That is, because National Cable & Telecommunications 
Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services (Brand X)281 seems to make 
entitlement to Chevron deference a precondition for an agency’s 
power to overturn a prior judicial interpretation,282 a regime in which 
agencies can earn only Skidmore deference would mean that once a 
court interprets a statute, the agency cannot change that 
interpretation. That inflexibility defeats nearly all of the objectives of 
our test. In addition to sacrificing adaptability and ongoing ties to a 
more democratic decisionmaker, inflexibility also diminishes the 
rewards to the agency for following the court’s proscribed 
procedures.283 Skidmore also fails on the incentives front by making 
the rewards to the agency for good and open deliberation too 
uncertain. Considering the costs of the form of decisionmaking we 
recommend, the rewards to the agency must be correspondingly 
large. Accordingly, courts must have flexibility to commit to a level of 
deference that, if short of what Chevron offers, is nonetheless more 
than the empty tautology into which some courts have made 
Skidmore.284 
To us, then, the solution is that the appropriate level of 
deference is something of an amalgam of Skidmore and hard look 
 
 280. Mead, 533 U.S. at 249–50 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Some commentators have suggested 
that Skidmore is the more malleable of the two deference doctrines, in that it offers courts more 
factors to consider in deciding whether or not to defer to an agency than the putatively wooden 
Chevron Step One analysis. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal 
Law?, 110 HARV. L. REV. 469, 509 n.198 (1996) (suggesting that Skidmore is malleable enough 
to support strong Chevron-type deference in appropriate situations); Merrill & Hickman, supra 
note 269, at 913 (noting the pragmatic nature of the Skidmore inquiry). If, however, one takes 
seriously the Court’s opinion in Barnhart, then Chevron deference too can depend on a sliding 
scale of factors. 
For advocates of Skidmore deference in the context of agency efforts to preempt state 
law, see Mendelson, supra note 29, at 797 (suggesting Skidmore deference for federalism issues 
of interpretation); Sharkey, supra note 21, 491–98 (suggesting Skidmore deference at least to 
agency determination of facts and policy considerations that would support or undermine 
preemption). 
 281. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688 (2005). 
 282. See Brand X, 125 S. Ct. at 2701. 
 283. See Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. 
REV. 1, 28–29, 93 (1997); Gersen, supra note 134, at 215 (noting that deference is a form of 
positive incentive courts can offer to agencies). 
 284. See Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore 
Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1252–53 (2007) (describing one judicial interpretation of 
Skidmore that “in effect . . . directs courts to treat the agency’s view just as it would the view of 
any litigant”). 
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review.285 Under this modification, the courts should look not only at 
the institutional factors that justify deference to the agency but also at 
the procedural posture in which the decision was made and at the 
agency reasoning explicitly explaining its determination on federalism 
values. Courts could grant something close to binding deference to 
well-crafted federalism decisions. Moreover, as with Chevron, agency 
determinations to which a court defers should probably be 
provisional—that is, subject to change by the agency itself.286 
Flexibility is crucial because, as Professor Merrill himself has argued, 
much of what goes into a decision about the appropriate national or 
state character of a program is highly fact dependent and prone to 
change over time.287 To the extent that this flexibility imposes some 
 
 285. At bottom, then, our approach may at times be similar to Professor Merrill’s and 
Professor Young’s. Merrill suggests that although agencies ought not have any power to 
preempt absent clear congressional authorization, when such authorization has been given, 
courts should grant a Skidmore-like sliding scale of deference to the agency’s views, depending 
on agency expertise and the quality of its deliberations. Merrill, supra note 6, at 775. Our main 
qualm with that approach is that we would grant deference regardless of what Congress had 
expressly said. Professor Young, like us, would tie the level of deference to a variety of factors, 
although our list of factors is rather different than his. See Young, supra note 4, at 891–92. He 
shares with Merrill, however, the view that federal law should cabin agency power to preempt in 
a variety of ways we would not. Id.at 896–900. 
To be clear, though we describe the deference we advocate as akin to Skidmore, our test 
would trigger greater deference based on factors unique to federalism rather than those set out 
by Justice Jackson. Moreover, we at times would grant binding or near-binding deference to an 
agency’s views when our factors suggest that such deference is appropriate. Thus, we disagree 
with Professor Mendelson’s suggestion in her contribution to this symposium, Nina A. 
Mendelson, The California Greenhouse Gas Waiver Decision and Agency Interpretation: A 
Response to Galle and Seidenfeld, 57 DUKE L.J. 2157, 2158–59 (2008), that our bottom line is the 
same as hers. 
 286. Cf. Richard W. Murphy, A “New” Counter-Marbury: Reconciling Skidmore Deference 
and Agency Interpretive Freedom, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 5, 41–42 (2004) (arguing for agency 
power to revisit interpretations that have received Skidmore deference). One of us (Professor 
Galle) views this as a minor development in administrative law because he believes it is 
inevitable that there soon will be a Brand X for the Skidmore doctrine. Given the disadvantages 
of complete inflexibility for courts, agencies, and the public, and the sheer doctrinal complexity 
of determining which of the courts’ hundreds of pre-Chevron decisions should be subject to 
Brand X, the Supreme Court will face enormous pressure to treat both forms of deference 
similarly. On the other hand, the other of us (Professor Seidenfeld) thinks that because some of 
these disadvantages can be overcome if the agency responds to a Skidmore decision with a 
regulation earning it Chevron deference, change is neither inevitable nor necessarily welcome. 
But it might be said in turn that the additional effort of promulgating more formal regulations is 
precisely what agencies hope to avoid. In any event, we reserve a more extended debate for 
another forum. 
 287. Merrill, supra note 6, at 742–44. 
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planning costs on parties, courts could use other tools to increase the 
costs or diminish the rewards of change at the agency level.288 
That wraps up our detour into deference doctrine; we move on 
now to the third significant factor at play in the decision to permit 
agencies to expand federal power, specifically, the need for more 
information. This factor is tied closely to the considerations we have 
sketched on agency procedure. If a court needs more information 
before it can determine confidently the federalism or other interests 
at stake in a given policy, the court may need to allow the policy to go 
forward to observe what transpires. If there is flexibility in the 
decision to uphold an agency’s action, as we think there must be, the 
court (at the invitation of a litigant) can always revisit its earlier 
decision should events show that the experiment has harmed either 
abstract or economic federalism. Additionally, as we have noted for 
factor two, thorough agency proceedings often produce information 
that would improve the quality of the court’s decision even before a 
policy is implemented.289 For questions that would predictably require 
such information, the court would have to provide some incentive to 
the agency to develop it. Thus, at least initially, courts would likely 
want to offer more deference to enactments whose federalism effects 
are uncertain. 
The last factor that should weigh in favor of agency action is 
evidence of congressional authorization. For one thing, congressional 
approval would indicate that proponents have paid some of the costs 
of overcoming the needed level of constitutional resistance. For 
another, to the extent we are mistaken here about the appeal of 
agency deliberation relative to that of Congress, deliberation in both 
branches greatly mitigates our errors.290 And if both Congress and the 
executive are aligned, the political costs to the court of resisting is 
higher. 
On the other side, there are several factors that would indicate 
that a court should be more dubious of agency action. One set of 
considerations arises from the arguments we have set out concerning 
the need for exclusive judicial control over the Constitution. The case 
 
 288. See Galle, supra note 253, at 187 (identifying mechanisms, such as expanded availability 
of private suits and higher penalties for error, that might enhance private reliance on agency 
outcomes); Thomas O. McGarity, supra note 191, at 1387–436 (cataloging judicial review 
techniques that tend to slow rate of change of agency rules). 
 289. See supra note 236 and accompanying text. 
 290. Merrill, supra note 6 (manuscript at 50–51). 
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for a formalist divide between constitutional and statutory 
interpretation seems strongest on matters of bedrock importance, 
particularly when there are conflicts between bedrock values or 
divisive social conflicts that would benefit from settlement. For 
example, Rust v. Sullivan291 for us represents a classic case in which it 
made sense for the Court to reserve meaningful interpretive power to 
itself; therefore it was a situation in which it may have been 
appropriate to prohibit the agency from approaching constitutional 
boundaries.292 Whether these kinds of considerations are ever at play 
in federalism cases is an open question. Arguably, though, these 
arguments may have played some role in decisions such as Gonzales 
v. Oregon,293 the physician-assisted suicide case.294 
A final factor, and another one that might cut against agency 
determinations, is the presence of political externalities. That is, when 
it appears that an agency is not bearing a significant part of the 
political cost of its decisions, a court might suspect that the decision 
does not represent good policy. As one of us has detailed elsewhere, 
this may drive the Supreme Court’s apparent hostility to private 
rights of action.295 Congress, or at times agencies, authorizes judicial 
resolution of disputes, sometimes with the effect of shifting the 
political cost of that resolution to the courts. In resisting private rights 
of action, the Court may be demanding that the political branches 
accept full responsibility for the rules they make. Similarly, scholars 
have read the Court’s anticommandeering and sovereign immunity 
jurisprudence as a prohibition on externalities: the federal 
government must bear the costs of implementing and enforcing its 
own laws.296 We play out some examples of how this might work in 
practice in the next Part. 
 
 291. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
 292. Rust dealt with Health and Human Services regulations barring physician recipients of 
federal funds from offering abortion counseling services. Id. at 178–81. 
 293. Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006). 
 294. Id. at 923 (stating that the Court would yield no deference to agency interpretation that 
“displaces the States’ general regulation of medical practice”); see also Gersen, supra note 134, 
at 244 (claiming that Oregon involved the application of the clear statement rule to trump 
deference to the agency); Metzger, supra note 63, at 2034–38 (explaining that Oregon is difficult 
to justify on the ground of administrative law alone). 
 295. Brian Galle, Getting Spending: How to Replace Clear Statement Rules with Clear 
Thinking About Conditional Grants of Federal Funds, 37 CONN. L. REV. 155, 222–27 (2004). 
 296. E.g., H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., The Quixotic Search for a Judicially Enforceable 
Federalism, 83 MINN. L. REV. 849, 876 (1999); Post & Siegel, supra note 262, at 512; see also D. 
Bruce La Pierre, Political Accountability in the National Political Process—The Alternative to 
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In addition to all of these factors, courts have some other tools 
they can use to modulate the appropriate amount of resistance they 
offer against federal expansions. For example, the Supreme Court 
could change the degree of clarity in the underlying statute that is 
needed to meet the congressional clear statement requirement.297 For 
maximal resistance, the Court might demand that Congress authorize 
any expansion with a tremendous amount of specificity. For instance, 
in the § 1983 context, the Supreme Court has taken to claiming that 
private litigants must point to statutory language expressly granting 
the class to which they belong an entitlement to private relief for the 
exact right they seek to enforce before suit can be said to have been 
“authorized by the . . . laws of the United States.”298 A lower tier of 
resistance might find clear language in a generic provision stating that 
an agency is authorized to regulate in an area with the potential for 
displacement of state law. Somewhere in the middle would be statutes 
permitting the agency to preempt state law when it deems preemption 
appropriate. 
We do not suggest that integrating all of these considerations 
would be uniformly simple or predictable. Again, however, in a 
regime in which agencies perceive significant benefits from careful 
deliberation and in which courts are willing to grant deference to 
create incentive to deliberate, a great number of these kinds of 
federalism decisions would be fairly straightforward once or if they 
reach the courts. 
One final word about state courts: the bulk of the literature to 
date has focused on preemption and avoidance decisions in federal 
court. As Professor Sharkey has pointed out, though, a significant 
number of preemption decisions happen in state court under the 
rubric of state court application of federal Supremacy Clause 
doctrine.299 She notes that states are more hostile to preemption than 
their federal counterparts.300 This perhaps is unsurprising if one 
 
Judicial Review of Federalism Issues, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 577, 664 (1985) (arguing that a 
requirement that Congress pay for the cost of federal expansions is a significant limit on federal 
power). 
 297. See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. 
L. REV. 2085, 2122–23 (2002) (explaining that the Court demands several different tiers of 
“clarity” to satisfy various presumptions against legislative outcomes). 
 298. 48 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000); City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 125 S. Ct. 1453, 1458 
(2005). 
 299. Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism in Action: FDA Regulatory Preemption in 
Pharmaceutical Cases in State Versus Federal Courts, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 1013, 1014 (2007). 
 300. See id. at 1017–18, 1030, 1035–36. 
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expects state judges to engage in empire building or to prefer to be 
able to apply the law that their constituents enacted rather than 
federal law.301 Another explanation more generous to state judges 
might posit that state courts are, maybe rightfully, suspicious of the 
judgments of federal agencies whose behavior they know little about 
and have little influence over. Our account here suggests a close 
relationship between the ability of a federal court to review and 
incentivize agency decisions and that court’s confidence in deferring 
to the agency’s outcomes. 
Paradoxically, then, it may be that the best way to increase the 
influence of federal law in state courts is to give state courts more 
control over federal agencies. If our analysis were made a question 
not merely of administrative law but also of Supremacy Clause 
doctrine, then state courts would be authorized to invoke it when 
determining whether state law, such as state tort or contract law, is 
preempted by federal regulation. That would give agencies reason to 
give heed to the views of state judges. And that, in turn, would give 
state judges some reason to give heed to the view of federal agencies. 
There are downsides to such an arrangement, but we offer it as a 
policy possibility that deserves more study. 
IV.  SOME APPLICATIONS: PREEMPTION AND AVOIDANCE 
Our call for a more flexible approach to agency participation in 
federalism issues that arise within their regulatory ambit provides a 
coherent framework for structuring the resolution of regulatory 
federalism issues. In particular, it leads to concrete suggestions about 
the role courts should allow agencies to play in two contentious areas 
of regulatory federalism: preemption and resolution of federalism-
related constitutional matters. 
 
 301. See Sharkey, supra note 299, at 1030 (arguing that state judges “as creatures of state 
law,” are predisposed toward state law). But see Bradley W. Joondeph, Exploring the “Myth of 
Parity” in State Taxation: State Court Decisions Interpreting Public Law 86-272, 13 WASH. U. 
J.L. & POL’Y 205, 217–18, 225–26 (2003) (summarizing studies finding no support for claim that 
state courts favor their own litigants). 
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A. Agency Preemption of State Law 
Agency preemption302 of state law raises three related but 
nonetheless distinct questions: first, whether Congress should have 
authority to delegate preemption of state law to administrative 
agencies; second, assuming Congress can delegate such authority to 
preempt state law, when should a statute to be read to provide an 
agency with that authority; third, assuming that a statute does 
authorize the agency to preempt state law, when is an agency justified 
in using that authority. 
1. Congressional Power to Delegate Authority to Preempt State 
Law.  Although no commentators have directly proposed that the 
Constitution limits Congress’s power to delegate authority to preempt 
state regulation, commentators who would require Congress to use 
clear language when statutorily preempting state authority to regulate 
implicitly suggest such a restriction. Both Professors Young and Hills 
propose such a clear statement rule for preemption for the purpose of 
improving the legislative process, essentially forcing the legislature to 
squarely face issues of preemption.303 One might reasonably infer 
from these arguments that Congress should not be able to avoid its 
obligation to decide preemption issues by passing the buck to 
administrative agencies either. 
The arguments of these proponents of clear statement rules, 
however, do not convince us that delegating to agencies poses a 
significant problem. Professor Hills, for example, premises his 
proposal on the reasonable assumption that industry groups influence 
Congress to preempt too often because these groups have 
organizational advantages over groups that tend to oppose uniform 
national standards.304 He recognizes that states are subject to their 
 
 302. In this Section, we use the term “preemption” to mean displacement of state authority 
to regulate in an area in which it would otherwise be able to do so. Thus, we use the term to 
include more than merely requiring state regulations not to conflict with legitimately issued 
federal statutes and regulations. For a more detailed discussion, see Mendelson, supra note 4, at 
700–01. We think that an agency’s authority to prohibit states from adopting laws inconsistent 
with federal regulations follows directly from the Supremacy Clause and recognition that 
Congress can give agencies the power to adopt legally binding rules. 
 303. Hills, supra note 28, at 17, 32–39; Ernest A. Young, Federal Preemption and State 
Autonomy, in FEDERAL PREEMPTION: STATES’ POWERS, NATIONAL INTERESTS 249, 250 
(Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2007); see also Bradford R. Clark, Separation of 
Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1425 (2001) (viewing clear 
statement requirement as “ensur[ing] compliance with federal lawmaking procedures”). 
 304. Hills, supra note 28, at 17. 
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own biases in the opposite direction in that they adopt inefficient 
provincial laws to export regulatory costs.305 But he argues that the 
burden should be on industry to overcome congressional inertia if it 
desires preemption.306 Our arguments about the benefits of agency 
action, however, suggest that the nation can have its cake and eat it 
too by using agencies to determine when federal law should displace 
state law. 
First, for the reasons we have set out, agencies’ decisions about 
whether to preempt are likely superior to Congress’s.307 Moreover, if 
the presumption is that agency regulation does not displace state 
regulation unless the agency clearly indicates its intent to do so in a 
proceeding that is open and invites participation by those affected by 
the agency action, then agencies too can motivate diffuse interest 
groups to mobilize in opposition to preemption. Our analysis 
suggests, in fact, that the costs of meaningfully participating in agency 
proceedings are lower for diffuse interest groups. That fact suggests 
that these groups’ influence on the outcomes of agency proceedings 
vis-à-vis their industry counterparts is likely greater than their 
influence would be in the federal legislative process.308 If our analysis 
is correct, so long as courts require agencies clearly and transparently 
to state when their regulations displace state law, delegating 
responsibility for preemption to agencies reduces the costs of federal 
inertia, minimizes inefficient state regulation, and is likely to lead to 
outcomes that more optimally balance federalism interests against the 
need for efficacious regulatory programs. 
 
 305. Id. at 24 
 306. Id. at 18–19. Professor Hills argues that allowing states to regulate as the default rule 
under legislation that does not clearly preempt regulation is more likely to induce Congress to 
act, which in turn will motivate diffuse interest groups to react, propelling the entire system 
closer to efficient and politically desired outcomes. Id.; see also Scott Baker & Kimberly D. 
Krawiec, The Penalty Default Canon, 72 GEO. WASH. L REV. 663, 664 (2004) (suggesting an 
approach to interpretation in which courts stimulate Congress to fill in statutes with incomplete 
terms). But see Seidenfeld, supra note 121, at 733–34 (doubting whether Congress would 
respond and actually undo the penalizing interpretation). 
 307. Decisions whether to preempt depend on detailed factual matters and predictions that 
agencies are well suited to address. See supra text accompanying notes 72–215; see also William 
W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1606–11 (2007) (detailing the richness of the information about regulatory 
cost and risks posed by regulated behavior that should factor into the decision whether to 
preempt state law). 
 308. See supra notes 79–81 and accompanying text. 
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2. Agency Authority to Preempt.  At first blush, our position 
with respect to agency authority to displace state law also seems in 
tension with the general clear statement rule requiring Congress to 
express itself unmistakably when it wishes to displace state law. If 
Congress must act with openness and clarity in preempting, it 
arguably also is obliged to speak clearly and openly when it delegates 
that authority. But our position is quite consistent with underlying 
profederalism rationales for a clear statement rule and follows from 
our conclusions about the relative abilities of Congress, courts, and 
agencies both to address federalism issues and to force coordinate 
institutions of government to address them meaningfully. 
Agencies can legitimately make preemption determinations 
because agencies are both deliberative and politically accountable. 
Our analysis suggests that, in most instances, agencies should be the 
institution that in the first instance decides whether to displace state 
law because their processes are more deliberative and more 
responsive to changes in both political preferences and endogenous 
circumstances, such as the state of technology, that influence the 
appropriate balance between federalism interests and interests in 
efficient regulation. In addition, having agencies make the initial 
decision on preemption involves the other branches of government in 
the dialogue about federalism values in a fact- and law-specific 
context through congressional oversight and judicial review. 
Consider a likely scenario in which Congress passes a statute 
authorizing agency action that, when passed, does not seem to require 
displacement of state law. Hence, the statute is silent about agency 
authority to order such displacement.309 Several years later, as the 
agency learns more concretely the issues raised by the regulatory 
program, the agency comes to believe that there are net benefits to 
displacement. If courts would not allow the agency to preempt 
without a clear statement, then the ball is in Congress’s court to 
amend the statute. But given the inertia involved in Congress’s law 
making process, it is unlikely that Congress will return the volley. 
 
 309. Professor Mendelson advocates reading such silence as a failure to authorize an agency 
to preempt, because “Congress drafts legislation against the backdrop of the presumption 
against preemption, which has been a well-established canon of construction . . . .” Mendelson, 
supra note 4, at 709. But existing doctrine is at best ambiguous as to whether agencies can 
preempt with a clear statement of their own, regardless of congressional authorization. See 
supra note 45 and accompanying text. So there is no clear background rule against which to read 
Congress’ intent. And any assumption on this front would not settle the normative debate over 
what the best background rule ought to be. 
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If instead courts allowed agencies to preempt when statutes did 
not explicitly deny agencies that authority, the agency would be free 
to consider and change the extent of preemption as the regulatory 
situation warranted. Congress would remain a player in shaping the 
ultimate rule, by monitoring and constraining agencies on issues that 
legislators find sufficiently important. Monitoring involves fewer veto 
gates, so congressional inertia is less of an impediment to oversight 
than to statutory enactment.310 And courts can demand that agencies 
take into account the programmatic values of federalism and explain 
why uniformity in the particular preemptive context is more 
important than the values of experimentation and diversification. 
One might object that once an agency decides to preempt, it is 
unlikely to reconsider that determination with an open mind if new 
circumstances or arguments come to light subsequent to the agency’s 
initial decision. In essence, this objection reflects the concern that 
even if an agency decision to preempt is warranted at any given time, 
the agency has no incentive to revisit the issue later if circumstances 
change so as to warrant revising the preemptive effect of federal 
regulations.311 
But this objection fails to consider the ways in which preemptive 
rules are enforced. Often the issue of enforcement of a preemption 
provision arises in a proceeding alleging that an entity has violated 
some state regulation or transgressed some duty leading to liability 
under state law. Such claims, however, are addressed primarily in 
state court,312 and state judges seem to apply federal preemption 
clauses narrowly.313 Hence it is quite likely that if changes in 
 
 310. Congress can check agency action by oversight hearings and budget cuts, which do not 
have to pass through the same veto gates as substantive legislation. See supra note 145 and 
accompanying text. 
 311. Cf. Freeman, supra note 283, at 13–14 (arguing that agencies may resist changes to their 
institutional purpose); Stern, supra note 99, at 621 (applying cognitive dissonance theory to 
explain why agencies might unreasonably resist changing rules even once the rules are simply 
proposed). 
 312. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987) (noting that federal 
preemption is a federal defense and does not provide federal district courts jurisdiction to try 
state law claims); see also, e.g., Ramanathan v. Bank of Am., 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 471, 472 (Ct. App. 
2007) (considering a bank’s defense of federal preemption against a state employment 
discrimination suit); City of Chicago v. Comcast Cable Holdings, L.L.C., 872 N.E.2d 368, 380 
(Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (holding that a city’s suit for franchise fees from a cable company was not 
preempted by federal communications law). 
 313. See Sharkey, supra note 299, at 1017 (reporting one study which concluded that 
“‘federal courts are considerably more likely to find preemption than are state courts’” (quoting 
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circumstances give the states new reasons to regulate, state courts 
would credit those reasons and apply the preemption clauses 
restrictively. If a state court does so, and the Supreme Court does not 
reverse its application of the preemption clause, then effectively the 
state court has forced the agency to reconsider its displacement of 
state law.314 In this way states are themselves guardians against 
administrative inertia. Lastly, if responsiveness to change is an 
important concern, then this factor should favor agencies because 
they are more responsive to change than any of the alternatives.315 In 
short, allowing agencies to address preemption would be more 
conducive to an ongoing dialogue about the propriety of any 
regulatory preemption that involves all the branches of the federal 
government and, most likely, state regulators and courts as well. 
3. Particular Agency Decisions to Displace State Law.  Our 
position regarding how agencies can displace state law reflects our 
determination that agencies can be more transparent, deliberative 
and accountable to the polity at any given time than courts and 
Congress, but only under certain circumstances. Transparency 
depends on the agency allowing the public to know in advance that 
the agency is planning to act on an issue with federalism implications. 
This suggests that the agency should displace state law only by clearly 
stated legislative rules, which by current Executive Order the agency 
must include in its regulatory plan.316 Deliberation depends on interest 
group access to the agency decisionmaking process, which also 
 
Keith N. Hylton, Preemption and Products Liability: A Positive Theory 20 (Aug. 2006) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=422661)). 
 314. See Todd E. Pettys, State Habeas Relief for Federal Extrajudicial Detainees, 92 MINN. L. 
REV. 265, 298 (2007) (“When state courts do go astray and interpret federal law 
inappropriately, the ordinary remedy is the same remedy that applies when the lower federal 
courts go astray: the Supreme Court can take the case on direct review and correct the error.”). 
Thus, an agency cannot limit a state court ruling on the extent of the preemptive force of its 
regulations except by making the scope of preemption sufficiently clear and the issue of 
preemption sufficiently salient that the Supreme Court might, in a subsequent case, overrule an 
inhospitable state court decision. 
 315. One could respond to this point by advocating resisting all preemptions, including those 
by agencies, because any initial preemption decision may be hard to change over time. But that 
presumes that the costs of false positives exceed those of false negatives—that it is better to 
avoid an incorrect preemption than to permit an incorrect preemption. As we have argued, that 
is not necessarily the case. See supra note 252 and accompanying text. 
 316. Thus, we would reject Justice Breyer’s suggestion that less formal agency mechanisms 
might also have preemptive effect. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 506 (1996) 
(Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
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suggests that displacement of state law should occur only by 
legislative rule or its equivalent. 
Deliberation also requires judicial oversight of the agency 
decision to ensure that the agency meaningfully considered the 
information provided and position taken by representatives of each 
group affected by the decision. This suggests that courts should 
review particular decisions displacing state law using hard look 
review. Although the benefits of hard look review are debatable, it 
can induce agencies to address such crucial issues as the impact of 
subjecting regulated entities to fifty different state standards, the 
efficacy of the agency’s particular regulatory approach, the 
predictability of the continued efficiency of that approach, and the 
fluidity of regulatory circumstances and the concomitant need for a 
flexible regulatory system that allows for regulatory 
experimentation.317 And particular inquiries aside, such review has 
seemed to encourage agencies to include in their decisionmaking 
processes members of different professions who are likely to 
entertain different perspectives about the various regulatory goals 
that are affected by the agency decision under review.318 Also, hard 
look review, buttressed by political oversight, seems to be well 
structured to induce the agency to take greater care in making the 
judgments about political preferences that would undergird any 
analysis of a decision to displace state law.319 
One possible objection to our optimism that oversight and 
procedural structure can adequately constrain agencies from simply 
trampling federalism values is the assertion that judicial oversight 
requires an enumeration of the relevant factors and how they fit 
together to make review a meaningful constraint on agency 
preemption. In particular, it may be difficult for courts to police 
agency balancing between relatively incommensurable values, such as 
abstract federalism and more concrete cost savings.320 
 
 317. Under the hard look test, any factor is potentially relevant; agencies must address those 
factors that the reviewing courts consider sufficiently important. Seidenfeld, Demystifying 
Deossification, supra note 117, at 496–97. 
 318. Id. at 510. 
 319. See Seidenfeld, Hard Look Review, supra note 117, at 562 (suggesting that institutional 
checks, including hard look review, “help ensure . . . that agencies . . . implement some 
commonly accepted view of the public good”); see also Seidenfeld, supra note 101, at 491 
(noting that hard look review forces an agency to publicly state its reasons for a decision, which 
facilitates interest group monitoring and political oversight of such decisions). 
 320. See Mendelson, supra note 29, at 794 (claiming that courts cannot adequately consider 
values, like federalism, that are not explicitly connected to the agency decision by statute); see 
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We agree that the trade-offs involving abstract federalism 
concerns do raise issues about incommensurable values that might 
not be constrained by hard look review. Even if direct review is 
difficult, agencies still would be unlikely to make decisions that are 
extremely biased by their failure to account for such values. First, the 
procedural protections we have suggested would limit agency 
discretion to compromise abstract federalism issues. Second, hard 
look review at least would force the agency to identify the precise 
trade-off it makes between program efficacy and the maintenance of 
state sovereign capacity that is implicated by the agency displacement 
decision. Although courts could not directly react to a balance by the 
agency of these two factors that the court thinks is wrong, the political 
process, motivated by the saliency of decisions that are subject to 
hard look review, could.321 Hence, once the agency, facing potentially 
hard look review, reveals what it has done, political reaction would 
constrain the extent to which agencies can downplay abstract 
federalism values. In short, so long as agencies ordered displacement 
of state law by clear language in legislative rulemaking subject to hard 
look review, they would be unlikely to give such short credence to 
abstract federalism values as to outweigh the benefits that would 
accrue from more accurate and deliberative agency resolution of the 
displacement issue. 
Other commentators have asserted that courts cannot easily 
review agency determinations about federalism values at all.322 We 
think that the objection to hard look review is incorrect in its 
apparent assertion that programmatic federalism values are 
independent and incommensurate with other regulatory values. Every 
regulatory regime necessarily balances achievement of regulatory 
goals against the costs of achieving them.323 Hence, whenever an 
agency decides on the extent to which it will regulate a matter and the 
means that it will choose to do so, it must identify at least implicitly 
 
also McGinnis, supra note 55, at 934 (arguing that hard look doctrine may give courts too much 
discretion in their review of agency decisions). 
 321. By some accounts, judicial review of the National Highway and Transportation Safety 
Administration’s automobile safety standards program in the early 1970s motivated the political 
reaction to the program that essentially killed it several years year later. See Seidenfeld, supra 
note 182 (manuscript at 50). 
 322. See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 29, at 794. 
 323. Decisions regarding trade-offs between devoting resources to one program or another 
necessarily involve cost considerations, whether explicitly or not. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The 
Appropriate Role of Costs in Environmental Regulation, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1237, 1255 (2002). 
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the costs that decision will impose on society.324 Programmatic 
concerns, however, merely lead an agency to use different means to 
achieve stated regulatory goals. Uniformity often reduces industry 
cost, albeit at the potential expense of statutorily stated regulatory 
goals.325 Regulatory experimentation may provide a means of 
reducing long-run costs of regulation, especially if the current 
regulatory scheme is both relatively ineffective and the current 
regulatory environment highly volatile.326 In short, programmatic 
federalism concerns do not pose any different issues for agencies and 
reviewing courts than other decisions about regulatory means. 
The controversy over the Department of Homeland Security’s 
displacement of state law in its regulation of chemical plant security 
provides a good example to illustrate how agency preemption might 
play out under our framework.327 The department proposed that its 
rules have preemptive effect despite the silence of authorizing 
legislation on the preemption question. In its Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, the agency proposed that its regulations would preempt 
all conflicting state law, including common law suits.328 It went on to 
note that its regulations reflected a balance between assuring security 
and “preserv[ing] chemical facilities’ flexibility to choose security 
measures to reach the appropriate security outcome.”329 The NOPR 
 
 324. Even under environmental statutes that preclude an agency from factoring regulatory 
costs into its decisions, agencies necessarily consider such costs, even if indirectly. Otherwise, 
until the nation lowered its pollution to a level that the agency could determine definitively did 
not pose any risk to human health, it would have to spend all of society’s resources on cleaning 
up pollution. This is not where the EPA draws the regulatory line: 
It is hard to imagine any explanation for the EPA’s choice of any particular standard 
that can provide a rational basis for choosing one standard over any lower alternative 
if the substance at issue is characterized by the absence of a zero-effect threshold and 
a linear dose-response curve, and if the EPA is not allowed to consider costs in any 
way. 
Id. at 1259. 
 325. See Hills, supra note 28, at 19–20 (discussing the industry’s general preference for 
uniform regulation). 
 326. See Friedman, supra note 223, at 399–400 (describing regulatory experimentation as 
more like evolution). 
 327. Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards, 72 Fed. Reg. 17,688 (Apr. 9, 2007) (to be 
codified at 6 C.F.R. pt. 27). For a description of the controversy, see Buzbee, supra note 307, at 
1573–75 & n.90; Leticia M. Diaz, Chemical Homeland Security, Fact or Fiction: Is the U.S. Ready 
for an Attack on Our Chemical Facilities? An Examination of State and Federal Laws Aimed at 
Immediate Remediation, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 1171, 1187–89 (2007). 
 328. Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards, 71 Fed. Reg. 78,276, 78,293 (proposed 
Dec. 28, 2006) (to be codified at 6 C.F.R. pt. 27). 
 329. Id. 
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suggested that state laws requiring greater levels of security, and 
perhaps even state health, safety, and environmental regulations that 
might affect security, would upset this balance and therefore were 
preempted.330 The press reported on this proposed rule quite 
negatively, noting that the proposed rules were weak and would 
override state regulations that require greater security measures than 
those which the department mandated.331 
In its explanation of the interim final rule it adopted, the 
department responded to these press reports and potential 
congressional concern about the preemption provisions by conceding 
that its language about the need to maintain a balance in its 
discussion of preemption was too broad.332 It indicated that its rules 
would mandate conflict, not field, preemption.333 It took a broad view 
of conflict preemption, however, indicating that its discussion of 
preemption “is only meant to indicate that the regulation is not to be 
conflicted by, interfered with, hindered by or frustrated by State 
measures, under long-standing legal principles.”334 It explicitly stated 
that general health and safety regulation by states would not be 
precluded, but that regulations and laws aimed specifically at the 
security of chemical facilities was more likely to be preempted.335 
It warrants noting that the department’s explicit proposal of 
preemption in its NOPR generated public awareness and public 
dialogue on this issue.336 Thus, the department reacted to this dialogue 
by at least purporting to scale back and make less definitive the 
extent of preemption.337 Congress then entered the fray by amending 
the authority of the department, limiting preemption of state laws to 
those that are in “actual conflict” with the department’s chemical 
 
 330. Id. 
 331. See, e.g., Editorial, Chemical Insecurity, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2007, at A18. 
 332. Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards, 72 Fed. Reg. at 17,727. 
 333. Id. at 17,726. Under field preemption, states are not allowed to regulate the domain 
which federal regulation occupies because federal regulation is meant to be the exclusive 
regulation for that domain. Paul S. Weiland, Federal and State Preemption of Environmental 
Law: A Critical Analysis, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 237, 253–55 (2000). Under conflict 
preemption, states may regulate the domain as long as state regulation does not conflict with 
federal regulation. Id. at 255. 
 334. Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards, 72 Fed. Reg. at 17,727. 
 335. Id. 
 336. Id. at 17,717. 
 337. Id. at 17,727. 
01__GALLE_SEIDENFELD.DOC 7/31/2008  9:55:16 AM 
2016 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 57:1933 
plant security regulations.338 This demonstrates that agency 
preemption in the face of congressional silence is capable of 
generating the public dialogue called for by many critics of agency 
preemption. 
Under the framework we envision, even without congressional 
intervention, the department’s explanation of its decision to preempt 
would fall far short of what hard look review requires. Again, our test 
would proceed in several steps. We would ask, first, whether an 
agency has adequately deliberated, in a transparent and relatively 
accountable way, the important federalism issues at stake. Although 
we urge lowered resistance to agency preemption, we do so only on 
the condition that there is exacting deliberation. We then would 
examine the extent to which underlying federalism concerns warrant 
higher or lower resistance. 
The chemical plant regulations would fail at the first step of our 
test. In light of the likely severe implications of a terrorist attack on a 
chemical facility, the need for minimum security measures is 
undeniable. But it is unclear why the balance between security and 
flexibility must be fixed once and for all, and for the whole nation, at 
this time. Under the hard look doctrine, the department therefore 
should have to predict the likely impact of regulations that may be 
more strict or inflexible than it considers optimal and to support that 
prediction with some credible evidence. In addition, given the then-
nascent state of understanding about security measures and their 
potential effects on plant productivity, as well as the possibility that 
the industry involves different types of facilities, the department 
would have to explain why it would be inappropriate to allow the 
states to function as laboratories to test different approaches to 
security. To the extent that the designs of facilities change relatively 
rapidly, the agency should also have to explain why it is best to 
cement the single balance between security and productivity that its 
rules instate.339 We do not know whether the agency could meet such 
a burden given the nature of the chemical industry, but an inability to 
do so would be a strong indication to the public and the courts that 
the agency’s preemption prescription is not justified.340 
 
 338. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, § 534, 121 Stat. 1844, 
2075 (to be codified at 6 U.S.C. § 121 note) (amending Section 550 of the Department of 
Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2007, 6 U.S.C. § 121 note (2006) (Regulations)). 
 339. See Buzbee, supra note 307, at 1606. 
 340. Similarly, a court applying our test would refuse to grant preemptive effect to a 
regulation where the agency expressly claimed during notice and comment that the regulation 
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Assuming that there were more adequate deliberations, the 
department regulation would also have posed problems at the latter 
steps of our test. First, there was no evident support in the original 
statute for preemption.341 Second, it is hard to characterize state 
regulation here as an attempt to externalize costs from the state to the 
nation as a whole, a characterization that would support preemption. 
The benefit of increased security would fall on local communities, 
which would be less at risk of the escape of toxic chemicals, whereas 
the increased costs would be borne by consumers of the plants’ 
products. But this characterization is far from convincing given that 
the state and local community also bear costs from resulting decreases 
in employment and economic activity if the plant moves out of state 
or curtails its production, and some forms of terrorist sabotage might 
affect consumers. 
One point that might have supported preemption is that the 
nebulous nature of the regulation’s stated scope would open an 
avenue for state court input into a dialogue on whether any particular 
state regulation or common law duty was displaced.342 In our 
framework, that might be a reason to think that the underlying 
federalism norm was in need of somewhat less protection, as with our 
example of State Implementation Plans. 
Overall, it is unclear whether a reviewing court should have 
deemed department preemption warranted under the latter part of 
our test, although most of the signs seem to point against preemption. 
 
would not preempt state law, as in the Food and Drug Administration example Mendelson 
notes. Mendelson, supra note 4, at 704. In that situation, there was no transparent, deliberative 
consideration of the preemption question. 
 341. See 6 U.S.C. § 121 (note). 
 342. The explanation of the interim final rule rather vaguely preempts state laws that 
frustrate or hinder the department’s regulations. Had Congress not precluded regulatory 
preemption, it would have fallen on state courts to determine whether any particular state 
regulation or tort duty interfered with or hampered the department’s administration of its 
regulations. See Merrill, supra note 6 (manuscript at 47). The state court would make its 
decision in the fact-specific context of a particular facility. If the department did not like the 
ultimate outcome of the state court proceeding, it would retain the option of revising its 
regulation to clarify its position using notice-and-comment proceedings. In this way, the 
determination of whether preemption would have covered the precise state law could have 
generated a renewed dialogue that would necessarily reflect the views of the state (at least as 
reflected in its own court’s decision) as well as the views of the agency and the affected interest 
groups, public and private. In many cases that would be a perfectly valid avenue, in our view, for 
state participation. This route is of little avail, however, if most litigation proceeds in federal 
court. 
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We note that the task would be easier if the agency had engaged in a 
deliberation about federalism values. 
B. Constitutional Avoidance 
We next apply our analysis to the debate over constitutional 
avoidance. More precisely, we unpack the question whether Congress 
should be presumed not to have delegated to agencies the authority 
to approach the limits of Congress’s constitutional powers. 
Here, again, because our test is sensitive to the precise context in 
which federalism questions arise, we cannot say as a general rule that 
agencies should always be permitted to tread on policy ground when 
Congress’s own step would be dubious. We can say, though, that if 
federalism limits are to rest on realist grounds, the reverse is false. 
That is, agencies should at least sometimes be permitted to enact 
policy that would be constitutionally dubious, even absent clear 
congressional authorization.343 The absolute bar adopted by the 
Court, we have shown, cannot be defended on the basis of the real-
world characteristics of agencies.344 To justify this greater license, 
however, courts ought to hold agencies to a high standard of 
deliberativeness and transparency—one that can likely only be met 
through more formal rulemaking. 
Before we turn to applying these general rules to a specific 
example, though, we should note one additional objection that is 
somewhat unique to the avoidance question. In our arguments, we 
have focused on identifying the set of doctrines that would best 
effectuate the goals of federalism. For the most part these doctrines 
would have to be enacted by judges. What effect, if any, would our 
suggestions have on the task of judging? 
Even if it is true that rejecting the congressional clear statement 
rule is better for federalism, it may not be better for federal judges, 
who might prefer to economize on political capital. Conceivably, if 
that capital is spread too thinly, the thinning might diminish all kinds 
of federal rights, including federalism. The clear statement rule 
preserves judicial capital, this argument might go, for the traditional 
reasons Professor Bickel offered in favor of avoidance: because it 
reduces the occasions on which courts must issue an almost 
 
 343. That is, we argue that cases holding that any constitutional doubt invalidates an agency 
decision, no matter how clearly enacted by the agency, see supra note 44, are wrong. 
 344. See supra text accompanying notes 217–62. 
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irreversible constitutional ruling rather than a decision that keeps the 
political process in play.345 
But that considers only one side of the scales. The congressional 
clear statement rule obliges courts to strike down even those agency 
decisions that would ultimately survive constitutional scrutiny.346 By 
hypothesis, there are many more of those decisions than there are 
clear statements issued by Congress. And, if the resistance norm 
functions as it should, on many occasions the rule will never be 
reinstated by Congress. As Professor Frederick Schauer has pointed 
out, avoidance can thus be equally effective at closing off popular 
will.347 Even if the populace is less frustrated by (theoretically) 
defeasible quasi-constitutional avoidance decisions than by outright 
constitutional holdings, the numbers of avoidance decisions should be 
larger. 
In addition, some agency decisions that approach the borders of 
state autonomy may relieve other, larger political pressures on 
courts.348 For instance, agencies may at times themselves promote 
state respect for constitutional values, relieving some of the political 
“heat” from a court that would otherwise have been left alone to 
defend them. To take one example, the Department of Justice has 
issued elaborate regulations instructing state and local governments 
how best to accommodate the particular needs of individuals with 
disabilities, which greatly reduces the pressure on the Supreme Court 
to recognize a strong Fourteenth Amendment right to the same.349 
Thus, it is theoretically indeterminate whether avoidance on net 
economizes on political frustration with the judicial branch. We 
welcome suggestions as to how Professor Bickel’s theory could ever 
be subjected to empirical test. In the meanwhile, although we view 
this objection as a serious one, we largely set it aside in our analysis. 
 
 345. We think this is what Professor Sunstein means to say when he hails the “minimalism” 
of the rule against constitutionally dubious agency enactments. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 
supra note 4, at 335. 
 346. Kelley, supra note 60, at 868. 
 347. Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 74; see also Kelley, 
supra note 60, at 834, 847, 852–57 (criticizing the avoidance doctrine as a form of judicial 
lawmaking); Manning, supra note 37, at 255 (“[T]he avoidance canon may enshrine a result that 
could not have been adopted ex ante.”). 
 348. See Post & Siegel, supra note 262, at 516–17 (arguing that permitting constitutional 
interpretation outside the courts allows courts to share the burdens of defending and defining 
rights). 
 349. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 36.101–.608 (2007). 
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Turning, then, to some specifics, under our analysis the federal 
agency would have won in SWANCC and similar cases. Recall that 
the SWANCC Court invalidated an EPA regulation implementing the 
Clean Water Act, on the ground that the regulation’s effort to govern 
waters only “hydrologically” connected to the navigable waters of the 
United States raised a serious constitutional question.350 The mere fact 
that the regulation was constitutionally questionable ended the case; 
the Court presumed that Congress would not have delegated to EPA 
any authority to reach a constitutionally dubious outcome.351 
Our approach would reject that presumption and move on 
instead to ask whether there were any particular features of the 
regulation that would make it particularly deserving of resistance. We 
see no danger of political externalities. The issue of federal authority 
to regulate waters hydrologically connected to navigable waters is 
extremely unlikely to involve a general question of federal power 
under the Commerce Clause that might affect any agency other than 
the EPA. Nor do we perceive any conflict between federalism and 
other core rights that might best be reserved to judicial control. In 
addition, Congress defined navigable waters in the Clean Water Act 
to include all navigable waters within the nation as that term is 
constitutionally construed.352 By writing the statute with this language, 
it appears that Congress fully expected the EPA to regulate up to the 
limitation on navigable waters that the Supreme Court would 
ultimately adopt, and therefore that Congress intended to authorize 
the EPA to raise this constitutional question. Moreover, given 
Congress’s apparent determination to test constitutional limits, the 
Court is likely well served by the opportunity to benefit from the 
agency’s ongoing deliberation over and experience with expansive 
federal Clean Water Act authority.353 
 
 350. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County (SWANCC) v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 
U.S. 159, 174 (2001). 
 351. Id. 
 352. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 133 (1985) (citing S. 
REP. NO. 92-1236, at 144 (1972) (Conf. Rep.)). 
 353. We note some kinship between our method here and the approach that appears to have 
implicitly been adopted by the Second Circuit in Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 
444 (2007), cert. granted, 76 U.S.L.W. 3255 (U.S. Mar. 17, 2008), the “fleeting expletives” case. 
The court claimed that it applied ordinary administrative law principles to its review of the 
FCC’s decision to change its policy on isolated swear words on broadcast television. See id. at 
454–67. But it seems that the degree and kind of explanation the court expected was ratcheted 
up by the possibility that the FCC’s ruling might exceed federal authority—might violate the 
First Amendment. See id. 
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The result of this analysis is that the Court would then have been 
obliged to confront the constitutional question. If its conclusion at 
that stage was that the regulation was invalid, it would not have much 
opportunity to observe further agency deliberations, depending on 
prevailing ripeness doctrines.354 But the point is that, in the absence of 
our approach, the Court usually is obliged to approach the 
constitutional question without the benefit of any agency efforts at 
all. 
CONCLUSION 
We have argued that the realist view of federalism recognizes 
that the principle of limited federal power is an instrumental one. 
Courts should choose the set of rules, including rules of 
administrative law, that best achieve the ends sought by federalism. 
On this view, it appears that prevailing doctrine and defenders of it 
somewhat overstate the degree to which federalism norms need 
judicial protection against the conduct of federal agencies. On most 
measures, agencies are usually a better forum for resolving questions 
of the state-federal balance than Congress. Given the right 
combination of judicial rules, the quality of agency deliberation is 
superior, and more transparent and accountable to interested parties. 
Although the ease of enacting agency rules in theory threatens to 
make federal expansion too easy, in many cases it would be easy to 
balance this danger against the need for federal intervention. 
Thus, we disagree with those who have urged that agency 
authority either to preempt state law or to enact regulations at the 
edges of federal authority should be limited to instances in which 
there is a clear statutory mandate. We acknowledge that there are 
instances in which agency action needs close supervision, direct 
authorization, or both. But there also are a wide variety of agency 
decisions in which such tight reins cannot be justified on realist 
grounds. That leaves, at most, some form of formalist explanation for 
 
 354. That is, ripeness doctrine determines when an agency determination can be subjected 
to judicial review. If the law of ripeness is open to court challenges very early in the 
administrative process, courts have relatively little opportunity to observe the agency’s views. 
Similarly, if ripeness caselaw permits preenforcement challenges, then the court does not have 
the chance to see the real-world effects of the agency’s decision before it must evaluate it. 
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Agency Authority to Define the Scope of Private Rights of Action, 48 
ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 2 (1996). 
01__GALLE_SEIDENFELD.DOC 7/31/2008  9:55:16 AM 
2022 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 57:1933 
prevailing doctrinal limits on agency action—an explanation we have 
seen floated but never defended thoroughly in the existing literature. 
Although we have focused here on preemption and avoidance, 
the question of institutional competence is pervasive throughout 
nearly all important federalism controversies. Thus, as we suggested 
at the outset, our analysis could also be applied to the interpretation 
both of federal private rights of action and conditions on federal 
grants. In both instances, Supreme Court doctrine seems to demand a 
clear statement from Congress before imposing obligations against 
states, while leaving it highly doubtful whether agencies can be the 
source of that clear statement.355 Our theory suggests that, to the 
extent that the preference for Congress is grounded in realist terms, 
agencies should often be a perfectly acceptable source of clear 
authorization.356 
Ranging farther afield, our work here also could have 
implications for areas of federalism doctrine that do not presently 
touch on agencies at all. For example, a central conundrum of the 
Court’s dormant commerce clause jurisprudence has been its struggle 
to decide whether it can reach defensible answers on the balance 
between federal interests and state autonomy, or whether instead it 
ought to force Congress to act in its place.357 If we are right that 
agencies are often the best positioned of the three branches to make 
these kinds of decisions, then the critical—and so far neglected—
question the Court ought to face is how it can best promote some 
kind of executive role in reviewing state burdens on national and 
international trade. 
Relatedly, scholars have begun to consider whether Congress 
ought to have unlimited power to authorize state discrimination 
against interstate commerce or migration.358 We humbly suggest that 
our analysis here implies that Congress should be encouraged to 
share its deliberations with the executive. Just as agencies are 
 
 355. See supra text accompanying notes 46–47. 
 356. Cf. Sharkey, supra note 2, at 249–50 (suggesting that an analysis of preemption and 
private right of action questions should produce results more similar than those provided by 
existing doctrine). 
 357. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 610 (1997) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting); Redish & Nugent, supra note 251, at 591–95, 617; Edward A. Zelinsky, 
Restoring Politics to the Commerce Clause: The Case for Abandoning the Dormant Commerce 
Clause Prohibition on Discriminatory Taxation, 29 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 29, 29–32, 84–87 (2002). 
 358. E.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV, and Interstate Relations, 120 HARV. L. 
REV. 1468, 1470–78 (2007); Norman R. Williams, Why Congress May Not “Overrule” the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, 53 UCLA L. REV. 153, 155–59 (2005). 
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sometimes granted greater license when authorized by Congress, so 
too Congress might be granted greater freedom to reach federalism-
implicating outcomes when those outcomes are triggered by the sort 
of transparent, deliberative agency decision we describe here. 
 
